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Introduction

A

s migrants to the United States in the late eighteenth century,
Adam Donaldson and Benjamin Maingault had much in common:
both arrived in bondage. They both obtained freedom at the end of
their indentures. Both of them attempted to exercise rights of citizenship, but
found that either official or public hostility impeded their ability to do so:
Maingault, a man of color, found his right to vote challenged in a Philadelphia election in 1807, while Donaldson, a British subject, was required to register as an “alien enemy” with the federal government during the War of 1812,
and faced being ordered to move forty miles away from tidewater—an order
that applied to all British subjects engaged in commerce. Both men were able
to influence their application and recognition of their legal rights and their
treatment by the government. They differed, though, in how their rights were
threatened. Donaldson, a white man, lost his status during a period of temporary national crisis. For those Americans who saw Maingault as a danger,
however, the crisis was ongoing: they continually had to ensure white control
of public participation in American politics, and exclude dangerous racial others from the polity.1
The experiences of Donaldson and Maingault illustrate the way migrants affected the development of citizenship in the early American republic. Although
neither drafted legislation, they nonetheless engaged with the political process
at a time when citizenship and its rights were acquiring definition in law and
capturing the interest of the American public. Citizens began to acquire new
rights, and foreign migrants new penalties, but the extent to which different
citizens might be able to exercise rights was open to debate. Donaldson successfully lobbied for different treatment by mentioning his American-born
wife, despite a legal tradition of coverture that made his wife a British subject.
Maingault exercised the franchise and voted, a right increasingly associated
with citizenship, despite white hostility. Maingault pushed for his rights even
as white Americans sought to curtail them. Their actions, and those of other
foreign migrants, demonstrate how the development of a national citizenship
occurred during this early period, gaining form through definition against its
legal opposite, the alien.
1
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In this time, geopolitical lines and concepts were not firmly set; early
America was a vast, disparate place where identities and political relationships
remained in flux, and citizenship was in its own process of acquiring shape and
meaning.2 What citizenship meant to Americans and in the broader Atlantic
world was open to debate, and ideas and people from far-away places connected
and worked to mold new forms of citizenship, both as a legal category and as an
idea that circulated in public discourse. The relationship between citizens, their
communities, and the state was still uncertain: people residing in the United
States did not necessarily envision or seek the path to a nation-state where each
citizen had a direct relationship to the central government. Individuals could
be citizens of a town, a nation, or all the republics in the world. Additionally,
citizenship itself competed with legal personhood as the category from which
rights would derive from the state. Moreover, the development of citizenship
was a participatory process that was affected by everyone who attempted to define or exercise citizenship and legal rights. Some people, such as President John
Adams and Secretary of State Timothy Pickering, wielded considerable power in
the formation of citizenship but others, such as Benjamin Maingault, were still
able to affect the rights associated with citizenship. For those like Maingault,
however, it was no easy task.
Although national citizenship would be fully forged in the crucible of Civil
War and Reconstruction, it began to grow in importance in the decades immediately after US independence. This growth of national citizenship resulted
in a shifting of rights away from legal personhood, a change that came at the
expense of noncitizens with officially foreign allegiance residing in the US, be
they foreign migrants, former Loyalists, or American-born women married to
either: they all were legally designated as aliens. The extent to which a decentralized—but strong—state functioned in the years after US independence is
an important historical question. Although local governments exerted considerable power over their inhabitants, one of the important ways a strong state
emerged in these years was around the citizen/alien divide at the national level.
That process included not only policing the nation’s borders, both geographically and in the public sphere, but also the national government’s exercise of
its new powers, controlling and forcibly resettling noncitizen populations.
Noncitizen migrants began to experience increasing penalties as citizenship
during this period grew in meaning and power. Rather than accept their subordinate status, migrants pushed to secure what legal rights they could. In doing
so, they gave shape to the rights that became a part of citizenship as well as
those retained by legal personhood. From the initial drafting of laws to the
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enforcement of those laws in local communities, migrants pushed for their
rights and interests.3
During this early formative period after independence, citizenship rights were
forged from the creation of alien legal penalties such as compulsory registration,
deportation, and forced internal removal—the term “alien” has a history as well.
These new penalties resulted not only from the Federalist vision of a powerful
national government and the need to safeguard it against foreign infiltration
and corruption—Democratic-Republicans justified some of these penalties as
necessary during a state of national emergency. Other penalties reflected the
growing consensus among white Americans that people of other races should
be excluded from citizenship.4 Citizens retained privacy, freedom from banishment, and the right to stay in their places of residence, as well as a right to due
process. Powers of deportation and internal removal may seem “natural” powers
for an emerging modern state, but Federalists, concerned about the spread of
revolutionary violence in the Atlantic world, also sought to link the right of free
speech with citizen status as part of their desire to safeguard the public sphere
from alien participation. These new and national alien penalties were among the
first linkages that occurred between the nation-state and citizens. The strong
citizen-alien divide that emerged during the early American republic provided
a framework for the further development of citizenship as the font from which
rights would spring, rather than legal personhood.
In addition, migrants themselves participated in the shaping of citizenship: in
trying to develop a state that limited citizenship to men like themselves, American lawmakers, politicians, and judges ran into resistance. They had to contend
with alternative understandings put forth by migrants, as well as more practical
attempts to secure entry, residence, and life without government surveillance,
regulation, and harassment. Migrants lobbied Congress, successfully defeating
a proposed blanket ban on the entry of any French citizens to the United States.
Migrants resisted deportation, argued against internal removal, and provided
alternative definitions of who was a citizen and who was an alien. At times, especially when they were able to mobilize popular political ideologies in their
favor, they succeeded in changing enforcement policies. They explored different conceptions of citizenship: white political radicals advocated a transatlantic
revolutionary republicanism, and some people of color emphasized a possibility
of a more racially egalitarian citizenship. Migrants’ racial status upon entering
the United States, however, also determined what claims they could successfully
make and what strategies they chose to pursue in attempting to obtain citizenship rights. Migrants whom Americans were willing to accept as white could take
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many of the benefits of citizenship for granted, while migrants whose racial reception placed them outside the category of white people needed to work hard to
obtain what rights of citizenship they could. This is in contrast to a view that assumes that nativists successfully drafted, passed, adjudicated, and enforced their
laws without intervention, lobbying, influence, or resistance from the migrants
against whom these laws were directed. Such views miss the important role of migrants themselves in shaping the legal development of citizenship: change came
because of actions across a broad political, legal, and social spectrum, showing
that migrants’ effects on citizenship were not confined to a narrow area of working as close allies of the leaders of political parties, or as key swing voters in events
such as the election of 1800. Rather, all sorts of independent forms of organizing
to push for reform as well as daily interactions with American society helped to
create and change citizenship in the early American republic. 5
Furthermore, an examination of the role of foreign migrants in the building
and defining of citizenship in decades after US independence shows the rich varieties and understandings of citizenship that were possible and contested in the
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, in contrast to growing dominance
of a male democratic citizenship of the mid-nineteenth century. Some migrants
embraced a revolutionary citizenship that extended beyond national borders,
while others advocated for a citizenship that was closely tied to a more local elite
status. Still others used local citizenship in a longer early modern tradition of
crowd action, contrasting a citizenship of rights with a citizenship of practical
community mobilization and solidarity. Similarly, migrants’ advocacy for citizenship was often, but not always, grounded in liberalism: for women in particular,
Scottish Enlightenment understandings of citizenship were more useful for white
binational couples where American women married foreign men. These ways
that migrants imagined, used, and deployed citizenship differed from the ways
that other ordinary people in the United States theorized and made citizenship.
In particular, as the historian Martha S. Jones has shown, native-born African
Americans engaged in both an intra-community practice as the nineteenth century unfolded and a broader antebellum push for citizenship. This push was part
of the continuous (and at times, radical) transformation of citizenship during
the middle of the nineteenth century, as the country shifted toward a democratic
citizenship more closely tied to the nation-state, and as political conflicts over
race led to the military conflict of the Civil War, followed by Reconstruction.6
In contrast to the continuous struggle for African American citizenship in
the nineteenth century, the construction of the citizen/alien divide was a discontinuous one: migrants grappled with policy makers during periodic crises
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of ethnicity, particularly white ethnicity. The effect was similar to later crises
that limited liberal citizenship and excluded suspect migrant populations. In
the years after US independence, the Alien and Sedition Acts and the War of
1812 would result in attempts to temporarily strengthen the power of national
citizenship and penalize suspect noncitizens. In addition to these temporary
crises, migrants from outside of Europe had to navigate a society where race was
seen as continually in crisis by many white Americans. Migrants fought to secure
status through engagement not just with the courts, but with the federal executive branch as well. Their claims and assertions could blunt the force directed at
them, redirecting and reshaping power and citizenship, even when they seemed
to be in very marginalized positions.7
The discontinuous nature of the interplay between the nation-state, migration, and citizenship is in contrast to a view of migration and citizenship policies as a gradual American political development in the structure, functioning,
and power relations of the state. This discontinuous exertion of federal power
appeared despite a lack of executive bureaucratic capacity that forced officials to
improvise. To accomplish their aims, these officials relied on partisan allies outside the government to engage in surveillance, secured the cooperation of merchants to assist in “voluntary” expulsion of refugees, and worked in cooperation
with local officials such as county sheriffs to ensure enforcement of regulation
of migrants. Outside entities in the form of formally organized pressure groups
have played a significant role in the development of the state and its regulatory
apparatus, but informal organizing and individual actions have contributed to
the development of citizenship as well. Officials had to contend with crowds
attempting to enforce different ideas about citizenship, or contend with individuals asserting rights and status in a one-on-one setting.8

Background: Theories and Practices of Citizenship
Although migrants had many different ways of conceptualizing and asserting
citizenship, they had to confront ideologies that dominated popular and official
understandings of political culture in the United States. The American Revolution had transformed British colonists into American citizens, both through
a grueling, years-long war, and through a political reordering that emphasized
citizens’ rights to self-representation while also limiting access to full citizenship
for outsiders and subordinated groups. In the American Revolution, individuals’
own relationship to the sovereign state also changed: before the Revolution, all
colonists were the king’s subjects. During the Revolution, the inhabitants of
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the rebellious colonies were faced with a choice: did they remain loyal subjects,
or choose to become citizens? Political status and membership itself became a
mutable, changeable relationship. Citizenship also shifted away from a personal
relationship akin to the lord-vassal bond of protection and loyalty to an idea of
community membership in which the state granted rights to its citizens, and
perhaps others within its borders. Naturalization also reflected this view: did
people seeking to naturalize share the values of the community, and a commitment to republicanism? Citizenship could also be more exclusive than subjectship in other ways: enslaved people retained a political identity as subjects of the
monarch, although from a hostile white perspective in the new republic they
were (almost completely) socially dead and devoid of an official identity.9
Among the most dominant understandings of citizenship post-independence
was republicanism. Differences in republican citizenship were related to questions of race, gender, and socio-economic status. Americans associated citizenship with the economic independence of the head of a household. Other household members received their citizenship status from the head of household, who
was implicitly white and male. Americans often saw citizenship as part of the
political public sphere in contrast to the private household sphere: the head of
household represented himself and his dependents in the public sphere. Through
his citizenship, he (ideally) both forged the laws that formed the social contract,
and obeyed the sovereign state. Within his household, he was sovereign and held
authority over his wife, children, other dependents, servants, and slaves. The
members of his household had no independent political authority of their own:
they were represented in the public sphere by the head of the household. This
was the conception of citizenship that those facing exclusion had to engage with;
they could argue that they fit the criteria for citizenship, or they could seek to
change how citizenship functioned in the United States. This republican concept of citizenship was an ideal that encountered numerous practical difficulties,
and the idea of fitness for citizenship itself was subject to change.10
Although republicanism emphasized patriarchal control over women and
others in the household, and was seemingly validated by the law of coverture,
marriages—and therefore women’s citizenship—could be more complex in practice. Under coverture, a woman took her husband’s citizenship status; if he was a
citizen, so was she. If she married someone who was not an American, she took
her foreign husband’s citizen or subject status. Women held an independent
legal status only if they headed a household on their own, which was usually the
case only in widowhood, but during the War of 1812, British men emphasized
that their wives were “American.” Their seeming challenge to the tradition of
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coverture was possible because of a mix of understandings that allowed them
to make claims for different treatment without destabilizing American gender-based hierarchies. Migrant men used this apparent contradiction to emphasize their American-ness in several ways: they included ideas about women’s normative roles as transmitters of culture, (white) women’s responsibility to counsel
and instruct their husbands and sons on the duties of patriotic citizens, women’s
daily connections to their communities, and wives’ roles as deputy husbands,
standing in the husband’s place when he was unable to do so.11
Whereas men used their wives to advocate for citizenship, women seeking to
act as citizens on their own confronted growing postrevolutionary challenges
to women’s personal political activity. White women faced significant barriers
to political participation, and women of color even more so. Women of color
faced governments and publics much more hostile to their assertions of citizenship throughout the Americas, although the revolutions of the late 1700s would
offer windows of possibility. The tenuousness of citizenship for women of color
was consequently tied to their engagement with revolutionary governments and
their quests for documentation of free and therefore citizen status. For white
women, their citizenship was tied to the documents controlled and recorded by
white men, and coverture therefore served as a check on white women’s informal
exercise of authority and independence in daily matters.12
Although citizenship held an inclusive promise for members of the nation, citizenship could also be exclusionary. As the relationship between citizen and nation grew, outsiders felt their exclusion more keenly. Revolutionary
nation-states saw threats to their nascent government, and the emergence of the
American nation-state meant that when noncitizens appeared to be the embodiments of those threats, they could be subject to social exclusion, surveillance,
loss of political and economic rights, restrictions on freedom of movement, and
violence. People who were citizens or subjects of another sovereign state were
aliens, and possible agents of a foreign power. As such, they could be targets of
xenophobia, and new nation-states attempted to put greater restrictions upon
them, especially in time of war. Public panics and rumors could have still greater
negative effects: arrest, detention, expulsion, and/or execution. What the state
did not do could be accomplished by crowd action, which not only might receive
tacit approval from elite men, but crowds would sometimes be led by them. Race,
gender, and class status also served to divide the polity. In the United States, elite
white men defined who deserved full citizenship and rights: themselves. Threats
from below in the form of people of color, women, and the lowly seemed to be
sources of corruption, effeminacy, and mob justice. Consequently, these people
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did not deserve equal political, economic, social, or legal status: to give them
equality was the sign of impending downfall of the virtuous republic.13
It is important to keep in mind that not everyone arriving in the United
States necessarily intended or wanted to become a citizen, either in a formal legal
sense or in a broader informal sense of joining a culture and community. Many
people traveled to the United States for economic reasons, while others were
fleeing violence, and many of them planned to return to their places of origin
instead of staying permanently in the United States. Among the people arriving,
those encountering a hostile reception sometimes rejected citizenship, preferring
their attachment to another polity or nation-state, while others who received a
warmer welcome nonetheless viewed themselves in a state of exile, and hoped
to return to their place of origin. Of course, those making these choices about
becoming citizens also developed and engaged with their own conceptions and
meanings of citizenship, even as they rejected a local, state, or national American citizenship. For these reasons, I mostly use the term “migrant” rather than
immigrant, unless referring to a person who has clearly stated an intention to
permanently settle in the United States.14

Background: Early Naturalization Laws
Although migrants influenced naturalization, citizenship, and the legal rights
increasingly associated with citizenship, they nonetheless had to engage with
the existing legal framework and laws directed at them. At the national level,
the most important among these were the comity clause of the of the Articles
of Confederation, which became formally effective in 1781, the Naturalization
Acts of 1790 and 1795, and the 1798 package of legislation known as the Alien
and Sedition Acts, which included the Naturalization Act of 1798, the Alien
Act, and the Alien Enemies Act. At the national level, naturalization law varied
in its provisions during the Confederation and early federal periods.
In the 1780s, after Great Britain formally recognized US independence, the
status of citizenship during the Confederation period was relatively unclear, but
was more clearly articulated at the state and local than at the national level.
The Articles of Confederation contained a comity clause that required states to
recognize one another’s citizens. The patchwork of state naturalization laws and
procedures varied considerably: some states required only one year’s residence,
while others required legislative acts. It was possible, under the comity clause,
for one state to naturalize another state’s aliens.15
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The new US Constitution contained a provision to “establish an uniform
rule of naturalization,” which Congress passed in 1790, though it was not clear
to what extent national and state citizenship might overlap or conflict. As originally drafted, the Naturalization Act of 1790 would have granted the rights
of citizenship in stages, but concerns about conflict with state naturalization
laws ultimately led simply to a grant of full citizenship rights after two years of
residence in the United States. The most important change in the final version,
however, was the new law’s restriction of the right of naturalization to whites
only. These new federal naturalization laws would continue to coexist with state
laws for some time. This coexistence appeared in inconsistent court decisions:
in 1817, the Supreme Court in Chirac v. Chirac ruled in favor of Congress’s sole
authority over naturalization, but the court partially reversed its decision in the
1830 case of Spratt v. Spratt, returning naturalization to the state of uneasy coexistence between state and federal government.16
Legislators viewed migrants through several different lenses. Their mercantilist views held that migrants would benefit the nation as either human capital
who would invest in the economic future of the nation, or whose labor would
support that growth. In keeping with this view, legislators also believed that
European migrants would assist in the ongoing expropriation of Indian lands
along the frontier, whose agricultural production would further support the
American economy.17
Legislators wrestled, though, with a liberal view that citizenship was mutable
and theoretically open to any independent white person who believed in republicanism. Legislators acted on a belief that a short residence in the United States
would acculturate monarchists to the American political system, but when the
French Revolution and the wars it generated resulted in the arrival of both republican radicals and ultra-monarchist aristocrats, legislators became concerned.
In 1795, despite the emergence of the first party system, both Federalists and
Republicans agreed that it was necessary to extend the residency requirement
for naturalization to five years. Each party saw radicals from either the democratic left or the aristocratic right as a political danger from which republicanism
needed to be shielded.18
In 1798 divisions over naturalization law became more partisan. Federalists
noticed that recent migrants, particularly from Ireland, had been increasingly
gravitating toward the Republican Party. When the diplomatic furor surrounding the XYZ affair resulted in widespread public alarm about radical migrants,
Federalists swung into action and passed the series of laws known as the Alien
and Sedition Acts. The Sedition Act targeted defamatory publications aimed at
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Federalist leaders. The Naturalization Act of 1798 lengthened naturalization requirements to fourteen years of residence and instituted compulsory registration
in federal courts for all white aliens. The Alien Act allowed the president to deport
aliens he deemed dangerous, along with requiring incoming vessels to report alien
arrivals. The Alien Enemies Act contained provisions allowing, in the event of a
declared war, for the detention and “removal” of aliens over fourteen years of age
either via the federal courts or by federal marshals.19
Following the election of 1800, immigrant activists hoped that the Republican Party would act swiftly to end the Naturalization Act’s fourteen-year residency requirement and return to a shorter one. Neither Congress nor President
Jefferson moved swiftly, and it was not until April 14, 1802, that a new naturalization act was passed. This act was a return not to the two-year requirement but
to the stricter five-year requirement of the 1795 act, and stated that immigrants
would first have to file a declaration of intent to naturalize, and then wait three
years for naturalization itself. Migrants who did not file a declaration of intent
in their first two years of residence would have to wait longer than five years. The
1802 act also retained the port data-gathering provisions of the 1798 act, and
additionally required formal documentation, no longer relying on immigrant
and witness testimony for arrival and declarations of intent. The 1802 act also
meant that those immigrants who had experienced the barriers of the 1798 act
would have to, in effect, wait an additional eight full years before being able to
naturalize. Immigrants continued to lobby and send petitions but faced resistance, and Congress did not pass a law amending the 1802 act until March 26,
1804. Federal naturalization law experienced no further changes until the War
of 1812; on July 30, 1813, Congress passed legislation allowing immigrants eligible
for naturalization prior to the declaration of war to naturalize, as well as those
who had declared their intent to naturalize.20

Demography of Migration during the
Period of Atlantic Revolutions
Toward whom was naturalization law directed? Migrants came from many
places, and those places varied over time as economic and political conditions
pushed people to emigrate from their places of origin. In the years immediately preceding the American Revolution there was significant migration from
Northern Europe to the United States. Britain’s agricultural revolution and
landlords’ rising rents dislocated people in Scotland and Ireland who sought to
resettle elsewhere. Many Irish immigrants were also Protestant dissenters: they
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were not members of the official, tax-supported Church of Ireland (equivalent to
the Church of England) but were often Presbyterians, Quakers, or members of
other Protestant sects. Similarly, German religious minorities sought to emigrate
to the United States. Many migrants could not pay for their passage and relied
on the system of indentured servitude, agreeing to serve a master who would
select them upon arrival, with some room for negotiation. Indentured servants
received no wages during their term of service, but contracts often stipulated a
requirement for education for younger migrants, and usually came with “freedom dues,” which in the late 1700s generally included clothing and tools to work
in a trade.21
The American Revolution resulted in a temporary halt in economic and
religious migrants, but replaced them with military ones: British and French
regulars, as well as mercenaries hired from several German states, the Hessians.
American leaders encouraged these soldiers to desert to the Patriot side, and
when a number of Hessians remained after the conflict, it was a public relations
coup for the American cause: the liberal, prosperous republic would make a better peacetime home than old, monarchical Europe.22
The period after the American Revolution saw a resumption of the previous
patterns of migration, with some slight changes. Irish migrants still tended to be
Protestant, but were often better off, with fewer arriving as indentured servants.
German migrants would continue to arrive as indentured servants until after
1820, with slightly less than half of German migrants indenting themselves or
their families from 1785 to 1804.23
Post-independence migration also resulted in conflicts between Britain and
the United States over “desirable” and “undesirable” migrants. Part of the impetus for the Constitutional Convention was the export of convicts from Britain to its former colonies. However, the British government wished to retain
other groups: officials had already been anxious about the migration of people
from the British Isles to the colonies in the years immediately preceding the
Revolution, as a general concern that depopulation of the United Kingdom
would affect rent prices and have other negative economic effects. Independence rendered the United States sovereign over its own immigration laws, but
did not impact existing restrictions on emigration from Britain and continental European states. Britain and Ireland especially restricted sailors and members of the armed forces from emigrating, but also had restrictions intended to
preserve Britain’s early monopoly on the industrial revolution; skilled factory
workers were forbidden to emigrate. Immigrants from restricted categories
did nevertheless sometimes manage to make their way out. Another industrial

12

Introduction

group of emigrants, who did not face such restrictions, were the agents of manufacturers and shopkeepers who sold British industrial products in the United
States. This group would later face internal migratory pressure in the United
States as fears of Britain’s economic strength combined with the revolutionary wars that embroiled the United States in the conflicts of the 1790s and
early 1800s.24
Another major group of migrants to arrive in the 1790s and the first decade of the 1800s were the thousands of refugees from the French and Haitian
revolutions. Instability and violence caused many to flee France and its largest Caribbean colony, then known as Saint-Domingue, as the Atlantic world
plunged into revolution and warfare between the French and British empires.
The United States had remained neutral during most of this conflict, and so was
an attractive destination for people fleeing the French empire. Existing trade
connections, especially between the United States and Saint-Domingue, made
it a convenient and practical destination. This wave of refugees was a varied
group, politically and racially: royalists and republicans both came, and from
Saint-Domingue white colonists came, with enslaved people they forced to accompany them, as did significant numbers of free people of color. Aside from
the six thousand or so people who settled in New Orleans in 1809, whose arrival was carefully documented, numbers are difficult to estimate. Nonetheless, even a very conservative estimate would place the minimum number at ten
thousand refugees, most of them from Saint-Domingue rather than metropolitan France.25
A small number of migrants arrived from Asia and the Pacific. In the years
after American independence, the global dimensions of American trade grew,
and American traders voyaged to India, Southeast Asia, and the Far East.
During this period, the whaling industry also grew, and whaling ships plied
the world’s oceans, stopping at various ports and remote islands. These ships
recruited local men and boys and returned to the United States after long voyages. These sailors sometimes remained in the US, often looking for work on
land. Their numbers are also difficult to estimate, but they remained a very small
group demographically. Because white American missionaries took an interest
in them, they created a wealth of biographical material about their lives while
focusing on narratives of religious conversion. Many of them were persuaded to
study at the Foreign Mission School in Cornwall, Connecticut. These boys and
men faced significant racism and economic marginalization, but they too made
subtle choices about citizenship and membership, as citizenship developed and
transformed in this early national period.26
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As different migrant groups encountered and pushed for their understandings of citizenship and its enforcement on the ground, citizenship and legal
rights took shape. Political leaders passed and attempted to enforce laws, but
their choices were affected by immigrant lobbying, engagement, and resistance.
This process of the emergence of citizenship, especially at the national level,
would have important lasting effects: not least, the Alien Enemies Act remains
part of the US legal code. Although they cannot serve as president, naturalized
citizens today officially have all the other legal rights as non-naturalized citizens.
Like their early US predecessors, though, they often found a gap between official legal rights and everyday experience. Early US legislators determined and
enshrined in law who could legally be a citizen or alien, what rights citizens
would have, and what rights aliens would not. Political leaders also determined
from whence that authority would emanate, and gave greater power to the executive branch of government at the expense of the judiciary. But in so doing,
those leaders encountered another check on state and legal power: the migrants
whose actions and rights were subject to control and restriction. Because of the
pushback from foreign migrants in the early US, rights such as free speech were
not successfully tied to citizenship. And despite increasing attempts to restrict
citizenship rights to whites only, some migrants of differing racial status from
outside of Europe were able to secure a tenuous foothold of citizenship rights for
themselves. The story begins in the next chapter, with a migrant who questioned
the US government’s authority to deport foreign residents without trial, and the
experiences of other migrants like him from the French empire.27
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Refugees Push Back
We did and do now reside . . . in Vine St. No. 167 [Philadelphia]
and do intend to fix ourselves as long as by complying with the laws
of the United States, we [should] find in this continent the safety
peace and protection which has been heretofore granted us.
— Landing Reports of Aliens, No. 161, Marie Dominique Jacques
D’Orlic and Marie Laurence Carrere D’Orlic, January 14, 1799

I

n Philadelphia in the summer of 1798, the French refugee
Médéric-Louis-Élie Moreau de St. Méry recorded in his diary that President John Adams and Secretary of State Timothy Pickering had “made a
list of French people to be deported” and, much to his surprise, Moreau de St.
Méry himself was on that list. During his time in the United States, after fleeing France in 1794, Moreau de St. Méry had run a bookstore in Philadelphia
and cultivated a small circle of French intellectual friends in exile. Perhaps he
did associate with US Republicans, and wore a tricolor ribbon, but he was no
French spy. Not without friends in high places, Moreau de St. Méry inquired
through Senator John Langdon “to find out what I was charged with.” In his
diary, Moreau de St. Méry wrote down Adams’s supposed reply: “Nothing in
particular, but he’s too French.”1
The exchange between Adams and Moreau de St. Méry represents an important shift in the decline of alien legal rights that coincided with the rise of national citizenship in the 1790s. When Congress passed the Alien Act in 1798, the
executive branch of the federal government gained the power to deport aliens—
without a trial. But doing so also invited aliens like Moreau de St. Méry to issue a
challenge to that law: was he not a person entitled to his legal rights? How could
he be deported without having been charged with a crime? Adams’s supposed
reply also reveals a new way in which citizenship was being equated with nationality: Moreau de St. Méry hadn’t done anything, but his birth within the French
colonial empire and possession of whatever other qualities Adams deemed to be
14

Refugees Push Back

15

“too French” meant that he did not belong among the community of American
citizens, and ought to be deported. Sensing a hostile climate, Moreau de St. Méry
opted to join the many ostensibly voluntary migrants repatriating to the French
empire, under pressure from Adams and Secretary of State Timothy Pickering.2
The Alien and Sedition Acts and related 1798 laws were an attempt to forge
a national citizenship, but that national citizenship as it came to be was not
necessarily one that fully reflected Federalist ideals. One of the key elements
in the nationalization of citizenship occurred through the creation of specific
rights of citizenship at the national level. These rights were carved out of alien
penalties and responsibilities, even if it was not necessarily Federalists’ intention
to create national citizenship specifically in this way. The passage of the laws was
part of the process of the formulation of national citizenship; it was driven by
nativist fears, but altered in its legal form by the lawmaking process and political opposition. This linkage between legal rights and citizenship preceded the
strong relationship between them that emerged from the conflicts of Civil War
and Reconstruction. 3
Migrants from the French empire were a part of this process of the creation
and enforcement of the Alien and Sedition Acts and, with those laws, changes
to citizenship and its associated rights. This chapter, in demonstrating the role
of migrants in shaping the laws and their enforcement, critiques the approach of
Rogers Smith, who has used a top-down model focused on actions of lawmakers
and judges: Smith’s work draws on national debates, laws passed by Congress,
actions taken by federal appointees governing Western lands, and the influence
of the courts. In contrast, this chapter, and this book more generally, emphasize
the role of the migrants themselves in affecting the development of citizenship
and its rights. It does not deny the power of political elites, and shows that they
not only tried to shut foreign migrants and nonwhite people out of citizenship,
but they placed further penalties on aliens by carving out rights of citizenship.
Nonetheless, migrants were able to push back, most notably in preventing a blanket ban on the entry of French citizens. Migrants also worked to affect the law
in their everyday engagement in public, and also with the government officials
with whom they interacted. These engagements showed differing deployments
of citizenship and rights-based claims: they included an assertion of cultural citizenship (“the right to be different”) that included a liberal right to act in support
of the French Republic as part of a broader right to be politically active. They also
showed the deployment of a form of social contract wherein obedience to the law
came with a reciprocal right of residence and asylum. Finally, French migrants
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also asserted a narrow citizenship that included legal rights for naturalized citizens, even though many of them rejected cultural integration.4
During the period of the early American republic, citizenship and nationality were not so intertwined as they are in the present. Citizenship was both a
narrowly defined legal status indicating a subordinate relationship to a representative government, and also a marker of integration into the political sphere of
the citizen’s local American community. Nationality was an emerging cultural
concept of membership in a broader community, the nation. Many elite Americans worried that significant differences among the inhabitants of the United
States could jeopardize the nationalizing project. In the late 1790s, elite Americans agreed that “national characteristics” should define American-ness, but
disagreed as to what criteria should qualify individuals for membership in the
nation. Federalists chose to emphasize birth within the borders of the United
States and white racial status. Republicans tended to emphasize a belief in republicanism and American political institutions, but agreed in equating whiteness
with American-ness. Conflicts between liberals and nativists were inflamed by
the Atlantic revolutions of the 1790s, and in 1798, Federalist lawmakers embarked on a legislative program that they hoped would strengthen national citizenship and exclude dangerous foreigners from the polity. Republicans worked
to alter that program, and in the process also contributed to the creation of a
national citizenship that accorded rights to citizens and assigned legal penalties
to aliens.5
White migrants from the French empire were active participants in shaping
the laws of citizenship that were formed in 1798. Moreau de St. Méry was part
of a body of people who had migrated to the United States as a result of the
Haitian and French revolutions, and who carried with them different ideas of
citizenship and its relation to the nation. Through every step from conception,
debate, passage, interpretation by the executive, and attempts at enforcement,
the laws—and with them the processes of naturalization and the definition of
citizenship—changed. Migrants from the French empire were among those who
influenced those changes. Although these laws were driven by Federalist nativism and molded by the Republican opposition, French migrants actively lobbied
and influenced the laws throughout the process. French migrants intervened
to prevent the US government from forbidding them entry, countered hostile
descriptions of themselves in the press, often refused to comply with compulsory
alien registration, and attempted to influence the naturalization process.6
Citizenship, particularly during this period, was not necessarily national.
Some migrants asserted liberal ideas of citizenship that were associated with
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political ideals more than national identification. Others asserted a kind of multicultural citizenship that incorporated national difference into the definition
of citizenship. And some asserted the local citizenship preferred by native-born
Republicans.7 But the move toward national citizenship tended to eclipse these
other options, even as they were asserted. In 1798, national citizenship began
to supersede local citizenship while the two maintained an uneasy coexistence.
In 1798, concern over the possibility of war with France and the possible
presence of foreign sympathizers and spies caused Federalists and other Americans to scrutinize the foreign migrant population in the United States for signs
of disloyalty and danger. French migrants who openly expressed Republican
sympathies found themselves the targets of both official and informal public
hostility. Coupled with provisions in the Naturalization Act of 1798 that required all white aliens to register with the federal government, many French
migrants would be compelled to respond and offer a defense of their beliefs and
their presence in the United States.8

French National Characteristics: Cutthroats, Religious
Danger, Licentiousness, the Tricolor, and Anti-Jacobinism
The naturalization laws that emerged in the 1790s, which ultimately began to
create a US national citizenship, fed in part on fears of French national character. They were related to the emergence of a particular form of nativism—
here defined as “the attitude, practice, or policy of protecting the interests of
native-born or existing inhabitants against those of immigrants”—a form that
saw French migrants as a particular threat to the nascent republic of the United
States. Federalist nativism especially saw French migrants as a cultural and political threat to American people and the American political system. French migrants were repeatedly stereotyped in nativist press coverage of local encounters
as lawlessly violent, irreligious, sexually licentious, and politically dangerous.
Francophobic views in the 1790s were associated with members of the Federalist Party rather than Republicans, who tended to see the French Revolution in
more positive terms.9
Francophobia in the 1790s United States drew on anti-Jacobin accounts of
the French Revolution. In particular, Federalist newspapers chose to emphasize a supposed French thirst for lawless violence and bloodshed, adherence to
non-Protestant beliefs, and sexual licentiousness. These alleged tendencies were
symbolized by the tricolor cockade worn by not only (non-Royalist) French migrants, but also by adherents of the Republican Party in the US.
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Conflicting views regarding French migrants in the United States borrowed
from a number of traditions as well as American reactions to the events of the
French and Haitian revolutions. Many Americans sympathized with white refugees from the Haitian Revolution, as well as those from the French Revolution.
Yet many colonists had also long viewed France as a source of luxury, decadence,
and atheism. A longstanding anti-Catholic tradition had centered on the role
of France as the preeminent Catholic power in the eighteenth century. France
was seen as the source of attempts to impose absolute monarchy and abolish
traditional Anglo-American political liberties. The French Revolution upended
these traditional views by disassociating France from Catholicism because of
the Revolutionary government’s disagreements with the Catholic Church and
the Jacobin de-Christianization of France. While some Americans viewed the
French Revolution as a source of political liberty, others saw it as a source of
lawlessness and violence. If some Americans continued to admire France, an
increasing number (even Republicans) began to suspect French migrants of harboring characteristics dangerous to the new republic.10
US criticism of the French Revolution began in earnest after the September
Massacres in 1792, when Parisians seized and executed prisoners in an attempt
to prevent counterrevolutionary activity during a period of military reverses and
foreign invasion. Conservatives were alarmed by the revolution’s mob violence
and disregard for due process. In their eyes, France had ceased to be a civilized
nation. The arrival in the US of European radicals, along with the public celebration of French revolutionary violence, including 1793 reenactments of the
beheading of the French King Louis XVI and demonstrations of the guillotine
in Philadelphia in 1794, caused conservatives to fear that revolution and mob
violence could spread to the United States. These fears were further amplified
by alarmist reports in the Federalist press. Although much alarm was directed at
local Republicans and radicals from the British Isles, articles describing French
Republicans attempted to describe a type of danger embodied by supposed
French national qualities.11
First among these was a delight in lawlessness and violence. In one instance
in June 1798, a concerned Philadelphian wrote to Fenno’s Gazette of the United
States reporting a truly shocking scene: a fire had broken out at the Philadelphia jail, and while the citizens of Philadelphia were attempting to put it out,
they were obstructed by “some scoundrel Frenchmen” who displayed “the most
open remarks of exultation at the alarming situation.” The writer came to what
was the most obvious conclusion for him: “They were doubtless of the infernal
Jacobin brood.” And really, what could “be expected of a Frenchman” who had
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“been received with open arms into a hospitable asylum” and yet wore a tricolor
emblem, the “ensign of bloodshed, carnage, and malice?” Surely, such a man
possessed “a soul ripe for murder, treasons, plots and dark conspiracies.”12
Connecting the propensity for violence with the threat of importing revolutionary political change, the Philadelphia-based newspaper Porcupine’s Gazette
carried a story about a “Frenchman” who had been brought before a court for
allegedly claiming that President John Adams’s “head would be off in 6 months
time” to be replaced by Thomas Jefferson, and that “If no one else could be
found” that the Frenchman himself “would be the executioner.”13
Similarly, the aforementioned Frenchmen who confounded the attempted
extinguishing of the city jail fire shared a disregard for lawful institutions. Such
activities might be viewed with greater suspicion when those same jails were
used to imprison French privateers, who themselves also showed a flagrant disregard for American law and legal institutions. In one instance, an American
sea captain who had just arrived in Baltimore encountered by chance the commander of a French privateer who had seized the American’s ship. According to
one newspaper account, the Frenchman, when confronted by the American captain, replied “Heh, that is nothing,” and also “had the impudence to make him
a low bow,” prompting to the American sea captain to have him “immediately
lodged in jail, to shew whether it was nothing or not.” However, these jails did
not always succeed in holding French privateers. Readers were warned of an escape made from the Lancaster, Pennsylvania, jail, where two French privateering
sailors had escaped, along with a runaway slave on the same day.14
No news story involving French residents in the United States in 1798 captured the attention of readers more than a dramatic murder-suicide that took
place in New York. Newspapers from Maine to South Carolina covered it, as well
as non-English-language papers. Federalist readers encountered a very different
version of story than the one that appeared in Republican papers, ascribing the
violence of the event to the French national character rather than presenting it
as a tragedy of domestic violence not unique to any ethnicity. Monsieur and Madame Gardie were refugees from Saint-Domingue; M. Gardie was “a young gentleman of considerable fortune” who was forced to flee the Haitian Revolution.
Once in the United States, he and his wife “behaved with a coming deportment
of people . . . who had seen better days.” This deportment apparently included M.
Gardie’s teaching French and perhaps Mme Gardie’s work as an actress, but their
debts exceeded their income and M. Gardie was in danger of being sent to debtors’ prison. Mme Gardie had received an offer of acting work in New Orleans,
and she proposed that they separate and he return to France, out of economic
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necessity. M. Gardie appeared to agree, but nursed a grudge and jealous streak,
purchased a knife from a French shopkeeper, and with it murdered his wife and
then committed suicide. Coverage tended to be sympathetic to Mme Gardie, if
also interested in the gory details of her death.15
Readers of Federalist publications learned where such violence came from.
The anti-Republican Porcupine’s Gazette covered the murder-suicide under the
headline “French Philosophy.” Another Federalist paper claimed that such behavior was typical of the French national character, noting that “every thinking
man will be reminded of the country from which Gardie sprang,” which was
where “the seeds of his inhumanity were planted.” While it made the murder
no less unpalatable, his Frenchness could “sufficiently account for his barbarity,” and the editor finally noted that “to abandon cruelty, a Frenchman must
flee from himself!” Lest readers not be aware of the possible contamination of
French traits, the article on the Gardie murder was immediately followed by a
story headlined “More Immorality!!!” recounting a Fredericksburg, Virginia, Republican feast at which “much wine was drank . . . on the Sabbath
day” and was presided over by none other than the “professed deist” Thomas
Jefferson.16
Also part of the French national character, according to Federalist newspapers, was a lack of Protestant faith. The opposition to French atheism (and “philosophy”) was built on an earlier tradition of Anglo-American anti-Catholicism.
By turning away from God, the French had gotten revolution and civil disorder
as punishment for their sins. Americans should not be tempted to adopt French
ideas and religious beliefs lest they suffer the same fate. In addition to Cobbett’s headline of the Gardie murder as “French Philosophy,” there were other
newspaper stories. A New England newspaper reported a supposed interview between President John Adams and “a Frenchman” who “began to descant largely
upon . . . the evils of [religion,]” arguing that the United States “had better do
as we do in France, lay it all aside.” When questioned, the “atheistical reformer”
stated “I profess No religion,” to which Adams replied “there is the door,” ending
the interview.17
For women from the French empire, there was the additional charge of sexual
licentiousness. The case of Mme Gardie, for some readers, only served to confirm
their attitudes. Mme Gardie was already engaged in acting, a questionable trade
for women, and her offer of work in New Orleans, some articles implied, may
have involved prostitution or courtesanship. William Cobbett also accused her
of having cuckolded her husband, justifying his rage (according to Cobbett), even
as such bloodthirstiness was part of his inherently depraved national character.
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Cobbett’s views also extended to the vogue for French fashions, in particular
the French West Indies turban, and favored by “fiery frenchified dames.” The
word frenchified also meant suffering from venereal disease, meaning Cobbett
was further attempting to present French fashions as vectors of decadence and
disease.18
The chief symbol that seemed to exemplify the spread of French ideas and
habits in the minds of Federalists was the French tricolor. This symbol was well
explicated by a story regarding a Stockbridge, Massachusetts, gentleman farmer
whose crops were being attacked “by a set of unprincipled, lawless Crows, who,
like Frenchmen, regardless of the right of property, take it wherever they can
find it.” In response, the farmer made a scarecrow “dressed . . . in the Uniform
of a French Soldier, with the National cockade in his hat.” According to the
news report, “The crows beheld this object of Terror, with surprise and horror”
and formed a council of war, wherein they “determined that the Frog-eating
Rascal, altho’ he appeared in the Garb of a civilized being” was not so, and “had
more of the Devil in his heart, than any terrible object they had ever seen.” The
crows decided that the time had come to leave, and “get out of the reach of the
[French soldier’s] Fraternal embraces.” Here, the tricolor was combined with the
French uniform, and referred not only to American actions toward the French
and French depredations upon American shipping, but also French destruction
or overthrow of fellow European republics.19
The tricolor was particularly alarming when it appeared on actual living Frenchmen, and in Philadelphia the tricolor was a part of the city’s
rough-and-tumble politics. The Gazette of the United States gleefully reported
an attack on a French resident of Philadelphia who audaciously wore the tricolor, noting that “some spirited citizens very meritoriously struck the tri-color
from his chapeau.” Similarly, Moreau de St. Méry, residing in Philadelphia, wore
the French tricolor. He noted the increasingly hostile climate and wrote in his
diary, “Antagonism against the French increased daily.” He further claimed in
retrospect that he was “the only person in Philadelphia who continued to wear
the French cockade.” He met with Republicans who provided him “keys to two
shelters in which I and my family could take refuge in case my house were attacked.” Four days later, he booked passage back to France. It was at this time
that Moreau de St. Méry wrote that he had appeared “on a list of French people
to be deported” and issued his indirect challenge to the Alien Act.20
Collectively, the view that readers of Francophobic articles began to see
was one that highlighted dangers to the republic: lawless violence associated
with mob rule, an emphasis on the longstanding tradition of viewing France
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as a danger to traditional “English” liberties, further amplified by references
to French destruction of the Venetian Republic. Many American readers subscribed to a belief that civic virtue was necessary for the survival of the nascent
American republic, and that if the citizens of the republic lapsed into mob rule,
decadence, and immorality, the republic would be destroyed, much like the ancient Roman Republic. The actions of French migrants were thus not only a danger to individuals, but a danger to the nation. As part of a national characteristic
that was unchangeable, they could not be molded into new American citizens.
The legal solution, then, would have to eliminate the migrants from political
participation and the American public sphere, or send them outside the borders
of the United States.

Federalists Legislate a National Alien Policy
and Ascribe Rights to Citizenship
The above concerns about the French presence in the United States and belief
in French national characteristics led nativists to seek a national, legal solution
to the possible threat that they presented. They were greatly assisted in this task
by the diplomatic crisis known as the XYZ affair, in which the French foreign
minister Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand’s intermediaries demanded a large payment before meeting with American diplomatic envoys, as well as making additional demands for loans to the French government. In the meantime, French
seizures of American merchant ships continued, angering Americans engaged in
commerce. When news of the scandal broke in the spring of 1798, war seemed
imminent. And something would have to be done to counter the French threat
from within.21
The ultimate legislative response was Congress’s passage of the Alien and
Sedition Acts, as well as the Naturalization Act of 1798. Legislators had designed these laws to exclude foreign migrants from the polity and prevent foreign espionage. The laws also allowed the federal government to surveil aliens,
regulate their presence, and remove those deemed dangerous or whose residence
in the United States was otherwise undesirable. But they were not simply a direct, unaltered implementation of the Federalists’ intended legislative program.
The laws instead took form as they moved from committee, to debate on the
house floor, and faced amendments, changes, and obstruction by the Republican opposition. A key shift during this process was the exclusion of naturalized citizens from the provisions that otherwise penalized aliens. Although it
was not necessarily the specific intention of legislators to do so, the debate and
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amendment process in Congress concerning national alien policy resulted in
the ascription of rights to citizenship and legal penalties for aliens. Rights, in
other words, drifted away from the complicated web of social status that gave
rights to legal persons and citizenship began to be a source of rights in and of
itself. The new laws privileged US citizens by exempting them from surveillance
and deportation, while aliens felt the burdens of the national government’s surveillance and harassment.22
The first step in this process of lawmaking was the intent to introduce bills
to address the nativist concerns about foreign migrants and control their activities and movements. Nativists already had a vision of excluding dangerous
migrants from the polity through increasingly high barriers to naturalization,
allowing the federal government to regulate the presence of aliens within the
nation’s borders. To put this vision into law, it would first be necessary to draft
a bill with these provisions. The change in public mood after Adams released
the first of the documents relating to the XYZ affair on April 3, 1798, and the
ensuing public uproar about the treatment of American envoys by the French
government gave the Federalists the political momentum to draft and push their
desired bills through Congress. After an initial flurry of war preparations, Congress acted to address the issue of aliens and citizenship. On April 17, the Federalist Joshua Coit of Connecticut moved for a committee to look into revision of
the 1795 Naturalization Act.23
The resulting recommendations were an attempt to nationalize governmental
authority over citizenship, secure control and knowledge about the movement
and whereabouts of aliens in the United States, and prevent persons of foreign
birth from naturalizing. On May 1, the committee issued a report that recommended longer terms of residence prior to naturalization, compulsory “report
and registry” of all aliens, and a law that would allow for the “apprehending,
securing, or removal” of male enemy aliens over fourteen years of age, as well
as aliens who “shall threaten, attempt, or perpetrate any invasion or predatory
incursions upon [US] territory,” largely the provisions that would appear in the
Naturalization Act of 1798, the Alien Act, and the Alien Enemies Act.24
The committee’s recommendations contained several possible new penalties
that, once passed as law, would not apply to citizens. The Alien Act would deny
aliens the right to trial, and would also allow for the peacetime deportation
of aliens. Both the Naturalization Act of 1798 and the Alien Act collectively
contained provisions that would require compulsory registration of all aliens.
Since these provisions were largely preserved during the debate and amendment
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process, they are discussed, along with the importance of their role in creating
rights of citizens, in the following sections on those two pieces of legislation.25
The recommendations were then subjected to debate and amendments in the
process of becoming law. During these debates, congressmen articulated their
specific concerns about the foreign threat and what additional measures ought to
be taken to address it. The debate and amendment process would also shape the
laws so that rights and penalties adhered along an axis of citizenship/alienage.
The Federalists, in control of the federal government, had the power to draft
the first version before it could be altered, reframed, or blocked by partisan opposition and immigrant lobbying. The Federalist project of national citizenship
sharpened the divide between citizen and alien over two kinds of rights: right
of residence, and a right to privacy. But other divides were on the table: nationality/ethnicity rather than citizenship per se, meaning that natives could have
rights that naturalized citizens did not. Federalists also would consider laws that
barred immigration over nationality/ethnicity. As the debates continued, opposition Republicans also influenced the shape of the laws, using constitutional objections and understandings of international law. As discussed in later sections
of this chapter, French immigrants themselves would be active in further lobbying and resistance to enforcement, but in these earlier debates, Francophone
influence was limited to the Swiss-born opposition leader Albert Gallatin.
In debating a federal bill to specifically exclude French passengers from entry
to the United States, nativist legislators argued that French persons inherently
possessed such dangerous characteristics that they should be excluded from the
United States. When debating the laws that became the Alien and Sedition Acts,
which targeted a broader swath of foreign migrants as well as the domestic opposition, legislators focused less on inherent national characteristics than on the extent to which French migrants in the US were acting as direct agents of the French
government. Legislators asserted that these agents spied for France, or might issue
privateering commissions for France à la Citizen Genet. They worked to “alienate
the affection of the people,” and printed French government propaganda.26
Some Federalists proposed more stringent regulations that would disallow
naturalization entirely and restrict citizenship to those born in the United
States. The Federalist congressman Harrison Gray Otis also recommended that
citizens of foreign birth be excluded from holding office, as was the case for naturalized subjects in Great Britain. Republicans responded to both movements by
successfully arguing that the Constitution did not grant the federal government
the authority to restrict either ability, or create a second-class citizenship for
naturalized citizens.27
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The Republican opposition, led Albert Gallatin, centered on constitutional
objections to Federalist measures. Republicans appealed to the Constitution as
the document that checked, rather than enhanced, the reach of federal authority
over national citizenship and alienage. The Republican opposition repeatedly
argued that the Constitution did not grant the federal government the power to
regulate alien migration and naturalization in the ways that nativists wished: either birthright citizenship only or new penalties for naturalized citizens that denied them the rights to political participation and officeholding. Their objections
resulted in the creation of rights that adhered along an axis of citizenship/alienage, rather than an additional right of legal personhood attaching to birthright
citizenship to the exclusion of naturalized citizens, as some nativists wished.28
Since constitutional objections halted the creation of a second-class citizenship, Federalists instead opted for an extremely long residency requirement that
effectively barred alien residents from naturalizing. The amendment passed narrowly, 41–40. Albert Gallatin successfully included measures that allowed immigrants who had arrived before 1795 to naturalize under the terms of the 1795
Naturalization Act, which required five years of residence instead of fourteen.
Republicans then further moved, unsuccessfully, to lower the residence requirement to seven years from fourteen.29

The Alien Act: Citizen Rights and Alien Penalties
in Deportation and the Right to Trial
Although the Alien Act was devised chiefly as a way to expel foreigners whose
presence Federalists thought endangered the United States, it nationalized regulation of migration by enabling the emerging nation-state to regulate the persons
within its borders, and expel them if necessary. The act also created a new penalty
for aliens: deportation in peacetime. Local attempts to regulate migration had
centered on the exclusion of paupers and carriers of disease, but these paupers
and disease vectors could be citizens or aliens; it was not their foreignness that
subjected them to restriction of movement. The Act also allowed for deportation
without charge of a crime. The law replaced the trial with an opportunity for
the alien, once already served with a deportation order, to provide evidence to
“such person or persons as the president shall direct” that “no injury or danger
to the United States will arise from suffering such alien to reside within.” In so
doing, the act further contained the right to trial as a privilege of citizenship.
Previously, aliens had held the right as legal persons to have a trial when faced
with government prosecution.30
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The Alien Act gave authority to the federal government to do what states and
localities had done in the past—try to control migration within their borders.
Local governments could “warn out” the undesirable wandering poor: individuals were informed by local officials of their ineligibility for poor relief and sent
to their ostensible place of origin, often a nearby town. City ports could also
institute quarantines and exclude paupers. State governments passed a flurry
of largely ineffective laws barring the immigration of paupers in the 1780s and
1790s. South Carolina, concerned about refugees of color destabilizing Carolinian society, banned their entry in 1793. When panic about a rumored invasion
from Saint-Domingue gripped Philadelphia in 1798, the Pennsylvania governor
Thomas Mifflin “prohibit[ed] the landing of French negroes.” The new federal
power did not prevent local governments from continuing they had before—indeed, Mifflin saw the federal regulations as assisting Pennsylvania in enforcing
its own exclusion more effectively.31
The move from aliens’ rights stemming from their status as common law
legal persons to a construction of rights around citizenship was spurred by fears
of French spies. A number of French migrants had worked to gather intelligence on North American affairs for the French Directory. The most prominent of these was the French soldier Georges Henri Victor Collot. President
Adams and Secretary Pickering also suspected that Johann Schweizer (sometimes spelled Sweitzer) and Pierre-Samuel Dupont de Nemours were engaged
in similar activities. There had additionally been suspicions about the traveling
French scientist Constantin-François Chasseboeuf, Comte de Volney. Adams
and Pickering suspected that there were more French agents operating in the
United States. Pickering also received warnings about European Jacobins and
United Irishmen from other Federalist leaders. The “too French” intellectual
Moreau de St. Méry’s act of wearing a tricolor cockade, associating with Republicans, hosting a French intellectual salon, running a bookstore, and corresponding with prominent French officials, including Foreign Minister Talleyrand, must have earned his place on the list of deportees by his activities as
well as his ethnicity.32
By simply beginning deportation proceedings against aliens, Adams and
Pickering reinforced the strength of the federal government and reified its authority to police its borders and points of entry. More importantly, they made
clear that there would not be a trial for the aliens they intended to deport. Pickering himself was to look over any proof of innocence that the aliens in question
might provide, and in Collot’s case, “permission to offer proof [could] be merely
formal,” because in Pickering’s opinion, Collot had no “good reason for Staying
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here” and would be unable to provide “any fact” that he was not “a French intriguer & bitter enemy” of the United States.33
In practice, deportation was difficult to accomplish, because the executive
lacked a large bureaucracy to adequately monitor candidates for deportation.
Secretary Pickering, the law’s chief enforcer, was overloaded with other duties,
which caused delays in the process, “and the pursuit of . . . aliens was overlooked.”
Ultimately there were no deportations prior to the expiration of the Alien Act
in 1800. The law, however, was most effective as a threat: Thomas Jefferson wrote
that “the threatening appearances from the Alien Bills have so alarmed the
French that they are going off” and that “a ship chartered for this purpose will
sail within about a fortnight for France with as many as she can carry.” At least
two prominent French migrants chose to leave the United States while the Alien
and Sedition Acts were being drafted. In addition to Moreau de St. Méry, there
was the scientist Volney, whom Jefferson noted was “the principal object aimed
by the law” and who received a passport from Timothy Pickering.34
Despite the broad powers of the act, it turned out that important, powerful,
and dangerous migrants were more difficult to expel and deport than Federalists had originally expected. Secretary Pickering lamented that the law lacked
the power to detain aliens prior to deportation, or “post sureties pending their
departure.” Adams and Pickering also differed over enforcement—Pickering
wanted broad authority to expel as many migrants as he thought necessary, and
wrote to Adams requesting blank warrants for deportation. Adams favored what
he termed a “strict construction” of the law and wanted individual deportation
cases to be cleared through him before he would sign any blank warrants. Of the
small number of French aliens whom Adams and Pickering agreed were worthy
candidates for enforcement of the law, each escaped expulsion for a variety of
reasons. Volney left before the passage of the Alien Act, as did the newly arrived
French Consul Victor Marie Dupont, whose diplomatic credentials Adams had
refused to accept. For Victor Collot, Pickering concluded that the intelligence he
had gathered would be more dangerous if he delivered it in France, so he halted
deportation proceedings, despite having a signed order from President Adams.
Instead, because Collot was a paroled British prisoner of war he persuaded the
British minister to delay his exchange, preventing Collot from leaving with his
information about weak American defenses along the border with Spanish Louisiana, a territory soon to be re-acquired by France. Pickering feared that Collot
“had formed plans of attack upon the United States from that quarter” that
would be carried out should he return to France. British Minister Robert Liston
accordingly “prevented his departure” citing a halt in negotiations over prisoners
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of war. Collot would not be able to sail to France until after the expiration of the
Alien Act in 1800.35
Ordinary migrants appear to have been more easily swept away by the hand
of the national government. Pickering was aided in his organization of migrants’
voluntary return passage by improved conditions in Saint-Domingue and metropolitan France. The Alien Act was not passed until June 25, 1798, but in early
May, Thomas Jefferson wrote in the letter quoted above that a number of French
residents had chartered ships for return passage to France and Saint-Domingue.
Pickering viewed these activities with approval, and granted the ships documents for safe passage to France, a necessary step in the war-swept Atlantic
of 1798, where ships were often stopped, boarded, and privateered. Pickering
viewed these actions as a useful step toward removing undesirable French and
other aliens from the United States, even if it was voluntary. Pickering recorded
fifteen ships by August 23, 1798, and had taken care to work with customs officials to ensure that they were filled with passengers rather than goods: “If an
American vessel is designed to deport French persons according to the [Alien
Enemies Act], as many passengers will ordinarily be engaged as she can conveniently carry. . . .” Pickering wrote with the presumed expectation that the
undeclared war would become a full-scale, officially declared war between the
US and France. In the meantime, ships full of passengers would carry French
citizens to various destinations in the French empire: Bordeaux, Cap-Français,
Port-au-Prince, Guadeloupe, and Cayenne. 36
In the view of Federalists, persons who did not possess what they deemed
American “ancestry, manners, character, habits, language, and support of the
government,” were an obstacle to the unification of the citizenry. The removal
of foreign persons, particularly those whose political views were at odds with the
Federalist/nationalist vision, strengthened Federalists’ belief in the possibility of
realizing their vision.37

The Naturalization Act of 1798:
Privacy for Citizens, Surveillance for Aliens
Deportation was not the only new power the federal government acquired in
1798. The federal government began to systematically gather information on
aliens as well. The Naturalization Act of 1798 was a highly partisan measure
through which Federalists hoped to exclude foreign migrants from the polity
by lengthening terms of naturalization, and also a means to subject aliens to a
“system of national surveillance.” In requiring aliens to register through district
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courts, and in requiring local ports to collect and pass on registers of incoming
aliens, the 1798 Naturalization Act envisioned the creation of a national citizenship by collecting information about aliens, partially in cooperation with
local authorities. Moreover, by reserving the privilege of privacy for citizens and
instituting compulsory registration for aliens, it added to the personal legal disabilities of aliens, in effect creating a right of citizens that applied at the national
level. Similarly, the Alien Act gave the federal executive the power to deport
aliens, while citizens could not be expelled under the terms of the act.38
Federalist fear of French (and other) migrants contributed strongly to the
form that both acts took—in particular, the fear of infiltration by foreign spies
such as Victor Collot, and the need to track their movements. To respond to
this danger required a national, centralized gathering of information and data
about aliens, among whom suspicious persons circulated and in whose communities they received assistance from witting or unwitting co-nationals. Federalists intended for the government to use this information to surveil, and
hoped to seize and expel those foreign migrants deemed sufficiently dangerous
to warrant expulsion—the two chief dangers in question were alleged spies,
and editor-journalists of the opposition press. The second group is discussed in
greater depth in Chapter 3.39
The Alien Enemies Act also worked to nationalize citizenship. It differed
from the rest of the 1798 legislation in that it originated from the Republican
opposition, who hoped to temper what they saw as arbitrary and excessive executive authority by demanding that the Federalist administration follow a legal
process when arresting or expelling alien enemies in time of war. In other words,
Republicans saw the measure as a necessary evil to prevent possible arbitrary
actions by the Federalist-controlled national government. The act granted the
authority to expel alien enemies to the federal executive (both to the president
and federal marshals), as well as to state courts and federal courts. Like the Alien
Act, the Alien Enemies Act broadened the authority of the federal executive to
act where aliens were concerned, but also granted authority at the state level
through state courts. Federal marshals, as appointees of the executive, were an
extension of executive authority into local communities. But since the Alien Enemies Act did not come into force during the undeclared quasi-war with France
from 1798 to 1800, its provisions and extensions of federal power would not be
tested until the War of 1812, when it would be used by the Republican Party
against subjects of the British Empire; its enforcement is further discussed in
Chapter 4. Despite its lack of immediate effect, the Alien Enemies Act had the
most lasting consequence of all the 1798 legislation, serving as the basis for the
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formation of alien policy for every declared war the United States has fought
against a foreign nation, and remains in effect in 2012. 40
A final bill, which never became law in part because of successful lobbying by
French migrants, aimed specifically to exclude French passengers from entering
the United States. Initially spurred by a panicky report suggesting collaboration
between white Jacobins from Saint-Domingue and their Black counterparts, debates centered more generally on whether French migrants were so dangerous
that the federal government, rather than local or state governments, should be
responsible for excluding them.
The migrants arrived at the height of nativist fears surrounding the XYZ affair in 1798. The migrants, however, were not Jacobins but rather predominantly
Royalist refugees who had sided with the British forces that had invaded revolutionary Saint-Domingue. Losing ground to Toussaint L’Ouverture’s forces,
British commanders negotiated a withdrawal from Saint-Domingue, and French
collaborators in Port-au-Prince and in other British-held areas began to look
for refuge elsewhere, and thought they had found it on ships bound for the
United States.41
The migrants’ arrival incited panic and demands that the federal government
act to prevent their entry. Although the passengers were predominantly white
and had brought with them some people in slavery, an inflammatory account
by the French-born US general Louis Tousard claimed that the ships contained
“between two hundred and fifty and three hundred negroes, well-armed, trained
to war, and saying they will land.” The Pennsylvania governor Thomas Mifflin
wrote to John Adams, stating that he himself “had determined to prohibit the
landing of any French negroes” but since he held jurisdiction only over Pennsylvania, federal action would be necessary, lest they land and come “through
the Jerseys with all their owners to Philadelphia.” He also suggested that the
embargo be extended to “white men.” Adams passed Mifflin’s letter on to the
Senate, and the Federalist senator William Bingham of Pennsylvania introduced
a bill to exclude French passengers (including whites) from entry to the United
States. Other 1798 legislation was written to target foreign migrants generally,
but this bill, spurred by fears of “French negroes,” was the only (potential) part of
the legislative package that specifically targeted foreign migrants of a particular
nationality.42
The bill quickly passed the Senate, while in the House debates on the bill led
to a second debate over the nature of national characteristics and citizenship.
American congressmen debated who was actually a Frenchman. This debate

Refugees Push Back

31

returned to the issue of the mutability of allegiance and the place of birthright or
liberal citizenship. Could those Dominguans who had sided with British forces
be regarded as Britons? Federalists argued indirectly for birthright citizenship
and Republicans argued against it.43
The controversy was raised when the Republican Joseph Bradley Varnum
of Massachusetts stated that many of the French passengers in question were
British subjects, because they “had taken arms against the French Government,
and . . . had of course alienate[d] themselves from it.” Furthermore, Varnum
stated, “the appellation of ‘Frenchman’ would [not] apply to persons born in
the West Indies, though born of French parents.” For Varnum, citizenship was
a mutable characteristic that could change with political activities and was not
necessarily tied to national origin.44
In contrast, Harrison Gray Otis stated, “A Frenchman is a Frenchman everywhere.” Otis argued that nationality stemmed not from a changeable allegiance but rather from national character, elaborating that a Frenchman might
“take his naturalization oath in this country, it does not alter his character; he
is still called, and known to be a Frenchman.” Otis argued that if the bill were
to become law, nationality and citizenship would be treated separately by the
federal government—the law applied to nationality rather than citizenship status—although he had previously argued for an immutable, birthright citizenship during the debates over the previous 1798 legislation.45
The French passengers bill ultimately did not pass, owing to timely intervention and successful lobbying by detained French passengers and the owners of
detained vessels. Their lobbying efforts and effects on House debates are discussed later in this chapter. Congress passed no further laws directly relating
to naturalization for the remainder of Adams’s presidency. In the meantime,
French migrants had to contend with the existing package of laws that were
directed at foreign migrants and the emerging national citizenship that was
strongly disadvantageous to them as aliens in an unfriendly nation.46

Migrant Response to the Federalist Program: Challenge or Leave?
French residents of the United States were compelled to respond to both the
1798 legislative program and the hostile public climate. The migrant response
took several forms. Many migrants chose to leave the United States. Some migrants challenged the legitimacy of new alien legal disabilities. They asserted
their perceived right to due process or refused to comply with compulsory registration. Some migrants did embrace violent resistance or preserved loyalties to
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France or revolutionary Saint-Domingue. White migrants also challenged negative coverage of them in the press, presenting themselves as peaceful, law-abiding
citizens deserving of the welcome and asylum given to white refugees in the early
1790s—a contrary form of self-representation. Also, in coordination with merchants trading in the French empire, they successfully lobbied to defeat a bill to
exclude French people from entering the United States.
Some of these migrant responses successfully impeded the growth of US
national citizenship, particularly the widespread refusal to comply with compulsory alien registration and the lobbying against the French Passengers Bill.
But other forms of resistance that attempted to frustrate, impede, or challenge
national citizenship inadvertently worked to strengthen it. Actions such as leaving the United States or attempting to assert local citizenship worked to justify
the Federalist nationalizing program: nativists could justify it as an effective
solution to the achieve their goals or prove the need for the laws passed in 1798.
Thus, the impact of French resistance on the development of citizenship laws is
more complex than previously recognized.47
The main French response, of which other foreign targets in 1798 generally
did not avail themselves, was to leave. The reasons for leaving were not just the
hostile US climate. As previously mentioned, conditions in the French empire
had changed significantly. Both France and northern Saint-Domingue were returning to political stability. In France, the Terror had ended, and the Directory
had curbed extralegal violence and seizure of property despite its shaky hold as a
sovereign government. Directory officials also began to remove individuals from
the list of émigrés who had been barred from entering France, while Toussaint
L’Ouverture had consolidated his political hold in Northern Saint-Domingue
and encouraged the return of the planter class to help revive the economy.48
The owners of the ships carrying migrants back to France and its colonies
included British-Americans such as William Moodie and Thomas Caldwell
and Franco-Americans such as “Lewis” Crousillat, Benjamin Nones, and Stephen Girard. Among the prominent French migrants in the United States who
chose to leave at this time were Moreau de St. Méry and the scientist-historian Volney.49
By leaving, French migrants accomplished “voluntarily” what Federalist nativists hoped to accomplish by law: the removal of non-Anglo-Americans. With
these foreign migrants gone, nativists hoped, Jacobinism and philosophy would
disappear from America. Of course, if they stayed, their continued presence
justified the continued legal deportation of aliens. Once they chose to remain,
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however, they had several options about how to engage with the federal government. A small number of migrants, overwhelmingly French, complied with the
provisions of the 1798 Naturalization Act and registered themselves as aliens in
federal district court. Most French migrants, however, did not, and they were
joined in noncompliance by British and Irish migrants as well—in effect, completely frustrating federal compulsory registration of aliens.50
Moreau de St. Méry’s response to his appearance on President Adams’s list
of deportees also exemplifies part of the French migrant challenge to Federalist
alien policy, and with it, the adherence of rights and citizenship. Targeted as a
suspicious person, he inquired through intermediaries “to find out what crime
[he] was charged with,” an indirect challenge to the law’s removal of the right
of trial or defense for alien deportations. In other words, Moreau de St. Méry
was arguing that under common law, he had rights as a legal person and a free
white man despite his status as an alien. Never formally deported but subjected
to xenophobic street harassment and official political pressure, and sensing an
improved climate in France, Moreau de St. Méry departed, but not before he
attempted to change and influence alien policy. This view of alien legal rights,
however, would not prevail.51
Many migrants also refused to comply with compulsory registration that
was part of the national system of alien surveillance instituted under the Naturalization Act of 1798 and the Alien Act. The full extent of noncompliance is
difficult to determine, but migrants were able to frustrate the enforcement and
the federal government was unable to punish those who refused to register. This
noncompliance was practiced primarily by aliens already resident in the United
States as opposed to new arrivals, who were already subject to local port information-gathering, which the 1798 legislation decreed would now be forwarded to
the federal government. In Federalist-controlled areas such as New England and
Petersburg, Virginia, at least, returns were forwarded. The widespread noncompliance in 1798 was not repeated during the War of 1812, when British subjects
registered as alien enemies with the federal government in large numbers, as
detailed in Chapter 4.52
Noncompliance can be determined by the relative absence of extant alien returns, although records are incomplete. Nonetheless, the federal court district
for Pennsylvania registered only 172 heads of household during this period,
when a much larger number of foreign migrants resided in Philadelphia and
nearby areas. The act required aliens to register in a federal court, and this was
the only one available to them without crossing state lines.53
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Some French migrants did embrace violent resistance or announced public
sympathy with such resistance, although there is only secondhand evidence recorded in alarmist accounts in the Federalist press. The violent resistance included the previously mentioned incident involving the alleged French migrant
who claimed he would be willing to behead President John Adams and was prosecuted for uttering “seditious words.” Taken at face value, his activities show several different strands of political activity. First, by supporting Jefferson, he was
taking an active part in American politics. Second, by mapping the execution of
Louis XVI onto John Adams, he was, like many Americans, placing the politics
of the United States in the broader context of a pan-Atlantic republican struggle. He also spoke about national figures and the presidency rather than about
local partisan concerns, and it was his discussion of the presidency that spurred
his prosecution. Last, he intended to fully integrate himself into the polity by
naturalizing the day after his arrest. This “seditious Frenchman” simultaneously
sought to resist the Federalist program while also bringing about coverage of
his actions that the Federalist press presented as justifying the exclusionary and
punitive measures taken against foreign migrants: this Frenchman should not be
allowed to naturalize, and was, in the eyes of the Porcupine’s Gazette, deserving
of his prosecution for his seditious utterances.54
In Newark, New Jersey, another French migrant was prosecuted for the same
crime. Lespenard Colie (also Lespinard, and possibly L’Espagnard) was prosecuted along with Luther Baldwin and Brown Clark for remarks concerning
the cannonade greeting President Adams as he rode through Newark. Baldwin
allegedly remarked that John Adams “was a damned rascal and ought to have
his a[rse] kicked, and one of the cannon shot through it.” Clark and Colie, associates of Baldwin, were also charged with “seditious words.” According to one
account, Colie also stated that “if the French came he would joint them & fight
for a shilling a day, & deliver up any that were inimical to them.” These remarks
were seditious not only for being defamatory toward the presidency, but were
indicative of the threat of violent resistance to the US government.55
Colie had initially pled not guilty, but then changed his plea on the same day,
and paid a fine of $40, “being very poor,” while his friends were brought to trial
one year after the incident. Colie and his friends found the Adams welcome ceremony rather pompous and, in keeping with Republican concerns about political
ceremonies and the presidency, perhaps veering uncomfortably toward monarchy. The inhabitants of Newark, including the dram-keeper who had supplied
them with alcohol that morning, felt that their remarks had become seditious,
and rather than actually dangerous, were an affront to the display of community
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harmony and order. According to the Newark Centinel of Freedom, the inhabitants of the town were disappointed that Adams did not stop when he passed
through, and in consequence “bent their malice on poor Luther [Baldwin] and
the cry was, that he must be punished.”56
French migrants also engaged in a frequent public defense against the
depictions of them in the nativist press. They countered the view of French migrants as lawlessly violent Jacobins by presenting themselves as predominantly
white, peaceable, unarmed, wealthy, and strictly obedient to local and national
American laws and regulations. Additionally, they, like other foreign migrants,
emphasized the American national vision as a place of asylum from the war-torn
Atlantic. They did so not only in public forums such as newspapers, but also in
their encounters with the American government. This defense was intended to
sway public opinion, and to bring about more favorable treatment in personal
encounters with federal officials and other enforcers of migration laws. Engagement could strengthen federal authority by acknowledging the legitimacy of
that authority, while at the same time migrants forced officials to explain why
harsh measures were being taken against migrants who presented themselves as
peaceable and nondangerous.
Among those aliens who did register with the federal government, a number
departed from the simple data that they were required to provide and explained
more about the circumstances that caused them to come to and remain in the
United States. They chose to emphasize their status as refugees and the asylum
they received in the United States. Elite women asserted their legal status in
these documents alongside their husbands. Those who did take steps toward
becoming citizens seem to have been motivated by their dislocations as a result
of the Haitian Revolution. 57
Among those who emphasized their status as refugees were those who had fled
from the 1793 battle and subsequent fire that engulfed the city of Cap-Français
(now Cap-Haïtien) on the north coast of Saint-Domingue. Jacques Julien Robert Malenfant, a “sugar refiner and overseer of sugar plantation” working as a
clerk for Peter Stephen Duponceau at the time of his registration, stated that he
was “a Fugitive from the Conflagrat[ion] of Cape François in the Island of St.
Domingo” and that “he left that town [on June 24, 1793] when it was actually
in Flames.” Francis (or François) Mery, a “Watch-maker” also stated that he had
fled from Le Cap “where he resided at the Time of the Conflagration.” Migrants
could also more clearly emphasize the importance of racial solidarity that they
felt white Americans owed them. Charles Collet, “following the profession of
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ice cream maker” in Philadelphia, stated that he was “a fugitive from the persecutions of black men in the Cape Français where he had arrived one year before
from france.”58
Other registrants emphasized their peaceful nature and willingness to live
quiet, law-abiding lives while in the United States. Joseph Marie Thomas, a clerk
and “teacher of the French language,” his wife, Jeanne Felicité, who was “about
44 years having no trade” as well as her adult sons from a previous marriage
collectively stated that that they settled in Philadelphia “after the Conflagration
of Cape Français,” where they “intended to fix their residence” until they could
return “with safety” to Le Cap. In the meantime, “bound by Gratitude” for “the
Hospitality they have received in this Country” they stated that they all would
continue to “behave in a Manner as suitable with the Government of the United
States as it become honest people that Misfortune has struck but not debased.”
Lewis Francis (Louis-François) Morin Duval, a “chemist” and paroled prisoner
of war who arrived from Jamaica, stated that although he was “bound to an
Oath of Allegiance to the French Republic” he registered himself as an alien “to
shew himself submissive to the Laws of Government in which he resides” conditionally stating “the two Countries as yet being at peace with one another.” Jean
Lefeve, “by trade a glass cutter,” and living in Philadelphia “from six months
ago” resided with his uncle “opposite city tavern exercising my trade,” which
Lefeve hoped “to pursue in the United States in the most peaceful manner and
with honesty.” Also “pursuing their trade in the most peaceable manner and
with honesty” were the coopers Etienne Paris, Pierre Nauze, and Louis Neau,
who reported themselves as a single household.59
Similarly, the D’Orlic family attempted to emphasize the peaceful nature of
their stay in the United States. Marie Domin[i]que Jacques D’Orlic and his wife,
Marie Laurence Carrere D’Orlic, both signed their alien report. Mme D’Orlic was not unusual in cosigning the landing report: many elite-status French
women did the same. Their report noted that M. D’Orlic was “late employed in
King’s household” although the couple had in fact arrived in the US from the
French West Indies in 1793. Unsurprisingly, they described themselves as subjects of the king of France rather than citizens of the French Republic. They lived
in reduced circumstances, living “upon the means we brought with us” at “Vine
Street No. 167.” The D’Orlics hoped that “by complying with the laws of the
United States, we [should] find in this continent the safety peace and protection
which has been heretofore granted us.” The D’Orlics were clearly emphasizing
that prior to 1798, they had been relatively unmolested and indeed found safety,
peace, and protection in the United States, but that recently that had seemed less
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the case, despite their impeccable Royalist credentials. While not condoning the
law, they hoped that their compliance with it demonstrated that they were not
in the class of dangerous aliens who needed to be expelled or could be subjected
to informal violence or harassment. The D’Orlics hoped to succeed in obtaining
favorable treatment from the US government while also maintaining a French
identity and legal status.60
In short, families like the D’Orlics and those who chose to present themselves similarly sought to change and influence the enforcement of the laws on
the ground—they complied with the law but made clear that they saw a different picture of the United States and their particular place within it. They were
peaceful people, refugees, seeking asylum. They felt that presenting themselves
in that way to officials of federal courts was a beneficial strategy. Like Moreau de
St. Méry, they viewed their rights as legal persons as entitling them to dignified
treatment by their host country. This strategy had its limits, in that it did not
prevent federal officials from enforcing compulsory registration and using the
threat of deportation against those French migrants whom they wished to expel
from the United States.
Some migrants displayed a different challenge to national citizenship by refusing to associate citizenship with nationality, either by showing their integration into the Philadelphia community, or by explicitly claiming to be citizens
of foreign localities rather than the French Directory. Royalists explained that
they had fought with coalition forces and argued that they were no longer legally
French, regardless of how nativists like Harrison Gray Otis chose to view them.
A few men, already required to list their alien dependents, mentioned their
American-born wives, while others displayed their investment in their communities as taxpayers. Louis Duvivier, who “practice[d] phisick and kept an apothecary shop,” stated, “I am maryed to an American and living in South Front Street
Number 375.” Similarly, Joseph Aubaye, a “merchant taylor” stated that after arriving in Philadelphia from Saint-Domingue in 1794, he “married an American
lady.” Petter Joubert, a goldsmith who “emigrated from Cape Phrensy” stated
that he “has paid tax since his arrivle in . . . 1793” Lewis (Louis) Deseuret, not
only “paid tax” but also “married a native of this country” [the US] from which
union he had “one child born a daughter.” Deseuret intended “to be and remain
a true citizen as long as I remain in [Philadelphia.]” Despite these provisions, federal officials in the 1790s made no move to treat binational couples differently,
although they would in the War of 1812. Similarly, the presence of taxpayers, who
qualified as Pennsylvania voters, indicated that national citizenship overruled
local standing—the penalties of being a national alien overruled local status.61
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Other migrants chose to unlink citizenship from nationality by disassociating the terms from one another in alien registrations, much as Deseuret attached
himself to Philadelphia rather than the US. Francis (François) Rosset displayed
just such a disassociation by stating that he was “a citizen of Grenoble subject of
the Government of France.” Jean Baptiste Lamdry, a tailor, reported himself as
“a citizen of Abbeville in the French Republic.” Andrew Vanderherchen, who
arrived in the US from Cap-Français in 1793, stated that he was “a native of
Namur” which he described as being in “Germany,” or what was then the Holy
Roman Empire and what is presently Belgium. Similarly, Jean Baptiste Thiry,
“a native of the province of Luxembourg,” stated that he was “a subject of the
Emperor” but also that he was an “Officer in the army of his Britannic Majesty
at St. Domingo.” Henry Roberjot was born in Bordeaux but stated that he was
“a citizen of Hamburg since the 10th may 1784.”62
Still others noted that their aid to British forces that had invaded
Saint-Domingue or as aristocratic émigrés in Europe had caused them to cease
to be legally French. Charles Colbert stated that he was “lately from England
where he was Captain in the British Service.” Thomas Badaraque stated that he
was a “subject of his Britannic Majesty by letters of Naturalization Granted to
me by Lord Balcares Governor of the Island of Jamaica.” The aforementioned
Louis Duvivier was “a native of Paris” but a “subject of the King of England.”63
Looking at the overall self-presentation of the migrants appearing in the landing reports, their attitudes toward naturalization itself show that citizenship
was most important for those fleeing from revolution and sensing that return
was not feasible. The sense that naturalization was a valuable protection competed with other possible understandings of their status: exile from their true
homeland and a cultural premium on things French, especially for those employed in occupations such as dancing instructors, French teachers, and artists.
More broadly, migrants were especially likely to have taken steps toward naturalization if they were middle-aged, well-off, highly skilled artisans. For people
who held high positions in government, or hoped to revive plantation slavery on
Saint-Domingue, naturalization held less appeal.
What these documents also show is a community of foreign migrants who were
well-informed about American public events and had a working knowledge of the
American legal system. These migrants worked with their lawyers and cultivated a
relationship with the federal district court in Philadelphia for their naturalization
and other legal needs. Thus, the accounts of suffering in Saint-Domingue, and
expectations of asylum, safety, and peace in the United States make clear that they
believed that their accounts of themselves would elicit favorable treatment from
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federal authorities and allow them to avoid deportation in the event of a declared
war. In order to effect changes in alien policy, it was necessary to engage with federal officials and work with the machinery of the state. That engagement would
have to be on terms with which decision-makers were familiar. Thus, refugees
from the Haitian Revolution emphasized their status as asylum seekers and depiction of the United States as a neutral refuge from the wars of the Atlantic revolutions, and indirectly attempted to validate their presence based on an American
self-conception of the United States as an “asylum for mankind.”64
One of the most effective attempts to influence national policy relating to
citizenship and migration was the successful halting of the passage of the bill
that would have prevented French citizens from entering the United States. The
Senate had already passed the French Passengers Bill and it was being debated in
the House, while panicky rumors of a combined invasion of French “Jacobins”
and Black Dominguans swirled around Philadelphia. The passengers of the ship
Melpomene, predominantly French Royalists who had aided British forces in
Port-au-Prince, were detained and forbidden entry into Philadelphia. Together
with the merchants who owned the Melpomene and other ships arriving from
Saint-Domingue, they launched a public campaign to halt the bill and allay fears
stemming from the misinformed rumors gripping Philadelphians.65
On June 29, as the House debated their exclusion, the passengers and crew
on board the Melpomene, along with its owner, signed a memorial that they forwarded to Congress and to local newspapers. The memorial was a public reply
to published rumors of the supposed invasion that had appeared the previous
day, which the memorial stated were “false, groundless, and calumnious.” The
passengers emphasized their white racial status and control of people of African
descent on board, their peaceableness, their lack of arms, their wealth, and their
strict obedience to local and national American laws and regulations.66
Countering accusations of low economic status, they stated that “we are not
vagabonds and ‘without any funds,’” but rather possessed “sums [of money] on
board more than sufficient to convince the government” of the contrary. Rather
than overwhelmingly Black, the passengers were evenly split between white
(fifty-six passengers) and “negroes” (fifty-five). The memorial stated that rather
than rebellious, “All of the slaves have followed their owners from choice . . . nor
is there one of them that ever bore arms.” The crew was predominantly white
as well.67
The passengers strongly emphasized their obedience to the law. They stated
that “we have submitted ourselves to the laws of the country, and so strictly have
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we done this” that they had prevented “two Americans” from carrying a sailor
off the ship in violation of quarantine, and that all communications with other
vessels had been done in good order and obedience to quarantine. The effectiveness of the memorial can be seen in the sudden change in the terms of the
debate of the bill in Congress. Shortly after Otis had argued that “a Frenchman
is a Frenchman everywhere,” Congressman Samuel Smith of Maryland and Albert Gallatin began to argue along the lines of the memorial that Congress was
about to formally receive—that the passengers had been compelled to board the
ships in Saint-Domingue, and that the merchants who owned the ships were at
risk for financial hardship over a controversy in which they had no choice but
to accept the passengers. Reflecting the memorial of the passengers, Smith also
argued that the enslaved people aboard accompanied their masters by choice, and
were “determined to abide by their masters,” and it would be “cruelty” to “separat[e] these faithful slaves from their masters, who had preferred this state with
them, to freedom without them.” It would be even worse, according to Smith,
to require the ships’ owners to deport the passengers at the merchants’ expense,
which would be “cruelty never before heard of.” The House did not pass the bill.68
In this instance, French migrants were able to mobilize a public response and
effective lobbying campaign in coordination with Philadelphia-based merchants,
defeating an attempt to achieve further national governmental power to regulate
immigration. The merchants do not appear in the congressional record by name,
but they are probably the same merchants involved in trade with revolutionary
Saint-Domingue—including the Franco-Americans Stephen Girard, Benjamin
Nones, and the Bousquet brothers. But responses by French migrants were not
always effective in stemming the growth of a nationally regulated citizenship.69
The presence of French migrants, refugees from the Haitian and French
revolutions, spurred nativist fears about foreign intrigue, which in turn led the
passage of the Alien and Sedition Acts. The acts were part of a Federalist attempt to create a national citizenship. The acts linked rights to citizenship by
denying rights to privacy and freedom from deportation to aliens in peacetime,
which explains how citizenship and rights became linked in the process of the
nationalization of citizenship. More practically, the Federalist program gave the
federal government powers it had previously lacked. The Alien Enemies Act, in
particular, would come very much into force during the War of 1812, as described
in Chapter 3.
Alien resistance to the Federalist program and nationalization of citizenship,
however, could also work to strengthen national citizenship. Migrants who
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threatened violent resistance gave nativists a chance to enforce the new laws
against them, as Colie’s prosecution indicates. The presence of actual French
spies such as Victor Collot provided an excuse to place the entire foreign population in the United States under surveillance. Even when migrants sought
to influence the on-the-ground enforcement of national citizenship, they were
forced to acknowledge federal authority and allow the laws the power of enforcement. Nonetheless, migrant lobbying also won important victories that limited
federal power, most notably in defeating the blanket ban on the entry of French
citizens into the United States.
French migrants employed a number of strategies, but differed from British and Irish migrants from the 1790s in their engagement with the American
public sphere. While French migrants carefully lobbied against laws specifically
directed at them, and engaged with federal officials enforcing compulsory registration, British and Irish migrants engaged in a boisterous public campaign
against the Federalist program, and worked closely with the Republican opposition and press to challenge the Federalists. These activities are discussed in the
following chapter.

Ch a pter 2

Virtual Citizens
Strangers . . . should be admited to all the Priveleges of Citisens.
— Letter of John Shaw to Robert Tennant, December 10, 1801

I

n 1796, John Daly Burk, a new arrival in Boston from Ireland and editor of the Polar Star, made an audacious claim to his readers: “I too am a
citizen,” he stated, and not just of Boston, but of “those [United] States.”
He further claimed that his failure to naturalize was irrelevant to his citizenship
status. “From the moment the stranger puts his foot on the soil of America,” Burk
argued, “. . . he becomes a FREEMAN; and though the civil regulations may refuse
him the immediate exercise of his rights, he is virtually a Citizen.” Burk presented
himself to his readers as a “fellow-citizen,” not because he had naturalized, but
because he, like them, was participating in the open political deliberation and discussion that occurred in the United States and was increasingly being mediated
and influenced by journalists like himself. Burk claimed that such participation
made him not a formal, legal, citizen, but instead a virtual citizen.1
But Burk found that there were limits to the kind of citizenship he proposed.
When Burk wrote inflammatory articles against the Federalist government in
1798, Secretary of State Timothy Pickering was so incensed that he had trouble
deciding whether he should deport Burk or try him first for sedition.2 Federalists like Pickering rejected, or perhaps did not even consider, Burk’s concept of
virtual citizenship. Instead, they responded to the public politicking of Burk and
other radical migrant journalists with an attempt to legislate a form of tiered
rights in the public sphere, restricting free speech rights as well as granting the
federal government the power to deport undesirable foreign residents without
trial. Ordinary citizens, they felt, did not have a right to dissent so audaciously
from official policies in the public sphere, and if they did dissent, they should be
punished. Aliens certainly did not have this right. Rather than merely prosecute
them for seditious libel as citizens were, seditious aliens were to be deported,
where presumably they would not meddle in American affairs.
42
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Burk, like many British migrants, approached issues of citizenship in ways
that differed markedly from most French migrants residing in the United States.
Both French and British migrants faced nativist hostility and, in particular, suspicions that they were dangerous radicals. As discussed in the previous chapter,
French migrants countered by asserting their legal rights, particularly as they
faced the XYZ affair and 1798 passage of the Alien and Sedition Acts. Migrants
from the British Isles had a different response. Overall, they appear to have been
far less interested in legal citizenship and instead advanced an idea of citizenship defined by participation in an imagined public sphere coterminous with the
boundaries of the nation. They also put these ideas into practice in their everyday
lives, along with their interactions with (or avoidance of) the American legal
system that regulated naturalization and migrant behaviors.
Burk’s advocacy for virtual citizenship was part of the lead-up to a conflict
over what rights were inherent in citizenship, a conflict that exploded during
the passage of the Alien and Sedition Acts through the election of 1800. The
conflict was not only about local versus national visions of citizenship and rights
but also about what rights citizens had that aliens did not. During this conflict,
migrant journalists from the British Isles were among the clearest advocates and
practitioners of virtual citizenship, and their public actions ran directly into Federalist opposition. That opposition varied, as some Federalists demanded that
only persons born in the United States should be considered as citizens, while
more moderate Federalists also accepted immigrants who had gone through the
formal process of naturalization.
One way of understanding the motivations behind the passage of the Sedition Act and the conflict between local and national conceptions of citizenship
during the 1798 crisis and its aftermath is to see the period as a failed attempt by
the national government to take control of the meaning and rights of citizenship
from local governments. Similarly, the Sedition Act was a struggle over freedom
of the press, the First Amendment, and the power of the federal government, as
well as a partisan attempt to silence political dissent. Federalists saw the Sedition
Act as a means to end radical printers’ influence over an electorate that those
printers had made unruly, silencing the printers and restoring the electorate to
a quiet deference. The Sedition Act and its enforcement was more than all this:
it not only regulated free speech but its enforcers sought to associate free speech
with citizenship by treating alien violators of the Sedition Act differently from
citizen violators. Free speech became a right of legal personhood. This process
of nationalization occurred through migrant activism and everyday resistance,
but also as a result of choices made by key actors in the executive, particularly
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John Adams and Timothy Pickering, rather than by the courts and Congress.
Additionally, rather than disappearing until the Civil War era, national citizenship persisted, and would be revived to enforce the citizen-alien divide at
the national, rather than local level; the Republican Party allowed this national
citizenship to persist after the 1800 election. 3
Radical migrants saw their political agency as an inherent right that entitled them to a form of citizenship, while members of the Federalist Party saw
their writings not only as a vector of revolutionary fervor but also as a direct
attack on the Federalist conception of citizenship. Federalists sought to remedy
the situation by physically removing dangerous aliens from the nation via the
Alien Act, reinforcing the relationship between the imagined community mediated through print discourse and the regulated geographical boundaries of the
emerging modern nation-state. Naturalized citizens obtained a respite from such
a measure: despite calls for birthright citizenship by some Federalists, Federalist
enforcers of the Sedition Act rejected the distinction between naturalized and
non-naturalized citizens when enforcing the law. But they did reinforce the official divide that accorded naturalized citizens freedom from federal deportation.
During this period migrants had low rates of naturalization, and the idea of
virtual citizenship helps to clarify migrants’ reticence. Virtual citizenship was an
appealing alternative to male migrants from the British Isles because it offered
most of the same benefits as legal citizenship. It was more than residence: virtual citizenship included active exertion of the rights and privileges of citizens.
In Burk’s vision, it also included participation in the mediated public sphere,
and through that membership in the imagined community of the nation. Because Americans accepted migrants from the British Isles as white, and because
those migrants overwhelmingly spoke and often wrote English, they were able
to participate publicly in American politics through newspapers. Furthermore,
migrants’ decisions not to naturalize were further compounded by a reluctance
among native-born Americans (and even other migrants) to see them as culturally American, regardless of their legal status. Virtual citizenship appealed to
migrants when they could avoid the penalties of their alien status, but also when
they found the remaining benefits of citizenship proved elusive.4
Foreign migrants from the British Isles had at their disposal several ideologies or understandings through which to frame their citizenship as a relationship to government and society. Citizenship could be (classically) liberal, giving
them rights, political and economic, that the government could not violate,
allowing citizens to exercise free choice in their lives. It could be a revolutionary transatlantic republican vision, united in support for the overthrow of
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monarchy and tyranny, often based on artisanal radicalism. It could be a status debated through legal discourse, where identity and the self were reflected
through official documentation, or it could be an imagined relationship to the
nation-state and fellow citizens. There were many different ways for migrants to
be citizens. Of these ideologies, virtual citizenship drew primarily on liberalism,
and for some radicals, the revolutionary transatlantic vision, while migrants’
engagement with legal discourse reflected opposition and resistance to enforcers
of the law.5
In addition to the ideologies of citizenship, migrants also needed to address
the practicalities of citizenship. There were different ways not just to think of
their status but different ways to act as citizens. Where did they find it useful,
and how did they apply and deploy their status? For many of them, virtual citizenship was not necessarily a passive identity, but built into their public activities
and encounters with government power and regulation. Sometimes a limited de
facto status proved useful, and gave migrants the benefits of citizenship (absent
a national emergency.) For men especially, this could coincide with a republican understanding of citizenship: they still represented the public face of their
household. Even those activities supposedly reserved to “true” citizens, such as
property ownership and holding public office, could be within reach as well. As
such, their citizenship was active in a liberal sense, largely free from government
control, regulation, or intervention.
This chapter also draws on the records of alien registrations made by foreign migrants in 1798 and the period shortly thereafter to argue for a difference
in deployments in citizenship between migrants from the French empire on the
one hand, and everyday migrants from the British Isles on the other. French migrants showed a willingness to naturalize, while rejecting an American national
identity. In contrast, migrants from Britain and Ireland saw the virtual citizenship proposed and theorized by migrants like John Daly Burk as also being useful in their daily lives. This analysis is based on 173 registrations of migrant heads
of household with the federal court in Philadelphia, and an examination all 761
extant registrations from the War of 1812 for the state of Pennsylvania.6
When the concept of virtual citizenship collided with Federalist ideas of
citizenship, radical journalists put up a compelling fight. Their resistance paid
off. Ultimately, the right to participate in public political debate was deemed to
belong to all free men rather than just citizens: aliens obtained a right to free
speech in the press along with citizens. Of course, those who were illiterate, people of color, or women were effectively excluded from this right, either formally
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or informally. Nonetheless, important boundaries had been established around
the idea of citizenship as a result of the debates and conflicts surrounding the
Sedition Act.

The Expulsion of Radicals from the British Empire
The politically active migrants discussed in this chapter shared the experience of
government attempts to silence them while they engaged in public, political debate in Great Britain and Ireland, at a time when the British government feared
pro-French agitators. Their stories, and decisions to leave for America, began in
the British Isles.
In his later years, John Daly Burk was recalled as “high and lofty in his carriage, haughty in his manners, and imperious and impulsive in his disposition.”
Despite this haughtiness, he “exerted great influence over the young men of
his day, literally leading them captive at his will.” Another described him as “a
fine-looking man, of medium stature; well built, of imposing presence.” It would
be his mediated presence in the public sphere, however, that brought him the
greatest controversy and public attention. 7
Other than his birth in Ireland around 1772, relatively little is known about
Burk’s early life. Raised a Protestant, he was admitted to Trinity College in Dublin in 1792. Trinity College was a key institution in Ireland’s eighteenth-century
Protestant Ascendancy, and its graduates made up much of Ireland’s political and
cultural elite. Despite the economic benefits that Ireland’s Protestants reaped,
they grew increasingly restive and resentful of British control, and Dublin and
Trinity College were sites of venting of discontent and “criticism of established
authority.” The students of Trinity College also were sympathetic to parliamentary reforms such as reducing or eliminating property requirements for voting,
and to Catholic emancipation. The French Revolution greatly inspired Irish reformers, and pushed them toward radicalism, leading to the founding of the
United Irishmen.8
It was in this milieu that Burk began to express political views, perhaps first
in the Dublin Evening Post, which sympathized with the French Revolution.
According to Burk, his affiliation with the paper and the articles published
there came to the attention of the government, which pressured Trinity to expel
Burk; he was tried for heresy and blasphemy, convicted, and expelled. Thereafter Burk became involved in a secret society, part of a network of societies that
would become the United Irishmen movement, which in turn would organize
the 1798 rebellion against British rule. The government was already prosecuting
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members, and Burk, who was under suspicion, decided to leave for the United
States in 1796.
The journalist James Thomson Callender was another radical who would be
expelled from Britain in the 1790s. Like Burke, little is known of his early life.
Most likely he was born in 1758 in Scotland, his father was a tobacconist, and
he may have been orphaned at a fairly early age. He may or may not have been
the nephew of Scottish poet James Thomson. He was raised as a Presbyterian,
probably of the more strict, evangelical, and strongly Calvinist variety. After
receiving a decent elementary schooling, though probably not attending university, Callender obtained a government job at the Sasine Office, copying real
estate documents indicating changes in ownership. He probably married in the
late 1780s, and had children soon after.9
The Sasine office charged fees for searching for, recording, and copying documents. Built into the British patronage system, these fees benefited officials with
sinecures, and although subclerks like Callender were also paid through these
fees, they benefited far less. A new chief clerk, Thomas Steele, manipulated the
fee system to his own benefit at the expense of the poorly paid subclerks. Since
the right to vote was tied to qualifications for property, the office was also involved in the creation of fraudulent voters, once again tied to the patronage system. Callender’s experiences there informed his later political views, especially
when he went over Steele’s head to expose the corruption in the office, only to
find that Steele had cut his government career short in retaliation.10
Pushed out of government employment, Callender turned to writing to make
a living. He had already, in 1782, begun a bold entry into the printed public
sphere with a pamphlet excoriating Samuel Johnson. In 1790, his poetry, which
had been published in local newspapers, attracted the attention of a local patron
of the arts, Francis Garden, Lord Gardenstone. Callender produced more poetry,
some of which criticized British expansion in India, and attacked the patronage
system. Callender then published a pamphlet on brewers’ excise taxes, exposing
corruption in the taxation system, and portraying it part of a system of English
economic domination over Scotland. In 1792, he followed that pamphlet with
another, The Political Progress of Britain, which had originally appeared as a series
of letters in a Scottish newspaper. In his pamphlet, Callender criticized British
imperial policy, the ideology of mercantilism, the manipulation of elections in
Scotland to serve English interests, and advocated for Scottish independence.11
What followed was a brief surge in nationalist sentiment in Scotland, in part
colored by the events of the French Revolution. Callender may have produced
leaflets calling for demonstrations in Edinburgh in 1792, and participated in
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the Associated Friends of the People, a political society whose members encompassed a range of views from reformist to radical revolutionary, with Callender
among the latter. Callender’s participation greatly influenced popular views,
both through his dissemination of radical writings and through his personal
influence with other members of the Friends of the People in Edinburgh.12
By this time, Robert Dundas, Lord Advocate of Scotland, became sufficiently
concerned about political activities of nationalists and radicals to crack down on
their activities. Callender’s Political Progress of Britain continued to sell swiftly,
but it had been published anonymously. Dundas determined to find the author
and prosecute him into public silence. Facing arrest, Callender fled Scotland,
and his former patron denounced him. At the same time as Callender came
under pressure in Scotland, another radical writer from the north of England
would also come under public attack, the polymath Thomas Cooper.13
In contrast to Callender’s struggling origins, Thomas Cooper was born to a
relatively prosperous family in England. His father pushed him toward a career
in medicine or law, but Cooper’s talent for chemistry led him to join a Manchester calico-printing firm, at a time when chemical applications were gaining
importance and value in the industry; the firm also possessed a dye-works that
Cooper seems to have supervised. Cooper was a man of diverse interests, presenting a medical history essay to the Manchester Literary and Philosophical Society
in 1783, while branching out into political and religious philosophy over the
next few years. Cooper later published his early writings in a collection, Tracts,
Ethical, Theological and Political, after his comfortable establishment as a Pennsylvania Supreme Court justice.14
Most notable among his early writings is an advocacy of the Lockean the right
of revolution, and his arguments against the slave trade were apparently the first
to be published in Manchester. Cooper organized an antislavery petition and
donated to antislavery causes during his Manchester years. He was also, briefly, a
leader among the Manchester Dissenting Protestants during a period of controversy over religious policy. Cooper’s own beliefs, leaning toward Unitarianism,
would bring him into contact with another radical: the theologian-scientist-philosopher Joseph Priestley.15
As the French Revolution expanded possibilities for change, Cooper became involved with secular political radicalism in the 1790s. Cooper traveled to
France in 1792 to watch the progress of the Revolution. There he attended events
of the Jacobin Club in Paris, where he and other members of the Manchester
Constitutional Society were introduced by the Jacobin leader Maximilien Robespierre. This introduction took place before the radicalization of Robespierre,
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the Jacobins, and the Reign of Terror. Cooper left Paris before the September
Massacres, the first event that turned away many early moderate supporters of
the revolution.16
Upon his return from France in May 1792, Thomas Cooper discovered that
he had become the target of denunciations by the conservative parliamentarian
Edmund Burke. Cooper responded with an eighty-page pamphlet of his own,
a Reply to Burke’s Invective, wherein he defended his trip to France and association with the Jacobins. The Reply also contained criticism of Britain’s privileged
classes and a forceful advocacy for political reform in Britain, at a time when
government leaders increasingly saw the reform movement as a step toward revolutionary overthrow of government. On May 21, the government issued a proclamation against sedition, which the British government used to silence political
radicals and, casting a wide net, reformers as well.17
Cooper’s enthusiasm for the French Revolution dimmed with the start of
war between Great Britain and France in 1793, and the beginnings of the Terror.
Cooper had begun to consider emigration to the United States, and conducted
a preliminary trip there. In the meantime, the government brought greater pressure against Manchester radicals and reformers. The government arrested another radical, Thomas Walker, and put him on trial. Upon returning to England,
Cooper took up his cause, contributing to a conviction of one of the witnesses
for perjury.18
After his initial trip, accompanied by two of Joseph Priestley’s sons, Thomas
Cooper decided to emigrate to the United States, arriving in 1794. He chose
to settle in Northumberland, Pennsylvania, partly out of a desire to reside in
a free state. Joseph Priestley joined him there, as there were plans to establish a
community for English emigrants nearby. Like many immigrants, Cooper arrived looking for work. Both he and Priestley, who had been friendly with John
Adams in England, wrote to Adams requesting a government appointment,
a request Adams chose not to answer rather than decline, as was his general
policy with office seekers. Cooper and Priestley’s request would later become a
source of political embarrassment and controversy. They both managed fairly
well economically. Cooper saw medical patients but did not charge them fees,
and instead supported himself through legal work. Although his friend Joseph
Priestley remained active in the public sphere, Cooper kept a relatively low profile for the next several years. In the meantime, Federalists became increasingly
concerned about radical migrants in the United States; by 1798 they had begun
to debate whether such migrants’ rights should be restricted regardless of citizen status.19
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Federalists, the Movement for Birthright Citizenship,
and Its Rejection by the Executive
Although Republicans claimed to favor a liberal citizenship that allowed all
white aliens to naturalize, many Federalists believed that citizenship was a fixed
status tied to the place of one’s birth. Federalist advocates for birthright citizenship, headed by Congressmen Harrison Gray Otis and Robert Goodloe Harper,
did not successfully pass any legislation establishing birth in the United States
as the sole criterion for determining citizenship. Federalists in the executive
branch, John Adams and Timothy Pickering, continued to view naturalized
citizens as legally different from non-naturalized migrants, and equal in rights
to citizenship as birthright citizens.
Federalist nativism reflected in part the proportion of foreign-born constituents in the areas that Federalist legislators represented. The leading proponents
of birthright citizenship were Otis of Massachusetts and Harper of South Carolina. These states had comparatively low numbers of white foreign-born residents. Federalists from states with larger numbers of foreign-born residents (and
voters) sometimes argued against birthright citizenship, or sought exemptions
for earlier migrants: although the Maryland Federalist William Craik was willing to prevent any post-1798 arrivals from naturalizing, he advocated allowing
migrants who arrived prior to 1795 to naturalize, stating that many of them
were “Germans, and . . . whose neglect to become citizens was probably owing
to their ignorance of our language and laws.” John Williams, representing New
York State, explained that “he knew a number of men who had taken advantage
of the naturalization law, who perhaps were as good men as any in the United
States,” and argued that “foreigners who come here to reside, and behave well”
should not “be prevented from becoming citizens.”20
Leading Federalists also saw the full rights of citizenship as adhering only
to elites, or themselves. In particular, although voting citizens had the right to
remove unfavored candidates from office during elections, Federalists believed
that they did not otherwise possess the right to dissent by publicly arguing
against government policies, especially during times of political emergency.
Moreover, as representatives of the will of the people, elected officials needed to
preserve their public reputations and dignity. Calumnious, false attacks upon
them therefore needed to be prosecuted. The public sphere was to be polite and
deferential, at least to Federalists.21
These views would come into conflict when newspapermen from the British
Isles brought a new journalistic style to the United States. Rather than abstract
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discussions of policy, and anonymous attacks on unpopular policies and leaders,
the new journalism gave newspapermen an independent, personal voice of their
own, and they used it to personally and publicly attack the reputations of political leaders and other persons in the public sphere with whom they disagreed.22
The new journalism was mean, both in the sense of being vulgar and in being
unkind to its targets. Rather than elevate political leaders through public praise,
the new journalism tore them down to the same level as the general public. Federalists feared that without the means to protect their public reputations, they
would be so leveled. Worse yet, they feared that these journalists, many of whom
were sympathetic to the French Revolution, would bring the Terror to American shores, and that Federalist heads would roll in the streets. Federalists feared
for their own reputation, for their own safety, and for the future of the nation.
While Federalists worried and determined how to respond, the British and Irish
radicals participated actively in American by churning out political writings in
newspapers, pamphlets, and other works.23

British Radical Migrants’ Advocacy for and
Practice of Virtual Citizenship
The migrants who entered directly into the public sphere as journalists and
newspaper editors were a subset of the migrants coming from the British Isles to
the United States for economic reasons. This subset sought employment in the
growing American publishing industry. The politically active radicals dove into
the American newspaper wars and aligned themselves predominantly with the
Republican Party. Like many of their fellow migrants, they often did not bother
with the process of formal naturalization. Although they possessed strong political beliefs, the radicals’ entry into American politics was eased by their status
as journalists; many of them found jobs in the United States as printers, writers, and newspaper editors. These migrants began to act as the virtual citizens
that John Daly Burk believed they were: they were politically active in domestic
American politics, regardless of formal legal status.24
Radical printers theorized and attempted to explain the workings of the public sphere; they postulated a citizenship defined by participation in the public
sphere, which was egalitarian yet restricted other persons from participation.
The eighteenth century was a crucial period for the development of the public
sphere, its relationship to the state, and its functioning as a vehicle for social and
political change. Although the public sphere appeared to create a level playing
field for all participants, it subtly excluded subaltern groups and certain modes
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of expression. Nonetheless, public political participation and coverage of those
events in newspapers served to create a national political culture, and to give
national meaning to local political activities—in part making local citizenship
more national. Printers such as Burk understood their role as active, political
participants in the public sphere, but Federalists such as John Allen also theorized a public sphere even as they acted in it. In other words, contemporary
scholarship has theorized the public sphere, but eighteenth-century Americans
both theorized and attempted to shape the public sphere in thought and deed.25
Virtual citizenship reflected the emerging persuasive power that editors began
to wield in the public sphere through their influence on their readers and on
political debate, while the reaction was an attempt to reinforce a system of social
hierarchy that was coming under increasing pressure from public dissent, using
force to silence that dissent, actions noted by other scholars studying the public
sphere. This section, and this chapter, rely especially on an understanding of the
eighteenth-century public sphere elaborated by John L. Brooke—his key theoretical terms are italicized within this paragraph. Brooke distinguishes between
the formal, legal aspects of the public sphere that are bounded within the term
deliberation; not just the top-down functioning of the state but also parliamentary debate, jury deliberation, and elections, though these aspects of participation are restricted to government officials and full citizens. Immediately outside
deliberation is the field of persuasion, wherein all persons interact—though some
have a greater ability to do so, because they can more easily disseminate their
views through emerging print capitalism. Through their public actions, those
people in the public sphere can either act hegemonically: they can wield cultural
power to reinforce the state and social norms, and work against social change;
or they can dissent; and the hegemonic reaction to dissent can increasingly drift
from dissuasion to force.26
Migrant journalists examined and understood the eighteenth-century public
sphere, which led them to articulate a citizenship defined not by deliberative
rights, but by participation in persuasion mediated through the emerging newspaper culture. By attacking Federalist officials during a time of political emergency, they also revealed that Federalists understood the distinction between
the deliberative political sphere and the broader persuasive portion of the public
sphere that constituted civil society. The Federalists saw migrant journalists as
exercising undue political and even deliberative power, and their solution to that
threat was legal policing of political participation: Federalists saw full citizenship as closely bounded by the strictly deliberative role given to full citizens,
while journalists imagined a wider public sphere, still bounded by the nation,
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but incorporating free (and implicitly white) men in a wider, informal debate
over the deliberative process.
Like other migrants from the British Isles, many of the migrant journalists did not bother with naturalization prior to 1798. James Thomson Callender of Scotland had not naturalized, and neither had John Daly Burk. William Duane claimed that his alleged birth in Vermont in 1760 gave him US
citizenship, even though he had moved to Ireland prior to the Revolution. All
these men would come under pressure for their writings in the 1798 crisis, and
Callender would hastily naturalize to avoid deportation. Burk chose to go into
hiding rather than return to the British Isles, and Duane was denaturalized in
an 1801 court case, though he reobtained citizenship in 1802.27
Without legal citizenship, radical migrants at times felt a need to explain their
presence in the public sphere. Burk had fled Dublin and begun to edit a newspaper in Boston, the Polar Star, in 1796. It was in this paper that he published
the address discussed in the beginning of this chapter. In it Burk claimed that
though he was not a legal citizen, he was a virtual one. Burk argued that he and
other migrants upon their arrival in a nation under republican government experienced a transformation from irrational, uninformed, prejudiced monarchical
subjects into rational, informed, thoughtful, and enlightened men. Changed,
they rejected their old-world prejudices and participated in public debate and
politics with their new neighbors, in the process becoming viable republican
citizens.28
Burk’s address rejected a legal definition of citizenship. Excluded from the
formal category of legal citizenship, Burk instead equated citizenship with participation in the public sphere, specifically the persuasive portion that served as
a counterbalance to official governmental power and actions. Doing so gained
him powerful currency among eighteenth-century readers who viewed the public sphere and its participants as reasoned, disinterested persons collectively seeking to further the public good. Burk also placed himself safely on the proper
side of two important boundaries of the public sphere as his readers viewed it:
first within the bounds of the nation (“those states”), and second as a journalist
contributing to the public good and public order rather than someone irrational
and dangerous. Burk had thought conscientiously about the norms and boundaries of the public sphere, as well as the political meanings of participation in it,
and wrote a careful placement of himself that legitimized his political activities.
Burk further defended himself and other migrants by arguing that republican
government was naturally appealing to migrants and molded them into citizens.
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He tied his belief in virtual citizenship to a theory of republican government
that suggested legal relationships were not really necessary. Republican governments, Burk argued, created an atmosphere that new migrants wanted to join
and participate in, “a moral, intrepid, and enlightened community.” Indeed, new
migrants could not resist participation because of their “natural sympathy” to
such a community, and the migrant “finds his affections irresistibly attracted”
to the community. This attraction itself transformed the migrant into a proper
citizen, thus causing the melting down of prejudices in Burk’s metaphorical
crucible. This magnetic pull and transformation affected not just a few, but it
was “the way in which all strangers are affected when they enter those [United]
states.” For Burk, virtual citizenship was coterminous with the borders of the
American republic.29
Under Burk’s editorship, the Polar Star also incorporated advocacy for a
local version of citizenship within the face-to-face community of the town. This
form of citizenship was defined by the respectful treatment of other members of
the community, as well as a hope for the further refinement of Boston. A letter
writer complained that it was difficult to pass pedestrians on the city’s narrow
sidewalks. The people of Boston had heretofore not observed the “right every
person has to the civilities of his fellow citizens in his town.” The article envisioned a community where people would not endanger and harass one another,
where each public stroller would be accorded respect and space on the streets of
the city, and where members would accord the proper respect due to their fellow
citizens. The author, in particular, hoped that the new proposed rules of public
conduct would “be particularly observed by coachmen, truckmen, cartmen &c.
that strangers may admire the politeness of all classes of citizens.”30
Federalists dismissed Burk as a rebel Irishman who was simply looking for
a place to escape punishment from his true country. In 1797, a Connecticut
author, in a satirical poem entitled “The Muse; Or Guillotina,” had accused
Burk of fleeing Ireland “to save his Bacon.” Burk responded that his ties to his
nation of birth and to those of his adopted nation were not in conflict with
each other. Burk stated that he was “an Irishman well known in his country
as a patriot and a rebel.” But Burk was also “a lover of the federal constitution”
and “attached to the people of America.” Thus, in Burk’s mind, it was possible
to be loyal to the United States and Ireland simultaneously, by linking Irish
nationalism as a struggle against British imperialism (and for republicanism)
akin to the American Revolution. Burk’s defense was later employed by other
Irish migrants, who linked the Irish and American struggles to petition against
the Alien Act.31
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Finally, Burk expressed his virtual citizenship by one other important excursion into the public sphere: the production of a patriotic play, which he had
written on his voyage to the United States. Using his new home, Boston, as a
backdrop, he wrote what proved to be a popular depiction of the Battle of Bunker Hill. Bunker-Hill; or The Death of General Warren: an Historical Tragedy
in Five Acts debuted to Boston audiences at the Haymarket in 1797. Although
thinly veiled Republican propaganda, it succeeded in winning over audiences in
Federalist Boston because it was the first play that depicted local events in the
American Revolution. That it made use of constructed scenery for stirring battle
scenes also helped. Aware of the new and vulgar journalistic style imported from
the British Isles, the manager of the rival Federal Street Theater claimed that the
play was “a tragedy, of the most execrable Grub-street kind” but he could not
help noting that “to the utter disgrace of Boston theatricals, [Bunker Hill] has
brought . . . full houses.” As a success, the play began to be performed elsewhere,
and when Burk moved to New York, a production there was attended by President John Adams. At about the same time, Burk’s second, less commercially
successful play, Female Patriotism, or The Death of Jean d’Arc, opened at the Park
Theatre in New York—it was before the age of Broadway plays, but technically
off Broadway across from soon-to-be-built City Hall. At a time of war between
revolutionary republican France and monarchical Britain, and its reverberations
in domestic American politics, the play recast Joan of Arc as a (secular) revolutionary heroine. The play suffered from bad acting and a hostile reception,
appearing at the same time as news of the XYZ affair and French demands for
American bribes became public knowledge in New York. The audience laughed
at dramatic moments and hissed at the stage; it was a flop despite later praise
from critics. Burk would find that anti-revolutionary feeling in the US would
result in personal and professional difficulty for him as he forged ahead in the
crucible of American political journalism. As did Burk, James Thomson Callender would soon find that the backlash against revolutionary movements would
affect him on both sides of the Atlantic. 32
The state of war and internal crackdowns on dissent meant that the United
States served as a beacon of asylum for many refugees, as it was still neutral in the
French revolutionary wars and as yet relatively unaffected by hostility to radicals.
Callender had initially fled to Dublin, but sensing that he was not safe from
arrest there, he sailed for the United States, arriving in the spring of 1793. Callender needed work, and thanks to letters of introduction from Dublin friends, he
obtained it from the Irish-born Philadelphia printer Mathew Carey. In addition
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to editing sections of a geography book, Callender published his first political
writing in the United States, arguing for US neutrality in the European conflict
on the grounds of preserving its prosperous shipping trade. Callender was quite
willing to participate vocally in American politics, but his political views on
arrival were not necessarily in lockstep with either emerging party.33
Callender then obtained a front-row seat to American politics when he was
hired to cover Congressional debates for the Federal Gazette. This was no easy
task, as congressmen’s speeches were frequently drowned out by loud conversation. Despite the shorthand skills that landed him the position, he found the
speeches too fast to be fully and accurately recorded.34
Transparency and public access to Congressional debate was not uniformly
embraced in the early 1790s. Many politicians and members of Congress instead
viewed the final product of laws and acts passed as the will of the nation—to
expose the deliberative process was to invite factional dissent and chip away at
national unity.
The reticence to expose Congressional debate to public scrutiny combined
with controversies over accurate transcription to embroil Callender in the growing conflicts between the Federalists and the Democratic-Republicans. Callender later noted that in particular, he had “especially irritated” several prominent Federalists: Theodore Sedgwick and Samuel Dexter of Massachusetts, and
Robert Goodloe Harper and William Smith of South Carolina. Of these “Dr.
Smith was far more rancorous than the other gentlemen collectively.” Callender
recorded that during a 1794 debate on British trade policy, “Mr. Abraham Clark
of New Jersey said, [while] looking at Mr. William Smith, that a stranger in the
gallery might suppose there was a British agent in the house.” The charge stuck
and became Smith’s nickname, and he was “burnt in effigy in Charleston.”35
In the meantime, House debates became more rancorous. Callender’s transcriptions became a source of ire not only for the Federalists but even for some
Republicans who denounced his work, with William Giles claiming that it had
“not only misrepresentations, but falsehoods, and contradictions,” while John
Nicholas alleged that supposed speeches he had made had in fact been fabrications, albeit “written in a handsome stile—better than he [Nicholas] was master
of.” Some members of Congress began to push for an official stenographer. In
the meantime, relations deteriorated with Callender’s employer, who took the
opportunity to fire him after discovering that Callender had been moonlighting and writing freelance for another paper, the Aurora, an increasingly prominent opposition paper. Callender believed the firing was at the behest of the
thin-skinned and vindictive William Giles.36
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At the Aurora, Callender became more closely allied with the emerging Republican Party, and wrote in support of its positions on major national issues in
the mid-1790s. He defended the newly formed Democratic-Republican societies,
criticized the harsh response to the Whiskey Rebellion, and opposed the Jay
Treaty, including condemning President George Washington for approving it.
In short, despite his foreign birth, Callender had become a vigorous and strongly
partisan participant in American public debate.37
Although Callender did not articulate a concept of citizenship grounded
by participation in a republican public sphere so clearly, he implied it when discussing political matters and rights. When championing free speech, Callender wrote that Americans possessed the right “of discussing and expressing an
opinion on public men or measures—of influencing by argument—by words as
many of our fellow-citizens, whether rulers or ruled, over to our opinions.” More
explicitly linking free speech to citizenship, Callender further opined: “This is
the right of every citizen in his individual or aggregate capacity.” In other words,
a citizen possessed a right to free speech as an individual and also the collective right to peaceably assemble, to organize politically, and to discuss political
opinions and issues. Callender was extending what Federalists saw as exclusively
parliamentary privilege, and applying it broadly to participants in the public
sphere, either as actual embodied citizens or as virtual citizens in printed discourse. Callender practiced Burk’s conception of citizenship by addressing his
“fellow-citizens” on political matters. Callender showed no great interest in naturalizing until he was threatened with deportation in 1798. Callender not only
equated public participation in the press with citizenship but he also saw free
speech as egalitarian and believed that both governmental officials and public
citizens should be free to speak their minds.38

Federalist Rejection of Virtual Citizenship: Tiered Citizenship
and Enforcement of Naturalization as the Citizen/Alien Divide
Federalists ignored Burk’s and Callender’s model of citizenship in favor of
tiered rights for citizens, with leading citizens exercising full rights. The attempts to deport foreign-born migrants and prosecute them for sedition also
solidified naturalization and citizen status as the attribute that determined
whether a person could be expelled from the boundaries of the United States.
This occurred because the enforcers of the Alien Act, John Adams and Timothy Pickering, rejected native birth as the litmus test of protection against
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deportation, and instead chose to deport only legal aliens like Burk: they allowed naturalized citizens to remain even if those migrants engaged in seditious activities.
Federalist prosecutors went after John Daly Burk in 1798, shortly after passage
of the Alien Act and the Sedition Acts. By that time, he had begun editing the
New York Time-Piece, a paper that was more radical than his previous journal.39 Federalist prosecutors demonstrated not only a belief that rights of free
speech belonged to citizens alone but that citizenship was tiered. Elite citizens,
Federalists believed, had rights that common citizens did not. They possessed
these rights because of their supposed lack of economic dependence on other
men, and also because they believed themselves to be genuinely not subject to
private interests. Federalists did not view artisans as independent because they
depended on the wealthy as a customer base.40 When lower status (and artisan)
alien printers like Burk threatened the Federalists’ concept of citizenship and
sought to bring political leaders down the level of ordinary voters, Federalists
called for aliens like Burk to be literally expelled from the boundaries of the
American public sphere.
Federalists believed that Burk possessed no right to publicly denounce official government policies. He and other foreign migrants were not, in the view
of Federalists, party to the social contract that bound American citizens to the
Constitution, so their dissent was egregious and dangerous in a manner different
from American-born writers who uttered seditious remarks: unlike wayward
lower status citizens who had exceeded their station, they were likely to be carriers of foreign ideas that endangered the nascent American republic, or perhaps
even foreign agents bent on its destruction.
Even if they disagreed on the validity of virtual citizenship, all participants
in American politics agreed on a conception of the public sphere bounded by or
coterminous with the nation. They recognized that public political remarks resonated beyond their local communities in the wider nation and would be heard
by its national government.41 Thus, when migrant journalists made intolerable
pronouncements, they had to be placed beyond the bounds of that public sphere
through deportation.42
Federalists responded so vehemently because they believed that their public
reputations were necessary for ensuring public acquiescence to their status as
political officeholders, and saw the Sedition Act as a tool for preserving those
reputations from attacks in newspapers. The new kind of journalism that began
to appear in the 1790s included personal and public attacks upon prominent
Federalists. Public reputations were the clothing that shielded Federalists from
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being evaluated on the basis of their private lives and actions. The Sedition Act
protected their vision of how citizenship should operate in the United States:
tiered, deferential, and limited. Citizens outside of the federal government
should have only very limited rights to dissent from government views.43
The Connecticut representative John Allen articulated these views on the
floor of Congress. When Republicans attempted to vote down a second reading
of the Sedition Bill, Allen accused them of supporting a dangerous press, stating that the French Jacobins had used the press to sway the “poor, the ignorant,
the passionate, and the vicious” to support the Revolution’s excesses, and that
the “Jacobins of our country” also hoped to “preserve in their hands, the same
weapon [the press]; it is our [Federalists’] business to wrest it from them.”44 Nor
was Allen alone during path from bill to law. Federalists like Harrison Gray
Otis, John Kittera, and Robert Goodloe Harper had already spoken about the
need to silence domestic critics during debates over the Alien Act. Overall, the
Sedition Act passed the Senate easily, 18-6, along straight party lines, while passing the House more narrowly, 44-41. The law “received the enthusiastic support
of Federalists both in Congress and out,” including Alexander Hamilton and
Fisher Ames, and in fact every Federalist who wrote on the issue in 1798, with
the exception of John Marshall, who thought the Sedition Act constitutional
but who presciently saw the law as politically unwise. John Adams publicly defended the law, stating that “licentiousness” and “the profligate spirit of falsehood and malignity . . . are serious evils, and bear a threatening aspect upon the
Union of the States, their Constitution of Government, and the moral character
of the Nation.” More moderate Federalists supported the bill, sensing that even
if a malicious and foreign-influenced press might not bring revolution, it nonetheless could destroy political leaders’ reputations, mislead the voting public, and
thus turn Federalists out of office, removing gentlemen from their proper role
steering the ship of state.45
Similarly, Allen defended the Sedition Act as necessary to maintain public
reputations by preserving the public/private divide. Allen painted a bleak picture of the dissolution of the public-private divide if the Sedition Act was not
passed. “The country will swarm with informers, spies, delators [accusers and
denouncers], and all that odious reptile that breed in the sunshine of despotic
power,” he warned, telling his audience of a gothic, almost vampiric, danger:
they would “suck the blood of the unfortunate, and creep into the bosom of
sleeping innocence, only to wake it with a burning wound.” This danger would
dissolve the barrier between private and public, exposing the intimate private
sphere to the cruelties of the public:
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The hours of the most unsuspecting confidence, the intimacies of friendship, or the recesses of domestic requirement, afford no security. The companion whom you trust, the friend in whom you must confide, the domestic who waits in your chamber, all are tempted to betray your imprudence
or guardless follies, to misrepresent your words, to convey them, distorted
by calumny, to the secret tribunal where jealousy presides.46

The picture Allen drew was one in which private utterances were suddenly
thrust into the public, not only by equals (friends) but also by servants and slaves,
undermining men’s abilities to present themselves and be received in a gentlemanly or respectable manner. And much as Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette
went from figures of public awe, majesty, and respect to figures of public calumny, abuse, and hatred, so a similar fate might pass to the American governing
class if the Sedition Act were not passed to protect government officials from
such attacks.
Allen’s descriptions of the threats upon public reputations bear a remarkable
resemblance to a fable that appeared in an eighteenth-century British publication, the Spectator. A letter to the editor of questionable authenticity described
the activities of a “Club of She-Romps.” At their meetings, the She-Romps suspended the rules of public decorum that respectable women were expected to
obey, and threw “off all that Modesty and Reservedness,” which resulted in a
room “filled with broken Fans, torn Petticoats” and other assorted accoutrements
the club referred to as “dead Men.” The club’s high point, however, was “once a
month [when] we Demolish a Prude,” during which “some queer, formal creature”
was brought to the meeting at which the members would “unrig her in an instant.” The male editor of the Spectator was invited to just such a meeting, which
he declined, for he “should apprehend being Demolished as much as the Prude”
by his presence and witness of the scene. Rather than welcome strangers, like a
public should, the She-Romps attacked and demolished them, removing the materials with which they presented themselves as respectable persons. So it was in
John Allen’s descriptions. Intimacy was ripped open before everyone to see, and
reputations would be destroyed. To preserve their public presentability, the press
must be carefully regulated, lest it cease to function as a public properly should.
More practically, Federalists believed that printers had acquired political power beyond their station, and in a manner that endangered their ideal
of the public sphere in which disinterested gentlemen governed impartially to
promote the general good. Newspapermen acquired the power to influence the
general public, which would become misinformed and insubordinate. It was
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troublesome enough when the newspapermen were native-born but when they
were foreigners importing revolutionary views from Europe they were much
more dangerous. Through their distribution of opposition and revolutionary
opinions, the radical migrants had accrued power and influence that was not
only above their station, but also put a power that should be reserved for officials
in the hands of foreigners who would use it for their own disloyal ends. Federalists hoped to restore public order by clamping down on such printers.47
Despite their distaste for some naturalized radicals, President Adams
and Secretary of State Pickering upheld naturalization as conferring the rights
of citizenship. As leaders of the executive branch, Adams and Pickering were
responsible for enforcing the Alien and Sedition Acts, which Congress had successfully passed in June and July of 1798.48 Pickering sought to target the most
dangerous members of the opposition, citizen and alien, to prevent the spread
of seditious ideas among native-born and migrant alike. In the process, he and
Adams rejected the idea of birthright citizenship that had been championed by
men such as Otis and Harper. Although Adams and Pickering were outraged
when foreign migrants they had targeted for deportation managed to naturalize,
they refused to deport anyone who had become a legal citizen. Thus they gave
naturalization greater significance.
For example, they did not target the English radical Thomas Cooper, who
settled in Northumberland, Pennsylvania, and had naturalized. Pickering saw
Cooper’s political writings and activities as threatening, and hoped to deport
him, but made an unfortunate discovery: “Cooper has taken care to get himself admitted to citizenship,” Pickering wrote to Adams. “I am sorry for it,” he
continued, “for those who are desirous of maintaining our internal tranquility
must wish them both [Thomas Cooper and Joseph Priestley] removed from the
United States.” Pickering once again expressed the Federalist view that once
outside the United States, political radicals would cease to affect US politics—
deportation was, theoretically, a successful remedy for aliens who endangered
the nationally bounded public sphere. Although deportation was not an option
for Cooper, Pickering was no doubt gratified when Cooper’s political writings
proved grounds for a prosecution under the Sedition Act.49
Cooper’s foray into print and politics began when he filled in for the editor
of the local Northumberland newspaper, who may have been feeling the heat
of an increasingly partisan public sphere. Cooper wrote political essays for the
paper, which were collected into a printed volume and sold. As they addressed
US national politics, including opposition to the Sedition Act, and were strongly
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against Federalist policies, they drew the attention of the wider public and the
scrutiny of Federalists on the lookout for possibly seditious writings.50
Up to this point, however, Cooper had written in the tone of a political
thinker to some degree above the partisan fray. But he soon chose to engage in
more partisan attacks, beginning in June 1799. In the Northumberland Gazette,
Cooper attacked Federalist policies and argued that taken collectively, they were
tantamount to an attempt to establish a monarchy in the United States. Cooper
became directly involved in the 1799 Pennsylvania elections, supporting the Republican candidate for governor, Thomas McKean.51
A different incident would ultimately lead to Cooper’s prosecution for seditious libel. Cooper served as counsel for William Duane, whom the US Senate
had charged with defamation. A constitutional question arose: did the Senate
have jurisdiction to prosecute? Duane and Cooper worked with the white Jamaican immigrant Alexander Dallas and Thomas Jefferson, then the vice president,
to coordinate a strategy. Both Dallas and Cooper declined to serve as counsel in published letters, illustrating the unjustness of a possible trial where the
Senate had already determined guilt. Instead, they urged Duane to decline to
appear before the Senate. Cooper’s vigorous public defense and rabble-rousing
language, along with his now-close ties to the Republican leadership, made him
a target of the Federalists. Cooper was charged with seditious libel under the
Sedition Act on April 9, 1800, but the charge was based on his previous statements in the Northumberland Gazette about the establishment of a monarchy
in the United States.52
Despite Cooper’s attempts to delay the trial in order to acquire better evidence for his defense, judge Samuel Chase proceeded with relative swiftness.
Chase allowed Cooper the use of newspaper excerpts rather than official copies of Adams’s speeches, which were the cornerstone of Cooper’s defense. Since
there was no doubt about the fact that Cooper had published his writing, his
defense rested on proving the truth of the claims that he made and further emphasizing the right to criticize the political decisions of those in power. Since
the trial itself was presided over by a Federalist judge appointed by Adams, and
an acquittal was unlikely, Cooper expected his defense to reverberate in the
public sphere. Chase pronounced Cooper guilty and provided the maximum
fine allowable under the law and a sentence of six months. Nonetheless, of the
prosecutions intended to silence the opposition press, Cooper’s trial was one in
which Chase proceeded with relative fairness.
Cooper served his sentence, while friends and associates unsuccessfully
lobbied Adams for clemency, although Cooper’s fine may have been paid by
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Republican benefactors. Cooper, after a short time, resumed political advocacy
in Northumberland, and he would become involved in the controversies over
Alexander Hamilton’s alleged attempts to manipulate the electoral college in
favor of Aaron Burr rather than Thomas Jefferson.53
Pickering also refrained from deporting James Thomson Callender, who
naturalized specifically to avoid the Alien Act. Callender hastily naturalized
in Philadelphia in 1798, and then fled to Virginia to avoid prosecution for the
Sedition Act. Through Republican connections he obtained the editorship of
the Richmond Examiner, and continued to produce criticism of the Federalist
government.54
Pickering may not have tried to deport Callender and naturalized radicals
like him, but he and other Federalists wanted to make clear that the federal
government could exert force in areas where Republican opposition was strong.
Callender and his Richmond newspaper, in the heart of Republican Virginia,
were ideal targets. Pickering gave instructions that Callender’s Virginia newspaper and other writings were to be carefully monitored and examined for seditious writings, and duly prosecuted. Callender soon published a pamphlet, the
Prospect before Us, which contained no less than twenty passages deserving of
prosecution for seditious libel. Callender was tried, convicted, and imprisoned.
Importantly, however, despite his hatred of Callender, Pickering respected the
legality of his naturalization, even though it was undertaken only to avoid deportation. Callender, no matter his foreign birth and suspiciously timed naturalization, was still a citizen.55
Although James Thomson Callender and Thomas Cooper had naturalized and could not be deported under the Alien Act, others under threat had
remained aliens. Cooper’s friend, the chemist and theologian Joseph Priestley,
another radical exile from the British Isles, was concerned about deportation but
did not naturalize. He was saved from deportation by Adams’s refusal to sign
a warrant for him despite Pickering’s wishes. “I do not think it wise to execute
the alien law against poor Priestley at present,” wrote Adams, “. . . his influence
is not an atom in the world.” John Daly Burk, on the other hand, was targeted
for deportation by Pickering, and in his case, Adams made no intervention.56
Burk’s targeting for deportation started out when he shifted back to newspaper editing (and away from playwriting) in the spring of 1798. Partnering
with the elderly Dr. James Smith, and probably receiving support from Aaron
Burr, Burk became the primary editor of The Time Piece. Burk’s editorship coincided with the controversies of the XYZ affair and the passage of the Alien
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and Sedition Acts, as well as the 1798 rebellion in Ireland. Unsurprisingly, considering his support for transatlantic republicanism and involvement with Irish
resistance, Burk began to closely ally himself with the Republican Party. Burk
argued fiercely against Federalist actions, especially the Sedition Act.
Burk, already part of a vociferous newspaper war with pro-Federalist editors,
came under suspicion of the government. Burk “claimed that . . . the seals of
his letters [were] damaged, and his mail examined.” Rumors had begun to circulate about Burk, and the New York Commercial Advertiser printed a story
about him.57
But the real danger began when John Allen quoted the Time Piece on the
floor of the House of Representatives, drawing attention to articles that “implied
that the President had tampered with” diplomatic dispatches in order to provoke
war, and that Secretary of State Timothy Pickering had some role in the mysterious death of an Irish refugee.58
Tensions then spilled out into the streets of New York, where, as in Philadelphia, men wore black or tricolor cockades to publicly demonstrate their political
standing, and young rowdies gathered before the residences of the politically
prominent. Burk, gaining the support of the New York Irish community, “stationed a guard of seventy men to protect the office of the Time Piece.” With such
threats, and expecting an indictment for sedition while in financial straits, Burk
ceased printing his newspaper, with the last edition on August 30, 1798.59
From there, things took an ugly turn with his business partner, Dr. James
Smith. The two disagreed about matters relating to the dissolution of the business, and to whom remaining subscriptions fees were owed. Burk took out newspaper advertisements urging his former readers not to pay their balances to an
unnamed “person or persons,” and holding out hope that the paper would be
revived to once again launch its salvos against the Federalist Party. Smith replied
with a number of claims that put Burk in a bad light: that the original contract
did not allow for the printing of seditious material, and that Smith had done
the heavy financial lifting in getting the paper started and Burk still owed him
money, and that Smith was collecting moneys due because he had also “assumed
the debts of the partnership.”60
With the Adams administration targeting politically active foreign migrants
in general, and Burk in particular, the government persuaded him to self-deport.
Burk planned to board a ship bound for Bordeaux in France, but later claimed
that there was “an actual attempt to seize me” despite his willingness to leave voluntarily. He was also “watched by the spies of the British minister” and “induced
by the advice of some of the best men in America to postpone my departure.”
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Burk informed Pickering that he planned to travel instead to New Orleans, then
under Spanish rule. Pickering was suspicious of these claims, warned the governor of the Mississippi territory, and indicated a willingness to prosecute Burk.
Pickering was right to be suspicious: Burk chose to go into hiding in Virginia,
with the assistance of his Republican friends.61
Despite acquiring the power to deport during the 1798 crisis, the federal government did not directly exercise this power. Rather, the power to deport served
as a tool in the coercive arsenal that Pickering and other Federalists deployed
against foreign migrants. The Department of State was overwhelmed with a
large number of duties for its tiny staff. Consequently, direct proceedings, even
when working in concert with the judiciary and federal prosecutors, could prove
unwieldy. Instead, Pickering opted for a strategy of encouraging “voluntary” departure and self-deportation. This strategy was discussed in the previous chapter,
as the largest group to voluntarily leave were migrants from the French empire.
What matters more specifically here is the role of naturalization: naturalized
citizens were not brought under the same pressure, only foreign migrants. It
was the threat of deportation, rather than deportation itself, that Pickering deployed, and he used it only against aliens and never against citizens. Inversely,
he did not choose to prosecute aliens under the Sedition Act, only citizens.62
Federalists did score a legal victory when they successfully denaturalized William Duane and more closely associated citizenship with the territoriality of the
United States rather than a liberal incorporation of those migrants who had
supported the Patriot cause elsewhere. In the eyes of Federalists, the newspaper editor Duane was not, despite his claims, an American. Duane claimed to
have been born in Vermont in 1760, but his Irish-born mother moved her family
back to Ireland in the early 1770s, before the Revolution. Duane subsequently
lived in India and England, coming to the United States in the 1790s. In 1801, a
libel suit against Duane, stemming from a statement published in January 1800,
came to trial in the suit Hollingsworth v. Duane. The court ruled that all persons born in the British dominions but not present in the United States at the
time of the Revolution were not citizens of the United States, which set a legal
precedent that continued to be enforced through the nineteenth century. The
decision came too late for Pickering to target Duane for deportation. The court
restricted citizenship to the borders of the United States as established in 1783:
it was not possible to choose republicanism elsewhere in the British Empire and
be eligible for US citizenship. Regardless of whatever support British subjects
elsewhere in the British dominions gave to the rebellious colonists, they were not
eligible for citizenship. In Federalist eyes, a discrete community (comprising the
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colonies) had severed its governing ties and established a republic (the United
States). Those not present at this time of separation had not been in the position
to choose a Patriot or Loyalist side, and would have to be slowly incorporated
into the community through naturalization. In this particular instance, the
broader, liberal possibilities of citizenship were curbed to conform somewhat
more closely with national border delineation.63
The end result of the enforcement of the Alien and Sedition Acts and the
election of 1800 that installed Thomas Jefferson in the presidency was a victory
for virtual citizenship, but also the disassociation of the right to free speech with
citizenship and its subsequent attachment to legal personhood. Despite Federalist attempts to treat citizens and aliens differently, that right did not ultimately
adhere to citizenship. This transition was aided by Republican electoral victory
in 1800, which ended federal attempts at deportation.64
As for the radicals specific to this chapter, their transitions represent a
political-cultural Americanization that continued post-naturalization. Of those
who lived a significant time past Jefferson’s election, many shifted toward a regional, white American identity, particularly John Daly Burk, James Thomson
Callender, and Thomas Cooper, who all acculturated to Southern surroundings.
In contrast, William Duane remained in Philadelphia and continued to be a
leader in the Irish-American community.
John Daly Burk had decided, at the last minute, against his own
self-deportation and had gone to Virginia to live under Republican protection.
Burk did not initially prosper; the Virginia Republican elite, while hostile to the
Federalist-controlled national government, were not fully disposed to give him
work. Burk languished and accumulated debts, and, he would later claim, “notified Pickering of his whereabouts and readiness to stand trial.” The Virginians
came through shortly after the 1800 election with a position as a trustee of the
newly established Jefferson College. With the Alien Act expired and Federalists
defeated, Burk could once again come out into the open.65
But it was not to last. Burk, who “had a way with the women,” was rumored
to have had an affair with a local married woman, which led to an attempt on
Burk’s life. Although the husband later “publicly admitted his wife’s innocence,”
Burk decided it best to leave. He moved to nearby Petersburg, established himself as a lawyer, and became a naturalized US citizen in 1802. Burk settled into
Petersburg society, married, had a son, was widowed, was accused of fathering a child in a bastardy case, and wrote several more plays. He also wrote a
three-volume history of Virginia, a well-received work with numerous excerpts
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from primary sources that continued to be used among historians into the early
twentieth century.66
John Daly Burk, advocate of virtual citizenship, lost his life owing to continued nationalist conflict in the Atlantic world, in an incident where international
war played out into local, interpersonal hostility. Powell’s Tavern had become
the place where Petersburg’s local elite wined, dined, and talked politics. The
French government began to “sequester” US ships as part of the development of
Napoleon’s Continental System, despite President Jefferson’s embargo against
Great Britain. Dining at Powell’s Tavern on the evening of April 9, 1808, Burk
took part in the political talk and began to express anger at French actions at
a time when the US was attempting to extricate itself from the British trade
bloc. Burk went “so far as to call the entire French people ‘a pack of rascals.’” At
this discussion, a Frenchman, Felix Coquebert, was present and took personal
offense, and wrote to Burk demanding an apology. Burk declined to give one
and a duel ensued. Coquebert shot Burk through the heart and he died at the
scene. Dueling was then legal, but owing in part to this incident, the Virginia
legislature banned it in 1810.67
Like Burk, Thomas Cooper adopted Southern ways, and even became a leader
of South Carolina’s nullification movement. Prior to his move south, while still
a Pennsylvania resident, Cooper became involved with settling land claims between Pennsylvania and Connecticut while he angled for a federal judgeship,
which he received in 1804. He retained a politically independent streak despite
a warm relationship with Jefferson in the period immediately after the 1800 election. Cooper nonetheless began to drift in a more politically conservative direction, brought shortly to the fore in the political split between radicals and moderates among Pennsylvania Republicans in 1805. Cooper disassociated himself
from both state factions, and lost his judgeship in 1811. He then shifted toward
science, becoming an instructor of chemistry at Carlisle College, now Dickinson
College, and subsequently at the University of Pennsylvania and then at South
Carolina College in Columbia, where he served as president of the college.
In his final years, Cooper became a strong advocate for South Carolinian ultraconservatism, grounded in white supremacy and vigilant protection of South
Carolina’s slave society. He was one of the leaders of South Carolina’s nullification movement, and would remain politically active until shortly before his
death in 1839. He favored the legal denization of African Americans, denying
citizenship to them, supported prohibitions against interracial marriage, and
viewed slavery not as a Jeffersonian necessary evil but rather as a positive good
for slaveholder and enslaved. Cooper’s shift from his early antislavery advocacy
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in England is in many ways similar to the experience of many European immigrants to the US, especially those who came to reside in the South, as was also
the case with James Thomson Callender.68
When Callender came to reside in the South, he stayed closer to his
working-class roots while adopting strongly racist views. The year 1801 started
off well for Callender. Not only was he released from prison but he was literally
the toast of Virginia: Virginian leaders raised their glasses to his name at public
celebrations. It seemed that Virginians and the Republican Party had recognized
the sacrifices he had made for Jefferson and other leaders, and surely they would
reward him for his efforts. Jefferson, now president, could dispense patronage
and federal positions to his allies. Callender felt that, considering his service
to the cause and aid to Jefferson, the postmastership of Richmond was not an
unreasonable request.69
Jefferson did not come through with the job. He chose to favor moderates
over radicals, and when Callender visited Washington to seek work from the administration, his lack of success, despite a meeting with Secretary of State James
Madison, turned to rage. Callender destroyed his relationships with the party
leaders, and they were even less interested in offering him employment after the
visit. Furthermore, Callender had quarreled with nearly all the printers in Richmond and nearby Petersburg, making his regular work difficult to obtain.70
Nonetheless, Callender’s situation improved slightly. His fines from the earlier prosecution were finally paid off by his Republican allies, and Callender
held back from his vicious, attacking style in print. He began to write for the
Richmond Recorder, a paper established by a new printer, Henry Pace. Their
relationship soon turned into a business partnership. Pace leaned Federalist, but
Callender, no longer expecting anything from the Republican Party, provided
independent political coverage. In particular, Callender declared war on the
Virginia gentry, regardless of party, and sought to expose what he saw as their
hypocrisy.71
The chief hypocrisy, in Callender’s mind, was miscegenation. Elite Virginia
men began relationships with enslaved women, often laboring as prostitutes.
Despite what had arguably been antiracist views while in Scotland, Callender
shifted toward a proslavery stance after spending some time in the United States.
Unsurprisingly, in his reporting, he was not especially sympathetic to the actions
and limited choices that enslaved women faced. Sex work may well have been
one of the few avenues for women of color to accumulate property and money
with which to free family members. Nor did Callender seem to have viewed any
of what transpired as rape or even tenuous consent between two very unequal
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parties. What Callender disapproved of was the sexual excess of Virginian men,
and what he saw as Virginian men’s preference for relationships with women
of African descent over relationships with their own (white) wives. Callender
further disapproved of white men’s willingness to be seen in public with such
companions, and their willingness to spend time in Black society. In short, he
disapproved of women whom he believed to be sexually disreputable rising above
their station, a view reinforced by racist views about women of African descent.
Specifically, the widowed Callender was not especially troubled by unmarried
men engaging in these activities, so long as women of color did not occupy a permanent station that should, in Callender’s view, be reserved for a white woman.72
Americans had a taste for gossip and Callender was starting to deliver it,
sometimes backed with substantial evidence. Readers soon learned about fellow
printer Meriwether Jones’s killing another white man during a duel started by
a dispute over sexual access to a woman of color. Stories like this, coupled with
Republican press counterattacks upon Callender, broadened his audience outside Virginia.73
The attacks also resulted in the publication of Callender’s most notorious
exposé: he made public Thomas Jefferson’s relationship with Sally Hemings.
Callender chose to do so in response the claims from Republican newspaperman William Duane that Callender’s wife had died of a sexually transmitted
disease, while Callender spent his money on drink and left his children starving.
Callender broke the news with the following item in his newspaper:74
The President Again.
It is well known that the man, whom it delighteth the people to honor,
keeps, and for many years past has kept, as his concubine, one of his own
slaves. Her name is SALLY. The name of her eldest son is TOM. His features are said to bear a striking although sable resemblance to those of the
president himself. The boy is ten or twelve years of age. His mother went
to France in the same vessel with Mr. Jefferson and his two daughters. The
delicacy of this arrangement must strike every person of common sensibility. What a sublime pattern for an American ambassador to place before
the eyes of two young ladies!75
He continued with updates on the story as he obtained more information,
and other newspaper editors looked to confirm details. The exact sources for
Callender’s story are not entirely clear: he may have received a visit from Federalist (and chief justice) John Marshall. Jefferson had received many visitors
at Monticello, and the story had circulated for some time among the Virginia
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gentry. The appearance of biracial children in planter households was a frequent
topic of gossip among white slave owners, along with speculation about their
parentage. Less common, however, was the acknowledgment that these relationships were part of the system of exploitation by white men of women and people of African descent. Strangely, one of the few acknowledgments came from
Callender’s newspaper rival, Meriwether Lewis, who attempted to explain away
Jefferson’s children as the product of some other interracial relationship:76
In gentlemen’s houses everywhere, we know that the virtue of unfortunate
slaves is assailed with impunity. . . . Is it strange, therefore, that a servant of
Mr. Jefferson’s, at home where so many strangers resort . . . should have a
mulatto child? Certainly not.77
Callender’s discussion of the relationship showed a disconnect between his
stated views and his disclosure of Sally Hemings’s relationship with Jefferson.
Jefferson, a widower, was in a similar position to Callender himself. Although
the relationship was the subject of talk among white Virginians, it had, up
to that point, existed in the private sphere. As the historian Annette Gordon-Reed has shown, Callender’s decision to expose was motivated by racism,
or more specifically, several kinds of racism that women of African descent have
long experienced: first, a view that Black women’s feelings, desires, and wishes
did not matter—what Hemings might feel about her exposure to the mediated public sphere almost certainly did not come into his thinking; second,
the view that women of African descent were sexually disreputable and could
be picked up and discarded by white men, but were never to occupy a social
place reserved for white women. To deny or obscure white men’s overwhelming
power in these relationships, the idea of the Jezebel, a sexual temptress who
manipulated men’s desire to extract what she wished, further legitimized Black
women’s exploitation. Callender probably viewed the Jefferson-Hemings relationship in this light, and saw it as preventing Jefferson from allowing a white
woman to occupy the place of wife and mistress of Monticello, and producer
of legitimate white offspring.78
Callender did not confine himself to Jefferson, but continued to expose the
embarrassing details of the lives of Virginia’s rich and powerful. To attack Callender, or challenge his claims, would only result in more embarrassing public revelations. Ultimately, Callender would be silenced by his former lawyer,
George Hay, and as the historian Michael Durey has noted with irony, Hay
was also the “author of the extreme libertarian Essay on the Liberty of the Press
(1799.)” While Callender was out one day, seeking the translation of a work, Hay
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approached him from behind, and began to deliver a brutal caning, an incident
that Callender described as follows:79
I felt a violent stroke on my forehead. An immediate effusion of blood was
so violent, that, for some moments, it was impossible for me to distinguish
who my adversary was. . . . I had hitherto considered that high crowned
hats were a mere species of foppery. But it was this kind of hat which saved
my life.80
Callender chose to take the incident to court, and Hay countered with a legal
maneuver: in Henrico County Court, he sought “a recognizance of Callender,
preventing him from publishing anything detrimental to Hay’s, or any other
Virginian’s character.” Hay’s legal team argued that Virginia’s interpretation of
common law “permit[ed] persons of ill fame to be bound over on account of
their bad reputations” with no need even for a prior libel conviction. Callender
refused to offer recognizance, “and was committed to Richmond jail.” His stay
was brief, for three weeks after the caning incident “a new bench of magistrates
in Henrico County . . . rejected Hay’s arguments” and ordered his release.81
But things went downhill for Callender after that. The Richmond Recorder, which had at its peak a then-impressive thousand subscribers, began to
taper off in popularity. Callender had already printed all his juiciest stories,
causing readers to lose interest once he ran out of the most salacious items. Relations with his copublisher Henry Pace deteriorated and they began to fight
over money. The tables turned when it came to shocking gossip: ugly details
about the two began to come to light, and Pace accused Callender of expressing
sexual interest in Pace’s brother, while Callender claimed that Pace had acted as
his pimp. Callender began to drink heavily, wandering the streets of Richmond
drunk, and not long after, his dead body was found in the James River. He was
forty-five years old.82

Ordinary Migrants and the Utility of Virtual Citizenship
Ordinary migrants from the British Isles also sought their own conception
of citizenship, and it was often the virtual citizenship described by John Daly
Burk. Virtual citizenship, and its emphasis on participation in the public sphere,
especially as mediated through printed newspapers, was not just a theoretical
construct of a few radical migrants but rather the everyday way in which many,
if not most, migrants from the British Isles saw their public and political lives
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as operating in the United States. They were able to apply Burk’s conception of
virtual citizenship by making use of the privilege they had as white persons and,
for many, as English speakers. Moreover, they could participate as fully in the
printed public sphere as their native-born neighbors. Belief in virtual citizenship
proved popular with migrants from the British Isles, but it was by no means
universal.
One migrant who personally rejected virtual citizenship nonetheless described its popularity. The former United Irishman John Caldwell wrote disapprovingly to his associate Robert Tennant in Belfast about Irish emigrant
politicking:
. . . I wish I could say so much of our Country men—the Labourer, the
farmer, the weaver, on coming here, all incline to live in large Towns, this
may arise from the known character of the Irish—we are to use a trite
saying, so warm hearted, we wish to live together & to be in the way of
hearing often from our friends, but this disposition is often attended with
ruin to Individuals and dishonour to our National character—I have often
seen the Man, who with his family might have made a figure a 100 Miles
from Town & there been respectable as a Citizen & a man—lose his little
property in the dram shop he kept—lose his time by attending to Political
controversy & matters that as an Alien did not concern him or at all events
which his interference could not better, & lose the respectability of himself
& his family by the consequences which must generally arise from such a
line of conduct. . . . 83
Although they were not citizens, if Caldwell is correct in his claims, these
Irishmen were actively engaged in politics and the public sphere, and operated
as virtual citizens. The men in question were investing themselves deeply in
the emerging political cultures of American cities. Men who operated “dram
shops” or grocery stores became a nexus of a male-dominated social world that
enabled them to network, court potential voters, manage ward politics, and
provide spaces for both public and private political meetings. Such politicking
was useful, and provided political and economic opportunities beyond the dram
shop’s immediate success. Such political activity also created and fostered ethnic
constituencies, although they were not necessarily as organized as they would
become in the mid-to-late-nineteenth century. Just as Burk described a form
of citizenship that was implicitly male, this urban politicking incorporated artisanal and laboring free men at the expense of people of color, women, and
unfree men.84
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Another migrant, the Irish-born John Shaw, found that his personal connections in New York allowed him to enjoy the benefits of citizenship without having to naturalize. Nor was he shy about voicing his views on American politics
back home. “The Pressedents Spech is now on the deske before me,” he wrote to
Robert Tennant in Belfast, referring to Jefferson’s 1801 speech prodding Congress to repeal the Naturalization Act of 1798, and Shaw wrote hopefully of the
new president:85 “[Jefferson] recomends Strongly that all Restrichons Should be
taken off Strangers that they should be admited to all the Priveleges of Citisens
and except the privelege of being officers which he alows they may be eligible
to in a Short times residence they should be taken in to Confidence”86 In other
words, what pleased Shaw was not so much the repeal of the fourteen-year restriction on naturalization, but rather the penalties applying to alien status. Similarly, Shaw found that New York State’s restrictions on alien land ownership
made it difficult to buy the farm he wished to own, but he was able to exercise
personal political leverage to get what he wanted:
Br[other] W[illia]m recomended to me to Comence farming . . . but when I
made enquiry & could not own property and dispose of it as being an alien
I have over the notion of purchassing, but an old veteran General Clinton
who is my Neighbour and a real Republican advised me to petition our
State Legeslature for this privelage and he is one of our Representativs so
that I and 12 others got that prevelage. . . . 87
Once again, Shaw was concerned less with his alien status than with integrating himself into the Republican establishment. He was able to obtain the same
treatment as a citizen, and successfully obtained the right to own real estate.
Shaw viewed his experience so favorably that he thought that the distinction
between citizen and alien would cease to matter: “The very name of Alien will
not be known among us,” he wrote back to his friend in Ireland.

Naturalization Patterns in the 1790s:
Naturalized but Still French vs. Virtually American Britons
Ordinary migrants from the British Isles often opted for virtual citizenship,
just as many printers did, or contented themselves with it when full citizenship
was unavailable. This contrasted with a common pattern among migrants from
the French empire, who more often pragmatically entered into the naturalization process. This may have occurred because British migrants were able to obtain many of the advantages of citizenship without naturalization, including
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participation in the English-speaking public sphere, while migrants from the
French empire found their language to be more of a barrier.
Documents from the 1798 crisis reveal the different ways citizenship was deployed among British and French migrants. Under the terms of the Naturalization Act of 1798, all white aliens were required to register with the federal
government. Not only did this requirement apply to aliens entering the country,
whose information was to be recorded and passed on by local port authorities, it
also applied to alien residents who had arrived prior to 1798. Information about
recent migrants was easier to record and gather, but there are few extant records
of alien registrations of foreign residents who entered prior to 1798, all of them
from the federal judicial district that comprised Philadelphia and nearby areas.88
Despite the large presence in Philadelphia of many unnaturalized migrants
from the British Isles, none of them registered. They ignored the law, and do not
appear to have suffered any consequences. In contrast, 173 heads of household
from the French empire did register. Many came not from metropolitan France
but from the colony of Saint-Domingue, the future Haiti. When registering,
they were required to state their reasons for remaining in the United States,
and whether they had begun the naturalization process. Whether citizens of
the French Republic or subjects of the king of France, they often displayed similar attitudes toward naturalization: they pragmatically moved to gain legal citizenship at the same time as they continued to emphasize their French cultural
identity. Indeed, many of these migrants expressed a clear desire to return to
their country of birth.89
An earlier migrant is a good example of this combination. Charles-Maurice
de Talleyrand-Périgord, Marquis de Talleyrand, described in his memoirs his
decision to leave France for England in 1793, fearing for the future of the monarchy and his own personal safety. Increasing anxiety about French refugees led
the British foreign secretary William Grenville to seek and secure Parliament’s
passage of the 1793 Alien Bill, whose provisions served as a model for the American Alien acts. Talleyrand claimed that he was one of the chief targets of the
act, and that his letters of intercession to cabinet leaders “Mr. Dundas, Mr. Pitt,
and to the king himself ” were unsuccessful. Thus in 1794 he found himself on
a ship bound for Philadelphia. Talleyrand seems to have viewed his status in
the United States as an exile, but he maintained a pragmatic attitude toward
legal-political citizenship. He took the oath of allegiance in 1794, a time when
the political future of exiles from France seemed especially uncertain. Even so,
he wrote to the politically active intellectual salonnière Mme. de Staël about
his strong desire to return: “If I stay here another year, I shall die.” Talleyrand’s
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fortunes, however, revived: de Staël secured permission for his reentry. Talleyrand returned to France in the spring of 1796, where he used his political skill
and connections to secure the post of minister of foreign affairs under the government of the Directory.90
Also exemplary of French attitudes and naturalization patterns, if not so well
known, was Jean Simon Chaudron, perhaps the same Chaudron who was the
legal guardian to Benjamin Maingault, who was discussed in the introduction.
Chaudron also took steps toward naturalization after the end of the Haitian
Revolution, commencing legal action in United States District Court in Philadelphia on June 21, 1805. Chaudron was a watchmaker, and elite artisans (goldsmiths, watchmakers, and jewelers) were more likely than lower-status artisans to
take steps toward naturalizing. Out of the eleven elite artisans who appear in the
1798 alien registrations, six took steps toward naturalization, while only five of
fourteen nonelite artisans did so. Elite artisans had a higher rate of taking steps
toward naturalization than other elites such as planters, lawyers, doctors, and
highly ranked French government and military officials, where only thirty out
of sixty-four did so. Chaudron left Saint-Domingue in July 1793, “on board the
American Schooner Charming Betzi [Betsey] Cap[tain]: Hart [Art].” Although
he does not explicitly say so in his landing report, Chaudron was probably a
refugee from the 1793 battle and conflagration of Cap-Français, when that city’s
inhabitants sought escape from fighting and fire in the French ships docked in
the harbor, depositing thousands of predominantly white refugees in the United
States. Those who identified themselves as refugees from that battle were more
likely to take steps toward naturalization than migrants from Saint-Domingue
who did not. Among the alien registrations, there is a very slight trend toward
naturalization among migrant heads of household who indicated refugee status:
only thirty-five out of eighty-eight (or 39.8 percent) of nonrefugees took clear
or possible steps toward naturalization, while forty-two out of eighty-nine (or
47.2 percent) of refugees did. Fourteen out of the twenty-five refugees from the
conflagration (or 56 percent) took steps toward naturalization. The disruption
of white Dominguan society and reordering of the economy left many migrants
sensing the instability of their condition, and for someone like Chaudron, these
conditions still held in the 1790s. Although many former planters sensed that
Toussaint L’Ouverture’s revival of the plantation economy would allow them
to resume their former status in Saint-Domingue, the elite artisans who had
supplied them with luxury goods before the revolution do not seem to have been
as optimistic, and were more likely to take steps toward naturalization than
planters.91
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Many other French migrants provided evidence of the cultivation of an exile
or refugee status when registering as aliens. In the landing reports, registrants
were required to state why they had chosen to stay in Philadelphia. Most responded with a boilerplate response: “until his business shall carry him elsewhere.” Among those who offered other reasons, the most common, given in
six forms, were those who remarked on the lack of safety in their previous places
of residence (e.g., “until the peace should be restored in his native country”). In
contrast, only two respondents indicated a firm intention to remain in Philadelphia permanently. Many migrants from the French empire saw naturalization as
useful, but ultimately did not intend to stay in the United States.
British migrants, by contrast, do not appear to have registered. There are no
extant returns for migrants from the British Isles among the alien registrations
in Philadelphia. They ignored the law, with few consequences. Despite the
threats of the Alien Act and the organization of passage back to France and
Saint-Domingue in 1798, no similar actions were taken against migrants from
the British Isles. Pickering and the enforcers of the 1798 laws chose to focus their
energies on a few prominent troublemakers rather than on the British and Irish
migrant populations as a whole.
Why did French and British migrants approach citizenship differently? Language was certainly one factor, but there may have been other reasons as well.
Migrants from the French empire worried about their political and economic
well-being in ways that the British migrants did not. The migrants from the
French empire in the United States comprised refugees from two revolutions:
those who had fled the French Revolution in Europe, and those who had fled the
Haitian Revolution (some even fled both.) These upheavals meant that refugees
had experienced great changes in legal, social, and economic status: political
leaders became enemies of the state, bishops became laymen, subjects became
citizens, slaves became freewomen, planters became umbrella makers. Uncertain
of whether they might be allowed to remain in the United States during a period
of hostility to aliens and fearful of reprisals in their homelands, many opted for
naturalization. Still others saw the economic conditions in their places of flight
as insufficient to carve out a living, while others hoped to use US citizenship as
hedge even as they worked on regaining their lost properties and status in France
or Saint-Domingue.92
French migrants found that retaining a French identity was useful in the
United States, regardless of whether they became legal citizens. French migrants
carved out an economic niche in marketing gentility in a culture that placed
a premium on things French. Americans felt that music was best taught and
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played by Frenchmen, French artists drew better drawings and painted more
pleasing paintings, and so on with glassmakers, dressmakers, milliners, and
naturally French teachers all finding a commercial advantage in emphasizing
their ties to France. Persons seeking to charge better prices and bring in more
clients found it necessary to emphasize their Frenchness and consequently retain
a French cultural identity.93 An identity and presentation as exiles also helped in
regaining property, status, and rights of entry to France and Saint-Domingue,
which in the late 1790s seemed more amenable to the resettling of émigrés.
In contrast, migrants from the British Isles did not need to cultivate a foreign
identity. Instead of having to find new occupations and livelihoods on their arrival, migrants from the British Isles of both high and low economic status often
had a job waiting for them on their arrival. British manufacturers sent their sons
or other male relatives to sell wares in the United States, while the weavers and
other industrial workers they employed in Britain emigrated with the expectation of finding employment through their social networks.
Naturalization was a long process that offered few benefits, and many migrants saw no need to bother with it.94 This was particularly the case with migrants from the British Isles. Alien status was one of many legal disabilities, and
a mild one when migrants from the British Isles could legally assert their rights
and privileges as white persons in a legal system of common law with which they
were already familiar. Consequently, migrants from the British Isles, in particular laboring male migrants, opted for Burk’s vision of citizenship because it fit
their everyday needs as public actors.
Although it was possible to avoid alien legal disabilities, virtual citizenship
also appealed to migrants because the full cultural benefits of citizenship did
not always accompany naturalization. Sometimes the benefits of naturalization
were illusory—migrants might legally be American, yet still be perceived as
foreign. Some migrants wrote glowingly of the post-1800 changes, but others
remained frustrated by the ongoing disconnect between the liberal promise of
volitional allegiance and the ascriptive American identity that prevented naturalized Americans from being perceived as truly “American.” Republicans and
Federalists both engaged in such behavior. For instance, when the members of
the French Masonic lodge (including Jean Simon Chaudron, who was discussed
earlier in this chapter), offered a eulogy to the recently deceased George Washington, Thomas Jefferson wrote to Auguste Belin, a member of the lodge, characterizing the activity not as one of informal citizens honoring their deceased
leader but rather of “foreigners” offering Americans a “fraternal homage.”95
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There is also an 1809 document that demonstrates migrant frustrations with
nativist unwillingness to view naturalized migrants as fully American, although
the circumstances of its generation means it should not be taken at face value.
Despite those circumstances, it offers clear evidence that such attitudes resonated with the foreign migrant community. The “adopted Republican Citizens
of the City of New York . . . unanimously adopted, and ordered to be published”
an announcement decrying a nativist unwillingness to accept naturalized citizens on equal terms with the native-born, stating that:96
We complain not of the constitutions and the laws: they are liberal in
principle and benign in operation. They enjoin an abjuration of former
allegiance: have we not with alacrity complied with the injunction? They
require an oath of fidelity to the union and to the states: devoted in spirit
and in truth to both, we have eagerly taken it.97
In other words, the naturalized Americans had agreed to renounce their allegiance to the sovereign of their birth. But despite this compliance, even though
“the law places upon the same undistinguishable level, the citizen of native and
the citizen of foreign birth,” full equality and acceptance had proven elusive:98
. . . we have complied with the injunctions of the constitutions and the
laws, and we will support them, upon equal terms, with our lives and our
fortunes. But how are we treated? What has been our reception? Has good
faith been observed? Have the promises been performed? Are not we, who are
citizens by all the solemnities and obligations of law, treated as aliens—stigmatized as foreigners?99
In short, the full statement argues that despite a belief in republicanism, and
the United States’ supposed status as an “asylum for the oppressed of all nations,” there remained a resistance to accepting naturalized Americans on the
same terms as the native-born. The liberal promise of full acceptance of volitional allegiance had proved elusive—no matter how American they acted and
how American they thought, there was an unwillingness to accept these legal
citizens as cultural citizens of the United States.100
The story behind this document is a bit more complicated—the “adopted
Republican citizens” there gathered were not a hodgepodge of all ethnicities,
but specifically a gathering of Irish Americans. Shifting factions in New York
politics meant that the Irish vote had been split between those supporting DeWitt Clinton, and endorsed by such former United Irishmen as Thomas Addis
Emmet, and others, the authors of the statement, led by James Cheetham, who
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had split off from the Republican Party. Cheetham failed to end Republican
control of the city assembly, but made a dent in the Republican majority. And
thereafter Clinton and other Republican leaders in New York no longer took
the Irish vote for granted, taking care to accede to Irish demands for inclusion
in the party.101
So this document was in part an attempt by Cheetham to capitalize on Irish
resentments to further his own political career—which causes the historian to
wonder to what extent this mobilization came from the grassroots or was the
1809 version of political astroturf. But its very existence indicates that these
resentments at the failure of liberal promise could be capitalized upon, and
carried weight and meaning in the Irish community. This feeling was probably
even stronger in the atmosphere after the anti-Catholic rioting in New York in
Christmas of 1806. Still, the open-ended language of Cheetham’s appeal, which
did not specify Irish ethnicity, must have been intended to appeal to all New
York voters of foreign birth. Ten years later, an English visitor, Henry Bradshaw
Fearon, quoted the appeal in an account of his journey, while also noting that despite Emmet’s successful legal career, “native Americans speak of him with great
jealousy” because he “was guilty of two unpardonable crimes,” being “a foreigner”
and the “second and greatest of all, in being an Irish rebel!” Fearon noted the
existing widespread distinctions between “citizens of native and foreign birth”
and attended a debate where the audience cheered a speaker who advocated the
exclusion of the foreign-born from all political offices.102
But for many migrants, the experience of Thomas Holmes was probably more
typical. Holmes arrived in the United States in 1803, after much of the controversy over citizenship had died down. Shortly after his arrival, he declared his
intent to naturalize, the first step in the process. But he never followed through
with a petition to naturalize, which would have made him an American citizen.
Holmes lived with his wife and four children and made a living as a copper-plate
printer. For the next nine years no experience as an alien was sufficient to prompt
his naturalization—there were few consequences for not doing so.103
Whether ordinary migrant or radical journalist, many British and
Irish migrants found that virtual citizenship met their individual needs, or was
useful substitute for the fuller citizenship that native-born Americans were not
always willing to give them. Such citizenship particularly appealed to migrants
from the British Isles, while migrants from the French empire found naturalization more pragmatic and useful, even if they often rejected a culturally American identity.
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When radical journalists attempted to exercise their virtual citizenship in
more direct ways, such as criticizing Federalist political leaders and their policies,
they came into conflict with the Federalist conception of tiered citizenship that
did not accord artisans such as printers full citizenship—and many Federalists
also refused to view them as American because they insisted on birthright citizenship. The conflict between proponents of virtual citizenship and the Federalist attempt to suppress their views and political activities showed that both
groups theorized and attempted to explain the functioning of the public sphere.
John Daly Burk and other radical migrants equated citizenship with political
participation in the public sphere and saw such activities as a right and a useful check on state power. In contrast, Federalists, especially Timothy Pickering,
viewed such men as exercising power inappropriate to their station, and as dangerous accumulators of political power. In treating aliens and naturalized citizens differently, much as it pained him to do so, Pickering gave the legal status
of citizenship greater weight and power. Ultimately, federal power to regulate
free speech failed to attach to citizenship despite Pickering’s attempts to deport
seditious aliens and prosecute seditious citizens.
Alien rights were subjected to greater testing when the United States declared
war on Great Britain in 1812. British subjects who had thought themselves secure
as virtual citizens suddenly found that the Republican government revived the
Alien Enemies Act and directed its provisions at them. The growth of the federal
government’s power, and the alien reaction and resistance, is described in the
next chapter.

Ch a pter 3

Married to an Alien Enemy
[Adam Donaldson] was ignorant that he was violating the law and
really thought himself a citizen in consequence of his marriage
with a native.
— James Mercer to John Minor, March 31, 1813

D

uring the War of 1812, John Smith, the US Marshal for the district of Pennsylvania, was a busy man. He had already been responsible
for enforcing court orders, serving subpoenas, and other related duties
when, at the outbreak of the war, the Department of State suddenly tasked Smith
with collecting data about every British household within the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania. The State Department’s orders required him to gather considerable information: name, age, time in the US, place of residence, occupation, and
whether the British subject had previously initiated the naturalization process.
A large amount of information began to flow through Smith’s hands, provided
to him by the aliens who came to report themselves at his Philadelphia office.1
Smith soon discovered that some aliens attempted to persuade him that they
were less alien than others. William Nottingham, a Philadelphia merchant, informed Smith that although he was a British subject, his wife was “a Lady a
native of New Jersey Daughter of a Revolutionary Officer.” Surely, the influence
of a woman who grew up in a Patriot household had some sort of moderating
effect on Nottingham’s sympathies.2
And some aliens thought that they were not aliens at all. William Young
had arrived in the United States as a child, served “9 years apprenticeship” and
had since become a “Carver & Gilder.” Most important, he had grown up in an
American household. Until the war, Young thought he had been “entitle[d],
to the privileges of a Citizen,” because he grew up in a household headed by an
American citizen and had since finished his apprenticeship. 3
Was William Young an American citizen? Should William Nottingham be
treated differently than other British subjects? Smith, acting in his executive
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capacity, would make these decisions, rather than refer such cases to a judge.
Indeed, as the war progressed, officials like Smith gained increasing power and
authority over the lives of British subjects in the United States. He was ordered
by the Department of State to ensure that alien enemies did not travel within the
United States without express written permission. Another directive demanded
that new arrivals not to be allowed to settle in coastal areas. And then, in February 1813, the State Department ordered all British subjects engaged in commerce
to remove themselves at least forty miles from tidewater. The city of Philadelphia was within this forbidden region, and also home to a large number of alien
enemy merchants, which meant that Smith became increasingly powerful and
busy as the war progressed.4
John Smith’s growing power over foreign migrants demonstrates how control over citizenship and alien status became increasingly nationalized during
the War of 1812. Moreover, that control was increasingly exercised by the executive rather than the judicial branch of the federal government. In the face of increasing penalties for failing to obey regulations, many British civilian residents
relinquished the virtual citizenship discussed in the previous chapter. The stories
of men such as Nottingham and Young, however, show how migrants from the
British dominions resisted some of these rules in new ways. They pushed for
cultural inclusion in (white) American society, advancing claims centered on
their acceptance in their communities and place in American or Americanized
households. The arguments that these alien enemies made during the War of
1812 for citizenship or differing treatment had a cultural rather than legal basis:
they asserted that American households altered the alien status of foreign subjects. Those claims had no standing under common law, yet British migrants
were at times successful in their claims, especially when they emphasized the
presence of American women in their households.
Important legal changes occurred in citizenship and the legal rights and abilities of aliens in the War of 1812. Although we know more historically about
claims to citizenship by military personnel and claims of subjectship and political agency by people escaping enslavement during this period, we know less
about the actions and treatment of free British civilians residing in the United
States and their effect on citizenship law and the rights associated with citizenship. Alien responses to their treatment, coupled with initial government
actions that targeted British-headed households, led to a debate about the extent
to which each household was represented in the public sphere by its head. Dependent claims to citizenship during the war weakened this relationship. This
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debate gave the concept of Republican motherhood practical utility in allowing
binational households to avoid forced removal.5
Long-standing immigration policies and systems are governed by path dependency—once in place, policies tend to stay in place because important actors in
policy formation and enforcement have an interest in maintaining the status
quo. The War of 1812 was a crucial point in the formation of alien policy and the
creation of that path dependency. Issues such as the legal definition of aliens,
their legal rights, and who had the authority to distinguish between citizen and
alien were all in flux, but trending against alien rights and toward increased
power for the executive branch of the federal government. The federal government enforced the Alien Enemies Act with vigor, exercised for the first time the
power to control the movements of aliens within its borders, and established
a precedent for the treatment of aliens in future foreign wars. The path upon
which policy began to travel was discrete and periodic rather than continuous
and slowly changing; when the United States went to war in the future, policymakers could dust off the Alien Enemies Act, interpret it, and try to enforce
those parts of it they found useful or necessary. The War of 1812 was the first and
formative instance from which future policymakers would determine how to
deal with alien enemies within the nation’s borders. In particular, the shift away
from the courts and toward the executive, and the use of emergency power to
impose severe controls on suspects began during the War of 1812.6
During the Civil War and Reconstruction periods, citizenship and the
nation-state became more closely integrated and less obstructed by local/
state citizenship and private slaveowning. But the War of 1812 was part of the
precedent-setting period during the early American republic when political actors were trying to come to an agreement on the rights of citizens and the legal
penalties for aliens at the national level of government. Could alien enemies
have legal agency? Should authority over them continue to rest with the courts,
or should the federal executive branch have the authority to enforce the citizen/
alien divide and exert control over the alien population? Their decisions would
have a permanent mark both on the US legal code, where the Alien Enemies Act
remains in effect, and on legal precedent, where people who fall into the category
of alien enemies continue to suffer severe legal disabilities.7
But this process was not completely top-down. Much as in 1798, migrant
resistance limited the government’s ability to surveil the alien population and
exert control over alien movements. Migrants’ resistance was most successful
when they exploited differing ideas about how citizenship related to the household, especially in the case of the government attempt to forcibly move British
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subjects from areas of strategic concern. Carefully deploying the idea of Republican motherhood, they argued, at times successfully, that the American presences in their binational or multinational households had successfully Americanized them. Other British subjects successfully lobbied for the legalization
of wartime naturalizations, deploying classical liberal arguments and gradualist
understandings of citizenship. Moreover, resistance to orders from the national
government came not only from migrants, but from the supposed enforcers of
the laws. Lower-level government officials chose to selectively determine citizen/
alien status, decide which aliens to remove, and interpret orders from the central
government as they saw fit for their localities. Alien policy was shaped by the
concerns of high-level officials but also by the cooperation of or obstruction by
lower-level officials, and by the people and communities who were affected by
federal policy. The end of the war left executive emergency power strengthened
while alien enemies’ right to legal agency and due process remained unresolved.

Origins of the War of 1812, Fear of British Economic
Domination, and Federal Surveillance of Alien Enemies
A Jeffersonian economic worldview, influenced by the transatlantic struggles
between Great Britain and France, determined the Madison administration’s
treatment of aliens and allowed for increased executive authority over citizenship. These views differed sharply from the Federalist view that merchants contributed to the wealth of the country, which led them to continue trade ties
with Great Britain. Jeffersonians reversed the fear of foreign powers and their
citizens/subjects: in 1798, many members of the Federalist Party feared France
and “Jacobinism,” while adherents of the Republican Party (sometimes called
the Democratic-Republican Party) feared Great Britain, monarchical rule, and
economic strangulation by Britain’s ever-increasing commercial and manufacturing clout. In contrast to the Federalists, Republican leaders viewed merchants
as a drain on “productive” members of society. Consequently, in the light of
increasing British-American political tension, they saw British merchants as vectors of British economic power, and Madison administration officials thought
they needed to implement a system of surveillance over British residents and
control over their movements once the United States and Britain went to war.
The system of trading blocs that emerged during the Napoleonic Wars would
influence Republican views. In 1806, Napoleon Bonaparte decided to pursue his
goals through economics rather than military force. The result was the Berlin
Decree, issued on November 21, 1806, which forbade all trade between Great
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Britain and areas under French control. In response, the British government issued the Orders in Council on November 11, 1807, which forbade trade between
neutral countries and territories under French control. The British Navy was
able to effectively enforce its blockade. Napoleon countered with the Milan decree, issued on December 17, 1807, which also forbade neutral shipping to trade
in ports under the control of Great Britain and its allies. Both powers pushed
merchant traders from neutral countries to trade only in territories controlled
by one power or the other.8
The resulting system of competing trading blocs put the President Jefferson in
a tenuous position: he sought to avoid becoming completely aligned with Britain
or France, and to keep the US neutral. Both British and French forces wanted
access to American grain, and attempted to coerce American traders into their
respective trading blocs. Additionally, the British Navy, short on manpower
after twenty years of almost continual warfare, sought available men wherever
it could, and searched American merchant vessels for British subjects to man its
ships. Citing rampant fraud, British officials often refused to recognize naturalized American citizens’ claims that they had ceased to be British subjects. British
impressment often left American merchant vessels short-staffed, and searches of
vessels close to the American coast exacerbated US-British tensions. Meanwhile,
French officials occasionally seized American merchant vessels in retaliation for
trading within the British bloc.9
Jefferson and his successor James Madison responded to British actions with
a series of embargo measures of decreasing effectiveness. Both Jefferson and
Madison realized that in practice, the United States was effectively drifting into
the British trade system. Their economic and political philosophies cast this relationship as a shameful dependence on Great Britain. In response, Madison
worked with the Republican-controlled Congress to pass legislation by which
the United States offered to participate in either the British or French trading
blocs in exchange for a halt on the seizure of American merchant vessels. Shortly
afterward, several diplomatic disputes with Britain, coupled with a French acceptance of the American offer, pushed the United States further toward war
with Britain. Madison obtained a declaration of war from Congress, which he
signed on June 18, 1812.10
Because Republican leaders worried about British economic power, they believed it necessary to monitor and control the movements of British subjects residing in the United States during the war. The Republicans valued some British
subjects not only as a source of potential Republican voters but also as a source of
white settlers who would carry out Jefferson’s vision of a nation of (supposedly)
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economically independent yeoman farmers. But others they feared: Republicans
had long expressed qualms about British economic warfare, and they saw British
merchants, as well as the newly arrived representatives of British manufacturers,
as potential infiltrators that would allow Britain to economically strangle the
nascent United States. Federalists, on the other hand, believed that any disadvantages caused by the presence of British merchants in the US were outweighed
by the benefits of the British Empire’s value as a market for American goods
and shipping, while British immigrant merchants contributed to building the
economic strength of the nation.
Republicans, however, continued to view events from their own
political-economic perspective. Building on a long-standing fear that consumption of British manufactures would reduce Americans to state of shameful dependence, government officials and much of the population at large were
alarmed at a new migration trend: in the years leading up to the war, British
businesses had begun to send young male family members to American seaboard
towns to manage exports. These men began to threaten local businesses by selling cheaper British goods. Once the war started, there would need to be a system
to monitor the activities of these possibly dangerous alien enemies.11
Following the declaration of war, the Madison administration attempted to impose a surveillance system on the British subjects residing in the
United States, which was focused especially on merchants as a vector of espionage, infiltration, and economic danger. Its initial measures did not directly
target merchants but rather sought to erect a surveillance system. Government
officials had a model to draw from, which Federalists had attempted to import
in the 1790s: the British Alien Laws. The first feature to be implemented was
compulsory registration of all alien enemies in the United States, in July 1812.
Suspicious of Federalist judges, they chose instead to pursue surveillance and
enforcement primarily through the executive branch of government.12
A body of laws that Congress had passed granted the Madison administration
authority to engage in monitoring and controlling British subjects residing in the
United States who, following the declaration of war, fell into the legal category
of alien enemies. This legislation, particularly the Alien Enemies Act of 1798,
allowed the executive branch of the federal government to operate with considerable authority over alien enemies during the War of 1812. The Naturalization
Act of 1798 had been replaced by the Naturalization Act of 1802. The 1802 Act
had restored the five-year residency requirement of the 1795 Naturalization Act;
but under the 1802 act “alien enemies were still barred from naturalization.” The
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1802 act also retained the 1798 provisions requiring information to be gathered
on migrants coming through ports of entry. The Alien Act expired in 1800, two
years after its enactment in 1798, while the Sedition Act, also passed in 1798,
expired at the end of the Adams’s term of office on March 3, 1801. The remaining piece of legislation in the Alien and Sedition Acts, the Alien Enemies Act,
remained in force. Because the quasi-war with France that was fought between
1798 and 1800 remained undeclared, the provisions of the Alien Enemies Act
never came into force in the 1790s.
Although the Republican-controlled Congress did not repeal the act, they
had not forgotten about it, and passed a supplementary act on July 6, 1812, less
than a month after the start of the War of 1812. The act stated that “nothing in
the . . . [Alien Enemies Act] shall be extended or construed to extend to any
treaty, or to any article of any treaty, which shall have expired, or which shall
not be in force, at the time when the Proclamation of the President shall issue,”
abrogating unpopular provisions of the 1794 Jay Treaty with Great Britain that
allowed Canadian fur traders to trade in the United States. This legislation presumably would allow the Madison administration a free hand regarding alien
enemies. Moreover, newspapers such as the New York Columbian noted the acts
were still in force, and opined on the status of alien enemies and pending legislation regarding them.13
Authority over aliens was maintained through the executive branch, and
although it would shift between offices, policies continued to reflect the Republican views outlined above. With the declaration of war, the treatment of
aliens initially fell to the Department of State, which issued orders reflecting the
administration’s concern about the activities of British subjects residing in the
United States. The presence of foreign migrants was a worry, but the department
was small, much as it had been in the 1790s, and its employees were overloaded
with duties during a time of international crisis. Eventually, authority would be
transferred to the Office of the Commissary General of Prisoners, militarizing
what had been under civilian control. The policies that the Department of State
developed continued to reflect the Jeffersonian fear of merchants, as well as the
belief that other migrants were economic assets, less capable of independent political action on their own, and consequently less of a possible threat.14
The government’s initial measures were intended to gather information about
the British population in the United States. Madison administration officials
were uncertain just how many British merchants were in the United States, and
estimates ran wild; some newspapers claimed that as many as “fifteen or twenty
thousand English merchants, runners, collectors, etc., not naturalized” resided in
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the United States.15 So on July 7, one day after Congress passed a supplementary
act to the Alien Enemies Act, the administration issued the following directive:
All British subjects within the United States are required forthwith to report to the marshals (or to the persons appointed by them) of the respective states or territories within which they may reside, their names, their
age, the time they have been in the United States, the persons composing
their families, the places of their residence, and their occupational pursuits,
and whether, at what time, they have made the application to the courts
required by law, as preparatory to their naturalization; and the marshals,
respectively, are to make to the Department of State returns of all such
British subjects, with the above circumstances attached to their names.16
The order not only was an ambitious attempt to begin the imposition of the
surveillance system directed at alien enemies; it also revealed how the Madison
administration viewed citizen/alien status as attaching to the head of household:
each alien was to report “the persons composing their families.” (This intrusion
of the official public into the private domestic sphere would prove too much.
Except for Massachusetts, returns of aliens only recorded family, boarders, and
servants/enslaved people by number, rather than supplying details about the
persons over whom the head of household held his authority.) The interest in
declarations of intent to naturalize also suggests that lawmakers still accepted a
view that citizenship could involve a gradual incorporation into the community.
The inclusion of occupational pursuits among the data also indicates the original purpose of the order: to find out just how many British merchants there
were in the United States. In this matter, public estimations were greatly exaggerated. Out of the 7,500 alien heads of household who appear in the returns,
there were only about 800 who might qualify as “merchants, their clerks and
bookkeepers,” compared to 1,000 heads of household employed in the textile
industry, and 1,600 “farmers, planters, [and] gardeners.”17
Through the order, the executive branch of the federal government also
gained the power to determine citizen or alien status. They were free to reject
migrants’ (and de-naturalized natives’) claims to citizenship. They could also
accord citizenship to other migrants whose legal claims courts may have been
less willing to accept.
The order also revealed that the surveillance system was to be centralized and
controlled by the national government. But the federal government could not
do so alone: the gathering of information about the tens of thousands of British
aliens in the United States would be done not only through the regional (and
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centrally appointed) federal marshals but with the further cooperation of county
sheriffs and local and state law enforcement. Marshals published notices listing
local persons to whom aliens could report themselves if they did not reside near
a US Marshal.18
The order was largely effective and sufficient for the administration’s needs in
the early stages of the war. Madison’s administration had designed a program of
surveillance by which information collected would be passed on and processed
in the new capital, where policymakers would continue to issue new requirements regarding enemy aliens. These measures seem to have been mainly precautionary: during the first six months of the war, the United States attempted
to invade Lower Canada, and also experienced losses in the Great Lakes region
at the hands of the British and their Indian allies. Meanwhile, the British Navy
was not yet successful at defeating the American Navy and establishing naval
supremacy; the invasions and raids into the United States did not occur until
the later parts of the war.
The order’s relative success greatly strengthened the government’s reach and
authority over citizenship. As previously discussed, Federalists in Congress had
unsuccessfully attempted to impose compulsory registration on all white aliens
in the United States through the Naturalization Act of 1798, but few migrants
complied and neither the Adams administration nor the federal courts seem to
have taken action against them. In 1812, however, the federal government was
able to extend its information-gathering reach into interior regions and areas
of strong partisan resistance. After the order was promulgated, aliens began to
report themselves, marshals sent in their returns, and returns arrived even from
areas of strong opposition to the war, such as Connecticut and Massachusetts.
As the executive branch of the federal government exerted its emergency powers,
it began to determine who was a citizen and who was an alien, a process that
would have important consequences for citizenship and the people categorized
as one or the other.19

Compulsory Registration, Loyalists, and the Shift
of Authority over Aliens from the Judicial Branch
of the US Government to the Executive Branch
The compulsory registration of aliens gave the executive branch of the federal
government the ability to recategorize citizens into aliens and vice versa, eroding
the power of courts over citizen/alien status. When enforcers of compulsory
registration chose to reject claims they thought invalid, they did so without
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resorting to the court system. This change caused former Loyalists and their
children, in particular, potential loss of citizenship. Government officials evaluated the claims of former Loyalists on the basis of their political affiliations.
Association with the Federalist Party, in particular, could justify citizens’ recategorization into aliens.
Compulsory registration during the war differed from the previous Federalist
attempt at compulsory registration in one important respect: a greater reliance on
the executive branch of the federal government. The Naturalization Act of 1798
envisioned a surveillance system that relied primarily on the federal courts for
the issuing of documents to aliens, their examination, and any punitive measures
taken against alien violators. In both the 1790s under Timothy Pickering and in
the War of 1812 under James Monroe, actions against violators and execution of
policy issued from the Department of State. Pickering had relied heavily on local
prosecutors and the courts, where Federalist allies were numerous and the federal
government retained national reach. The retention of Federalist judges after they
lost power in other branches of the federal government made the courts a less
reliable ally in controlling alien enemies during the War of 1812. Consequently,
the Department of State relied more on US marshals, who were appointed by the
president, and later shifted responsibility to the military under the Office of the
Commissary General of Prisoners, headed by Gen. John Mason.20
Many Loyalists successfully made the transition into US citizens, but the
emergency conditions of the war pushed some of them into alien status, sometimes owing to their neighbors’ suspicions that they continued to sympathize
with Great Britain. Most Loyalists who remained in the United States acquiesced to citizenship despite their opposition to US independence, and although
some might have slowly come to accept it, others still quietly mourned for colonial days. Elizabeth Drinker, the wife of an elite Quaker of Loyalist sympathies,
noted a loud and raucous Fourth of July in Philadelphia in 1801, which included
“guns firing, Drums beating from day break, rejoycing for Independence.” She
confided in her diary that “the most sensible part of the Community, have more
reason to lament than rejoice—in my opinion.” Drinker, who was born in 1734,
died in 1807, before the outbreak of the War of 1812. But a few Loyalists were
either unwilling to acquiesce to citizenship and reject their allegiance to Britain,
or their Patriot neighbors were unwilling to admit them to citizenship. One of
these longstanding Loyalists was Frederick Smyth, a “Gentleman” who listed his
length of residence in 1813 as “50 years” and his age as eighty. Frederick Smyth
had, prior to the Revolution, been chief justice of the Supreme Court of New
Jersey, in which position he carefully, but unsuccessfully, worked to prevent
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colonial independence. During that time, Smyth’s lower public profile and cautious diplomacy allowed him to avoid the radical anger that was largely directed
at Royal Governor William Franklin. After independence, Smyth split his time
between his 77 Union Street address in Philadelphia and the nearby town of
Roxborough. Smyth was the only extant permanent Loyalist resident who registered himself as an alien in Pennsylvania during the War of 1812. He registered
much later than other migrants, at the time of the 1813 removal order, a choice
that indicates that he probably thought it more prudent to acknowledge alien
status and remain in Philadelphia than be seen as someone eluding surveillance
and subjected to imprisonment or forced removal into the interior. The public
political presentation of Loyalists like Smyth, whether they claimed to be either
citizens or aliens, would be subject to evaluation by government officials.21
As gatherers of returns, US Marshals and local sheriffs exercised especial executive power when they decided whether to categorize former Loyalists as citizens
or aliens. Officials evaluated Loyalists’ claims to citizenship on the basis of local
reputation and political activities. If a Loyalist had a reputation of active participation in Federalist politics, the gatherer of returns might choose to categorize
the Loyalist as an alien, a status that applied to all members of the household.
Gatherers of returns might do so even if a Loyalist had naturalized or otherwise
possessed valid qualifications for citizenship. US Marshals and sheriffs were particularly likely to do so in areas of political opposition to the war, or in areas in
danger of invasion or raiding by British forces.
In areas of concern about disloyalty, Republican compilers of the marshals’ returns were especially vigilant about former Loyalists in their communities. Connecticut was one of these regions; Robert Fairchild, US Marshal for Connecticut,
recorded that Peter B. Rindle of Norwalk was “A pilot to the enemy in the last
war,” but also a “British pensioner & bad inhabitant.” Reports from Connecticut, along with reports from upstate New York, where much of the War of 1812
was fought, were especially likely to list which aliens expressed Federalist sympathies: Sheriff Barnabas Smith reported that Timothy Reddy, a tailor in Scipio,
New York, was “opposed to the administration.” Sheriff Smith also noted that a
farmer, William McMillan, was a stranger, but tempered his remarks: “however
I believe him to be an inoffensive man.” In Danbury, Connecticut, Fairchild’s
report stated that the coincidentally named Irish migrant Joseph Moneypenny
was “said to have been convicted of passing counterfeit money.” Fairchild’s report
also noted that James Richards of Litchfield was an “Englishman & Laborer a
State Pauper.” Richards, like potentially threatening merchants or spies, was also
a foreign drain on community resources in the form of public relief.22
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Gatherers of returns not only reported those aliens of suspect loyalty, but
also in at least one instance recategorized a citizen as an alien, on the basis of
anti-administration political activity. John C. Gray was born in Halifax to Loyalist parents originally from Massachusetts. They resettled in Boston in 1790,
and Gray established himself as a printer in Danbury, Connecticut, where he
published the Connecticut Intelligencer. Gray’s Federalist partisanship made the
gatherer of returns suspicious about Gray’s true motives and citizenship status. Gray “claim[ed] to be a citizen of the US” and thus a legal citizen rather
than a virtual one, and “sa[id] he had bee[n] admitted to the right of suffrage in
Mass and Connect for 10 years past,” but the collector of returns for Danbury
thought it necessary to group him with the alien enemies. The collector further
noted that “Since he came into this State (about 5 years ago) [Gray] has been
a tool of the federal party, to print a newspaper full of abuse & falsehood agt
the govt of U.S.” Gray’s activities were simply too public and active to allow
them to be brushed aside, and he was, like a true Tory, too disloyal and opposed
to the national government to truly be a citizen. The collector of returns was
also attempting to silence a long-standing and vocal Federalist opposition in the
region. Connecticut in particular had been a place of particularly vocal Federalist editorializing, such that Thomas Jefferson considered prosecuting several
Connecticut journalists for seditious libel in 1807. Ultimately, despite Gray’s
claims of citizen status, the gatherer of returns, acting for the executive branch
of the federal government, rejected Gray’s claims to citizenship, viewing Gray’s
challenges to the federal government through his newspaper as an attempt to
undermine its authority.23
Overall, the success of Loyalists’ claims to citizenship depended on how officials viewed their political actions after the Revolutionary War. Former Loyalists and their children who associated with the Federalist Party, who received
pensions or had half-pay retired status from British armed forces, or who were
remembered in their communities as prominent Tories, could all find that gatherers of returns considered them to be aliens. In contrast, former Loyalists who
kept a low profile or demonstrated their newfound patriotism could have their
US citizenship status affirmed.24

The Executive, Control of Aliens,
and Internal Removal of British Subjects
With alien registration continuing, the State Department began to issue increasingly strict orders that attempted to exert greater control over the movements
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and residences of British subjects in the United States and further strengthen
the surveillance system. It did so first by subjecting aliens to an internal passport system. This effort culminated in orders ordering British merchants away
from coastal and tidewater regions, reflecting a shift away from exerting control
over US borders to exerting control over internal areas of the United States. US
regulations had negative consequences for those British subject residing in the
United States who had not felt the need to naturalize.
The increasing control began in the fall of 1812. On October 13, 1812, the
Department of State provided further instructions to marshals, announcing
that alien enemies who had recently arrived within a marshal’s jurisdiction
were to be ordered to travel to “particular places of residence, at least thirty
miles distant from tidewater, to the limits of which designation they are to be
confined.” The department further followed that order with a proclamation
issued on February 6 of the following year. That order required recent arrivals to
report to the marshals. It also prohibited alien enemies from traveling without
first obtaining a passport from either a US Marshal or a collector of customs.
Moreover, the State Department forbade marshals to issue passports unless they
were “acquainted with the nature of the [applicants’] pursuits, know them to
have a reputation for probity, and can confide in their good intentions towards
the United States.”
Passports during the Napoleonic Era functioned differently from
twentieth-century system that appeared in the wake of the Russian Revolution and First World War. Rather than being identity documents issued by a
sending country to a host country, allowing for ease of deportation and surveillance of undesirable aliens and usually associated with border control, Napoleonic passports served as passes controlling internal movement within a
state. Napoleonic-era passports did not serve as proof of citizenship. Excepting
sailors’ passports, which contained an attempt at description of their faces and
bodies, passports during the War of 1812 assumed that the bearers were who
they said they were. Moreover, although passports were usually issued by the
host country they could also be issued by government officials from other foreign governments. Prior to orders indicating otherwise, a British subject in the
United States could conceivably obtain a passport from the Portuguese consul. The national government did not maintain a monopoly on the authority
to issue passports: Benjamin Silliman, the president of Yale College, received a
passport from Jonathan Trumbull, the governor of Connecticut, in 1805. The
restriction of permission to issue passports to the US Marshals and collectors of
customs was a further extension of government power and monopoly over the
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surveillance system that had previously diffused authority among local community leaders.25
These new regulations were part of the federal government’s growing attempts
to control aliens and their internal movements. This change was a transatlantic
import: the British government had imposed a passport system on aliens in 1793,
and the American law was worded similarly to the 1793 British law.26
Madison administration officials felt that the restrictions had not yet dealt
fully with the danger from British subjects in the United States. In the last major
attempt to impose new restrictions on alien enemies, the State Department issued the following order on February 23, 1813:
Alien enemies, residing or being within forty miles of tide water, are required forthwith to apply to the marshals of the states or territories in
which they respectively are, for passports to retire to such places, beyond
that distance from tide water, as may be designated by the marshals. This
regulation, however, is not to be put in force without special notice against
such alien enemies, not engaged in commerce, as were settled previously to
the declaration of war in their present abode, or are there pursuing some
regular and lawful occupation, unconnected with commerce, and who obtain monthly, from the marshal of the district in which they reside, permission to remain where they are.27
The proclamation divided British subjects in the US according to Republican
economic concepts of productive labor. The proclamation’s government authors
placed alien enemies into two categories: those whom Madison administration officials wished to keep rooted in one place so that they could continue to contribute
to the agricultural and manufacturing sectors of the economy; and a second, more
dangerous class, either “engaged in commerce” or without “regular and lawful occupation.” In other words, farmers and laborers were productive potential citizens:
their work and the physical products they produced were clearly visible and contributed to the wealth of the country. Their labor supported themselves and their
households, allowing them to interact with one another as proper independent
citizens. In contrast, British merchants endangered the independence of fellow
citizens and the country’s wealth: the sales of their goods sapped the credit of
hardworking Americans, making them dependent upon the merchants while directing the wealth produced by citizen labor out of the United States to its enemy,
Great Britain. Thus merchants were in the same category as persons without regular or lawful occupations: thieves and the wandering poor, who also sapped the
wealth of citizens through theft of goods or demands upon public relief.28
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The government’s actions and their successful enforcement also effectively
abrogated the status of British and Irish migrants who considered themselves
entitled to the rights and privileges of citizens regardless of whether they had
naturalized. Suddenly, alien status carried significant penalties: not only did
they lose rights of formal political participation, but many civilians born in the
British dominions now found that they were required to register with the federal government (unlike their naturalized fellow migrants). Soon their movements were controlled and they were subjected, in some cases, to forced removal
from their residences. Thus it was no wonder that Thomas William Holmes, the
copper-plate printer discussed in the previous chapter, regretfully stated to US
Marshal John Smith that to “his neglect he had not become naturalized & that
he wishes to become a Citizen of the United States.” Marshal Smith did not
choose to treat Holmes like a citizen and refrain from including him in the list
of alien enemies he forwarded to the Department of State in Washington, but
he merely added Holmes’s plaintive statement of regret to the remarks section
of his report.29

The Relative Absence of Press Coverage: Government
Policies Implemented without Public Criticism
Government actions, though officially publicized, were subjected to remarkably
little public comment, providing officials leeway in determining policy toward
alien enemies. Unlike discussions of impressment, war expenditures, invasion,
and other news, coverage of regulations concerning alien enemies remained
sparse in American newspapers. Madison administration officials consequently
operated in an atmosphere of public permissiveness regarding their treatment of
British subjects in the United States. There seems to have been a public agreement among Republican-leaning papers that national surveillance, particularly
the passport system, was an amenable means of dealing with the perceived internal threat. Federalist papers were largely uninterested in the government’s
treatment of aliens, with the one prominent exception of a cause célèbre, the
internal removal of the Boston musician George K. Jackson. The immigrant
press for British subjects in the United States mainly consisted of the fledgling
Irish immigrant press, which, while emphasizing the loyalty of Irish residents
of the United States, refrained from openly criticizing alien policy. Irish immigrant newspapers instead provided their readers with practical advice about
obeying regulations and attempting to further the path to naturalization when
possible.30
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Although the American press had initially refrained from significant praise
or condemnation of alien policy, it divided along partisan lines in response to
the removal order. Coverage of the order, however, was relatively light, especially
compared to other war events and policies. Among those papers that did choose
to address the issue, most initially attempted to look into existing current law
and what laws remained in effect from the anti-immigrant panic of 1798. Several
papers noted that although most of the Alien and Sedition acts had expired, the
Alien Enemies Act remained in force. They also noted that existing laws forbade
a change of allegiance in wartime. The only nonimmigrant paper to comment
extensively on the laws saw them as necessary to prevent British infiltration of
the country, consistent with its editors’ Republican-leaning views:31
. . . the time has arrived when the president may exercise the authorities
vested in him by the act of ’98 . . . and we trust that a system of police will
be carried into execution, which is demanded by the quantity of British
influence in this country, and without which spies may flock in upon us
to watch our movements and blast our enterprises. When British officers
themselves steal in disguise among us, it is time to arrest the evil. A system
is apparently required of a similar nature with the British alien office; a
system, which shall grant licenses for residence, passports for travel, and
warrants for removal. We feel the importance of the subject, and we invited
the attention of the constituted authorities of the nation to it. 32
The editor of the Enquirer summed up much of what in fact seemed to be the
thoughts and concerns of Secretary of State James Monroe, as well as concerns
among the larger American public. The editor saw the British system of control
as effective and worth copying in the United States, and he defended his reasoning by citing a fear of British infiltration. Aliens were to register with the
government, not be allowed to move about the country without express permission from government officials, and dangerous aliens were to be expelled. The
editor envisioned the courts’ authority remaining in the process of obtaining
warrants. Fear of infiltration created a desire to extend state regulatory power,
gather information, sort through households, and categorize them according to
their perceived threat to the nation. 33
These fears also existed at the more local level, where Americans wondered
about their British neighbors and their activities, even during the period leading
up to the war. In a prelude to future concerns about the activities of the Masons,
secret societies seemed to have been seen as chief vectors of British intrigue and
infiltration. In New Hampshire, the presumably pro-Federalist Keene Sentinel
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published an explanation defending the inclusion of a British subject into a local
“W. B. Society,” explaining that although a British subject, he “came to this
country when he was but two years of age,” and that he was not yet twenty-one
and ineligible to naturalize, but that he “intended to become an American citizen as soon as he became of age.” Had he failed to support “the American form
of Government” the society would not have allowed him to become a member.
The announcement was also reprinted in the Concord Gazette.34
When the State Department issued the removal order, many papers simply
published the order as a public notice but did not offer additional comment.
Individual federal marshals for each district had the order published as much as
they felt was necessary. Peter Curtenius, US Marshal for New York State, aware
of the state’s strategic value and its comparatively large foreign-born population,
especially in New York City, ordered the order’s publication in many New York
papers. In Pennsylvania, there seems to have been comparatively less publication.
New England papers also published the order, including the more inland Bennington News-Letter, although Federalist-leaning papers may have seen in the
order further justification for opposition to high-handed policies.35
Those few papers that raised objections saw the removal order not as an affront to migrant rights per se, but rather as part of a broader opposition to the
Madison administration and its unpopular war-related policies. Although coverage of earlier regulations had been scanty, some Federalist editors saw the order
as an excess of federal power and a threat to individual rights. The issue was not
always central to their concerns; rather, they saw it as part of an overreaching of
federal executive power and threat to the right of due process. Harsh measures
against British subjects were simply another reason to oppose a ruinous war.
Among the condemnations was that of the Federal Republican, whose lengthier
article was briefly excerpted in the Bennington News-Letter: “During the French
war of ’98, when there was a federal administration, and the alien law was in
force, not a single Frenchman was ordered out of the country. Now when there
is no law for it every Englishman is ordered forty miles from tide water.”36
The original article in the Georgetown-based Federal Republican highlighted
the case of the music teacher George K. Jackson, and further characterized the
Madison administration’s actions as an unnecessary witch hunt designed to distract the public from the war’s lack of success. The Federal Republican also noted
in a later article that Jackson’s absence in Boston prevented a concert from taking
place owing to the “ill-timed exercise of the despotic power given to the executive over aliens directed possibly . . . by the malice of party feelings.” The Federal
Republican was chiefly concerned with the treatment of aliens as a distraction
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intended to instill fear in the public and further support for the war, rather than
a simple outrage against the right to due process. The Bennington News-Letter
excerpted the original article to highlight the extreme measures taken by the
Madison administration compared to the Adams administration, and noted
that the regulations were put in force without an accompanying new law (an
error in this case, as the administration grounded its actions in powers granted
by the Alien Enemies Act of 1798).37

Enforcement of Alien Policy:
Practical Success Despite Resistance of Officials
The Madison administration was largely successful in implementing compulsory
registration and forced removal, despite resistance from US Marshals. Compulsory registration of all white aliens under the Naturalization Act of 1798 was unsuccessful, but this time enforcers of the State Department’s orders concerning
aliens ultimately obeyed them, though not without hesitation. Extant returns
list a total of over 7,500 households headed by British subjects residing in the
United States, from New England to South Carolina to the Illinois and Missouri Territories.
The federal marshals whose duty it initially was to enforce the laws at times
required encouragement from the Department of State. They were particularly
reluctant to fully enforce the removal order, which proved highly unpopular
with British migrants in the United States. The Department of State found it
necessary to repeat to US Marshals that orders were “to be enforced.” Despite
delays in implementation, federal marshals largely complied with orders from
the Department, causing much disruption in lives of British migrants “engaged
in commerce” or “without regular or lawful occupation.”38
The initial duty of alien registration was publicizing its existence, coordinating reports with county sheriffs, and gathering information on those who failed
to register. Marshals were assisted by what seems to be a large number of aliens
self-reporting soon after the announcement of compulsory registration. Marshals’ information-gathering was also aided by mediation through the printed
public sphere, since the largest American cities were too big to function as faceto-face communities. Notices began to appear in local newspapers informing
British subjects that they were required to report themselves.39
The resistance of the marshals increased greatly when they were required to
control the movements of British migrants rather than simply record their presence. When the circular dated October 13, 1812, informed the marshals that new
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residents were to be settled at least thirty miles from tidewater, which included
all major port cities (and even the city of Albany, where the Hudson remained
tidal), some of them wrote back expressing surprise at such measures. The department replied on October 29, two weeks after the initial order, informing
the marshals that “I have to inform you, that you have very accurately construed
the intentions of the government, in extending [the regulations] to all arrivals
of persons of that description, subsequent to the war.” Marshals had evidently
judged some migrants as potentially dangerous, forcing them to settle away from
coastal areas, and others less so, allowing them to settle in coastal areas where
many of them had intended to find employment. Milling Wooley, a weaver who
arrived in Pennsylvania in the fall of 1813, and was allowed to settle in Philadelphia where he found work in “Henry Hawking’s factory” on Ridge Road, fell
into this latter category.40
But it was the removal order of February 1813 that generated the most resistance from the marshals. The instructions accompanying the proclamation
ordering the removal of the British subjects engaged in commerce or who otherwise happened to be persons of interest make clear that the department had
planned action against those who resisted its orders, instructing marshals that
“all those . . . who do not immediately conform to the requisition, are to be taken
into custody, and conveyed to the place assigned to them, unless special circumstances require indulgence.” The marshals were reluctant to fully enforce the
proclamation, however, and refrained from deporting individuals to whom they
planned to grant indulgence or about whom they planned to inquire with the
department. As a result, the department wrote the marshals on March 12 that
“the regulations . . . of the 23d ult. And your instructions of the same date, are to
be enforced.” Moreover, marshals were told not to exercise individual judgment,
but instead to “refer the question of indulgence to this Department, setting forth
all the circumstances, on which the claim is founded.” The orders further emphasized that “in no instance is the removal of an individual to be delayed for an
answer from Washington.”41

Alien Resistance and the Deployment of Cultural Claims to
Citizenship: American Households Produce American Citizens
The resistance of civilian British subjects that was most successful in obtaining
more lenient treatment from officials also showed a weakening in the relationship of citizenship to the household and male authority. British aliens successfully obtained exemptions from removal in the case of British subjects “married
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to natives.” They did so by arguing that (free, white) female American presences
in their households made those households less foreign, and the alien enemies
who headed them more like American citizens. These claims were aided by emphasizing the Patriot credentials of American women and the ties of binational
couples to their local communities.
Claims based on household status were not the only ones made during the
war. Also successful were liberal claims that successfully pushed for naturalization of alien enemies in wartime arguing that the allegiance of citizens could
shift to reflect incorporation into their new communities. They also reflected a
gradualist claim to citizenship: migrants who had taken the previous step of declaring their intent to naturalize prior to the war had already been on their way
to becoming citizens. Other claims for differing treatment were less persuasive
to officials enforcing orders relating to alien enemies: these claims sought to cast
British subjects as “neutral” private persons uninterested in a conflict between
states. Similarly, a court challenge asserting alien rights to habeas corpus may
have been technically successful, but practically had no effect for the plaintiff or
other British subjects similarly detained by US Marshals.
The virtual citizenship described in the previous chapter ceased to have practical benefits with the imposition of compulsory registration for most civilian
British subjects in the United States. Legal status as citizen or alien was what
mattered. Whether British subjects residing in the United States during the War
of 1812 believed, like John Daly Burk in 1796, that they were virtual citizens,
as discussed in Chapter 2, or if they wished to retain a formal political loyalty
and remain subjects of the king of Great Britain and Ireland, migrants from
the British Isles were subject to the emergency regulations. Overall, few aliens
had begun the naturalization process. Using Pennsylvania as an example, only
104 out of the 761, or 13.7 percent, extant heads of household who appear in the
marshals’ returns had already declared their intent to naturalize. When the War
of 1812 began and compulsory registration began to be instituted throughout the
country, many migrants seem to have been caught off guard by how rapidly and
suddenly their alien status became disadvantageous. A number of the previously
apathetic migrants hastily began the naturalization process: of the ninety British
subjects for whom the time between their alien registrations and declarations of
intent can be calculated, twelve (or 13.3 percent) began the naturalization process
within a day of registering as aliens. Still others expressed surprise at the alien
registrations. Thomas Curran, a twenty-year-old “accomptant” with no wife
listed, who resided at 37 South Water Street in Philadelphia, stated that he did
“not know of its being requisite for him to apply, had omitted it but wishes to
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become a Citizen.” Edward Clarke, a teacher living with his “Wife, 1 Child & 2
Servants” at 92 North Seventh Street stated that “he regret[ted] the delay of not
making application to become naturalized,” further emphasizing that he was
“attached to the United States & pledge[d] himself to defend them with every
energy he possesses against all violation.” Others had begun the naturalization
process but failed to follow through. Thomas William Holmes, mentioned earlier in this chapter, reported that to “his neglect he had not become naturalized,”
although he had declared his intent on June 21, 1803.42
Among the major successes for liberal citizenship was a change in legislation allowing for wartime naturalizations. Previously, a change of allegiance in
wartime was seen as analogous to a betrayal of one’s sovereign. Many migrants,
however, saw wartime naturalization as an updating and formalizing of their integration into a new community. The push for liberalization of wartime naturalizations seems to have come at least in part from the Irish emigrant community.
Irish emigrants received early information about their legal options: they had
access to emerging ethnic newspapers targeted at them. New York-based publications such as The Shamrock and the Western Star (or Harp of Erin) mainly
carried articles concerning Irish politics and British-Irish relations. These papers
provided information about US government policies of interest to them, as they
fell under the category of alien enemies. The Shamrock began its coverage with
a reprint of a legal commentary that had originally appeared in the Savannah
Republican. The commentary stated that under international law (“the law of
nations”) allegiance could not be transferred from one sovereign or state to another in time of war. It averred that regardless of whether the required maximum residency of five years had been fulfilled, applications to naturalize could
not be admitted. In the fall, the Shamrock published an article entitled “Informations to Aliens,” which summarized the regulations in force regarding British subjects, noting that “a large majority of [emigrants] . . . are unacquainted
with our laws respecting them.” The article summarized the order requiring
alien enemies to register with US Marshals, and also noted that the provisions
of the Alien Enemies Act of 1798 remained in force and that state and federal
courts had the right to deport British subjects or require “securities for their
good behavior.” The article then summarized the regulations of the Naturalization Act of 1802, emphasizing the residency requirements, the necessity of
the declaration of intent to naturalize at least two years prior to the petition
to naturalize, and finally noting that although the state of war prohibited naturalization, “aliens are not . . . prohibited from filing the declaration of their
intention to become citizens.”43

102

chapter 3

Migrants successfully lobbied to allow aliens who had filed a declaration of
intent to fully naturalize. In a petition to Congress, migrants argued for legislation allowing the naturalization of those who had already taken oaths of
allegiance prior to the war. On July 30, 1813, Congress passed legislation allowing
such naturalizations, provided that declarations of intent had been made prior
to start of hostilities.
The lobbying effort was successful because it was grounded in both a classically liberal idea of the mutability of citizenship and because of earlier, gradualist views of naturalization. The former was liberal in the sense that new residents could naturalize to reflect their incorporation into new communities and
their change of allegiance; in this case liberalism and mutability superseded a
view of citizenship/subjectship as fixed allegiance to a sovereign. The lobbying
push was also gradualist in the sense that individuals would be gradually incorporated into the community as citizens in training, acquiring the rights of
full citizens “step by step.” Rather than a betrayal of one’s sovereign in time of
need, naturalization was a capstone in the process of community incorporation,
the previous steps having been completed. This lobbying push, however, came
in part because the migrants felt that they were “held in durance by the [US]
Marshalls . . . deprived of the liberty of attending their personal concerns, as
well as the means of procuring a subsistence for their families or themselves.”
Increasing burdens upon alien enemies, in particular forced removal, prompted
the lobbying push—thus the passage of the law in the summer of 1813. Once virtual citizenship ceased to be a practical option, these migrants sought to make
citizenship easier to obtain.44
Claims that Republican mothers or wives had Americanized
British-headed households and that they should therefore be treated more leniently was a new and successful argument advanced by some British subjects in
the alien returns. Robert Dunn, a “Principal of a Military Academy” residing in
Philadelphia, noted that he was “married to an American Lady.” As mentioned
in the beginning of this chapter, William Nottingham pointed to his marriage
to “a Lady a native of New Jersey Daughter of a Revolutionary Officer.” Dunn
and Nottingham’s use of the term “lady” was also meant to indicate respectable,
genteel status. These men not only made these claims, but the marshal recording them felt they were worth mentioning in his remarks. The Scottish-born
shopkeeper Adam Donaldson of Fredericksburg, Virginia, did not report himself to the marshal, and a letter vouching for his conduct stated that “he was
ignorant of having violated the law” because he “really thought himself a citizen
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in consequence of his marriage with a native.” The letter-writer further cited
evidence of Donaldson’s acquisition of confiscable property as ignorance of his
status. 45
These claims paid off: in 1813, President Madison, “desirous of defining more
particularly the treatment of Alien Enemies, and of extending as much indulgence to them, as may be compatible with the precautions made necessary,” exempted from the removal order men who had already declared their intent to
naturalize more than six months prior to the declaration of war and were “married to natives.” Adam Donaldson was among the few Britons whom the administration granted an indulgence and “allowed to return on account of his wife.”
On what basis could such claims be made? This was, after all, a time when
women’s legal identities and citizenship status were suppressed through a resurgence of the law of coverture, and a time of backlash against women’s active participation in the public sphere. These men could make such claims for a variety
of reasons: an ideology of republican motherhood or wifehood, because of the
day-to-day nature of marriages that husband and wife may have thought of as
“equal”; the practical link that such marriages made that integrated the couple
into the community; a Scottish Enlightenment conception of national culture as
being transmitted by women; a longer Anglo-American legal tradition of a separate allegiance status for wives; and the inconsistency of the legal understanding
of women’s status.46
Republican motherhood (or Republican wifehood) provided major ideological support for claims made by binational couples. A true republican mother,
who was often a “lady,” infused her household with patriotism and instructed
her children, especially her sons, in the principles important to republican liberty. More importantly, “she condemned and corrected her husband’s lapses”
from civic virtue. Madison administration officials seem to have found that
republican mothers (or wives) had had a similar beneficial effect on their foreign-born husbands, whom they presumably infused with civic virtue and attachment to the United States. Proper social connections must also have helped.
William Nottingham thought it advantageous to mention that his New Jersey-born wife was the “daughter of a Revolutionary Officer” when reporting
himself as an alien.47
The claims that British men made could also be understood within a context
of the differing roles for men and women in American society. The Scottish Enlightenment provided an understanding of social and cultural development that
ascribed politics to men as their proper role and the transmission of culture and
societal norms to women. This new understanding caused Americans to think of
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marriage as an equal partnership, with men and women having particular roles
and duties. 48 Under the influence of the American ladies whom British migrants
had married, the cultural transmission of American-ness was theoretically underway, while husbands, as alien enemies, had been removed from their ability
to be politically active.
A foreign woman who married a man had historically retained her foreign
allegiance. In practice this allowed the Crown to claim ownership over the husband’s estate, reverting what were known as escheated lands to the state, but its
flip side was a separate political identity for such women. Although Martin v.
Massachusetts ruled that women’s loyalty to their husbands trumped their birthright legal identity, British courts, at the same time, accorded French wives of
British subjects a separate identity when it came to the confiscation of lands. For
women in the United States married to British men, it was in their interest to
stress their American connections in informal ways, and to appear cooperative.
To push against their husbands too much, by asserting a separate, pro-American
political identity could lead to the use of coverture by their husbands to check
their wives’ independence. Appearing as a linked unit was more advantageous.49
Some other factors allowed men in binational marriages to make the claims
that they did: their role as important nodes within their personal social networks, and their wives’ position as deputy husbands during a period of their
husbands’ legal disability. These rested less on women’s status within the law
than on their customary and day-to-day interactions, coupled with cultural understandings about women’s roles.
The wives of British men could make claims because of their face-to-face interactions within their communities. Many Americans saw their communities
as the place where real citizens interacted with one another. Elite women had a
public presence and linked households through the bonds of womanhood with
other members of the community. Formal, legal status was less central to this
community membership, and it was possible to participate and live as a citizen of
a town in an everyday way. Each town was connected more broadly through its
public spectacles, and their reporting and mediated reproduction through early
republican print culture, but the citizens of other towns were imagined citizens:
within the community, citizenship was real, face-to-face, and embodied. In this
context, it was possible to be a “citess,” and maybe even a “female citizen.”50
These claims could also be made because of the wives’ places within their
social networks. Status as a “lady” was genteel: it certainly relied on conspicuous
displays of wealth and respectable deportment, but also on reputation and interaction and circulation within the community. American women were socially
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active: they attended church and mingled afterward; they attended dances and
parties (even at taverns); they entertained visiting friends and family, and wrote
letters at other times.51 In this way they incorporated their husbands into their
networks: literally, when attending events as a couple, and figuratively through
mediated interactions, and even by their status and title of “Mrs.,” using coverture as an extension of husbands’ public and private presence in the community.
Coverture in this instance was a simultaneous and seemingly contradictory
restoration of male dominance for men who found themselves categorized as
alien enemies.
Last, white American-born wives of British husbands could also make claims
because of their role as deputy husbands when their husbands were unable to fulfill their roles as head of household.52 Alien enemy status was a disability which
prevented the husbands from representing their household in the legal and public sphere. Their wives could temporarily fulfill that role, albeit with limitations:
they did not formally represent their husbands in a legal or political capacity, but
served as the link to the community when the husband was ostracized. These
women and their husbands were able to obtain formal, official recognition of
their status because of the informal role of deputy husband as well as the other
reasons previously discussed.
Former apprentices made claims similar to those of binational couples,
indicating that their time spent in American-headed households had made them
into citizens, but the success of these claims is unclear. The men appearing in
the marshals’ returns for Pennsylvania indicate that a popular understanding
of Americanization occurred through incorporation into an American household. Subsequent matriculation into the public sphere as an independent man
conferred status as an American. As discussed in the beginning of this chapter,
William Young, a “Carver & Gilder” residing in Philadelphia, stated that “he
served 9 Years apprenticeship in the City of New York & that he was informed
that [coming into] the country while a minor & serving an apprenticeship was
sufficient to entitle him to the privileges of a citizen.” Two wire-workers and a
“Printer & Glazier” also noted their apprenticeships but did not explicitly claim
citizenship. Adam Donaldson is the only such demonstrably successful claimant. In addition to his American-born wife, he noted that he “came to America
as an indentured servant.”53
These claims were less successful in changing treatment for several reasons.
Artisanal status exempted these men from the removal order, if not from compulsory registration, so they could not claim damage to their economic livelihood
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as that those Britons who were subject to removal could. Lack of elite status also
made these claims less effective because they were less likely to have personal
connections to decision-makers. The British-born husbands of elite American
women were able to exert influence and persuade central policymakers that their
wives had made their households less foreign and the husbands less of a danger.
Donaldson had risen from indenture to much more respectable shopkeeping.
Nonetheless, artisans used the same cultural argument as binational couples: the
presence of Americans in a household Americanized its other members.
Despite the success of binational couples, elite connections alone did not necessarily guarantee that the government would exempt migrants from removal,
even when coupled with widespread public pressure for exemption. George K.
Jackson was a Boston musician who faced forced removal to Northampton, Massachusetts. Despite his apparent non-merchant status, Jackson had been targeted
for removal. He exercised his connections among the Boston elite to secure an
exemption. Wealthy Bostonians wrote to the Commissary General of Prisoners
requesting an exemption for Jackson, attesting to his character. As previously
mentioned, the case became a cause célèbre in the Federalist press. Despite Jackson’s legitimate claim that he was a non-merchant, and despite elite attempts to
influence decision-makers in Washington, Jackson does not appear among the
list of indulgences granted to those exempted from removal. Jackson’s passport
indicates that he was “ordered to Northampton, Hampshire Co.,” in the interior
of Massachusetts.54
Other claims were also unsuccessful: in particular, claims of private, personal
neutrality in a public conflict between two nation-states (or sometimes the Republican and Federal Parties). Hugh Scott was a “son of [a] citizen of Glasgow”
who owned a lumber business that supplied the US Navy Yard in Norfolk, Virginia. Additionally, he kept a “small store” because of which he was evidently
categorized as a merchant. The removal order had been disastrous to him, and
he returned to the Tidewater area because his “situation in the country for want
of employment became Irksome.” Arrested, Scott pleaded for more lenient treatment. He emphasized that he had “never interfered or taken part in the disputes
of Political Parties.” He further emphasized his connections to the United States
and association with his local community, contrasting it with what he saw as
unfair treatment for something he could not change: “my Crime is being born
in a foreign country, although my Interests & affections are here,” he wrote to
General Mason. But such claims carried less power than an American-born wife.
Scott did not win the exemption that binational couples had received and he was
ordered to Augusta County in Virginia’s interior.55
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Collectively, the claims made by the British subjects described above were
claims to virtual citizenship: Hugh Scott and William Young and William
Nottingham claimed that they should be treated more like citizens and less like
aliens. For most British subjects, virtual citizenship ceased to have value once the
government decided to no longer treat virtual citizens as such.

Do Alien Enemies Possess a Right to Due Process?
Lockington v. Smith and Aliens’ Right to Legal Agency
Several migrants attempted to challenge the legality of the removal order and assert a right of legal agency. The cases attempted to preserve court and local jurisdiction over aliens, but decisions gave the federal government effective power to
continue enforcing alien policy and forced removal. Lockington v. Smith was the
most prominent of the court challenges, and the decision retained alien enemies’
right to legal agency as well as state jurisdiction over aliens, while still keeping
Charles Lockington, the British subject in question, in custody. Lockington was
able to obtain a ruling that theoretically granted him legal agency and the right
to petition for a writ of habeas corpus, but this ruling left key questions about the
legal agency of alien enemies ultimately unresolved. It had little effect on British
subjects subject to removal.
Courts successfully retained their authority in certain circumstances. William Bold, who had been placed in custody of the US Marshal in South Carolina,
successfully argued that as a dependent, he became a naturalized citizen when
his father naturalized in 1786, and so obtained a court order for his discharge.
Another case petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus for an alien enemy came
before Virginia’s circuit court. The opinion of the presiding judge, John Marshall, skirted the issue but retained some court authority over aliens by ordering
Thomas Williams, the British subject in question, released on a technicality: he
had not been ordered to remove to a specific place by the US Marshal.56
Lockington v. Smith stemmed from Marshal John Smith’s arrest and confinement of Charles Lockington for violating the removal order. Lockington was an
English emigrant who had settled in Philadelphia before the war, and he made
his living there through “a mercantile pursuit.” Although Charles Lockington
was exceptional in his choice to pursue a court challenge to the removal order, his
actions were otherwise typical of many men in his situation. He contemplated a
return to Britain, but chose instead to remain in the United States, and followed
the orders requiring his registration with the federal marshal. He even initially
complied with the removal order, retiring inland to Lancaster, Pennsylvania. But
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his work, presumably involving import-export trade, was not a feasible means
of subsistence away from port. Lockington’s health, class status, and education
meant that he felt himself “not fitted by condition or habit, for manual labor.”
Lockington “remained at Lancaster until his funds were exhausted, and being
destitute of the means of support, he was compelled to return to Philadelphia, in
order to obtain the means of subsistence.” His presence came to the attention of
US Marshal John Smith, who ordered him to leave for Reading, Pennsylvania,
“where little or no commercial business is done.” Lockington “represented his
pecuniary inability to the Marshal” and asked for permission to leave the US, or
to be sent to Reading, “if the means of doing so and supporting him when there
should be furnished him.” The marshal declined to do so and instead placed
Lockington under arrest.57
Lockington had been arrested for being in violation of the State Department
order of removal, but he had not been charged with a crime. Finding that his
time in prison was becoming exceedingly lengthy, and the rations not to his
liking, and that the marshal was unwilling to release him or allow him to return
to Europe, Lockington initiated a suit with the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Lockington sued in a state court because of a federal circuit court decision,
Mumford v. Mumford, that barred alien enemies from bringing suit in federal
courts. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed to hear his case, and the attorney Charles Hare represented him. The Pennsylvania Republican politician
and lawyer Alexander James Dallas served as counsel for Joseph Cornman,
“Keeper of the Debtors Apartment” where US Marshal John Smith had confined Lockington. Ironically, Dallas was a naturalized former British subject
who had arrived in the United States in 1783 shortly after its independence, having previously lived in the British West Indies. He had also risen to prominence
in Republican Party circles, becoming the de facto leader of the Pennsylvania
Republican Party, and would soon serve as the US Secretary of the Treasury.58
The arguments centered on federal versus state authority and jurisdiction,
as well as the rights of alien enemies—especially their legal agency. Dallas’s arguments for denial of the writ of habeas corpus were that the US Congress had
not granted state courts jurisdiction over alien enemies, nor the right of alien
enemies to petition, nor the right to interfere with the marshal’s execution of
his orders. Additionally, Dallas argued that Lockington, as an alien enemy, did
not have a right to petition the court; in other words, no right to legal agency.59
In contrast, Charles Hare, arguing for Lockington, emphasized a limited federal authority over aliens. He challenged the right of the federal government to
regulate the internal movements and residences of alien enemies, arguing that
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the Alien Enemies Act granted the federal government the authority to seize
aliens only to expel them from the United States. Hare also argued that state
courts did indeed “have complete jurisdiction of an alien enemy . . . to issue a writ
of habeas corpus,” even if the detainment had been done under the authority of
the federal government.60
Chief Justice William Tilghman rendered a decision that granted Lockington the right to petition for habeas corpus, but did not release him from custody.
Although he did not consider alien enemies to be prisoners of war, he agreed
that the federal executive retained sufficient emergency wartime powers and
authority through the Alien Enemies Act to detain Lockington, even though
orders came after the federal government had transferred authority from the
Department of State to the Commissary General of Prisoners. This dispute over
jurisdiction had yet to be fully resolved in the courts: although cases such as
Collet v. Collet (1797) and Chirac v. Chirac (1817) increased federal authority
over citizenship, Spratt v. Spratt (1830) gave state court decisions greater finality
in decisions over citizenship status.61
Alien arguments that an American presence in the household made
those households less foreign were partially successful, at least combined with
other forms of political influence and access. Lockington’s challenge was also
partially successful, but with limits. The court’s decision ultimately did not
change his situation, and left the access of alien enemies to courts as plaintiffs
ambiguous, in part because of the continued ambiguous relationship between
state and federal citizenship.
The strongest effect on the citizen/alien divide was the effective exercise of the
national government’s power to regulate its alien population. The federal government not only gathered information on alien residents (nationally implemented
for the first time) and regulated their entry and exit, but it also controlled their
internal movements and forcibly moved residents who had fallen into the category of potential political threats. Furthermore, the federal government recategorized residents as citizen or aliens. The implementation of the Alien Enemies
Act resulted in all these powers accruing to the executive branch, and the Alien
Enemies Act remains a part of the United States legal code.
Another British subject, John Johnson, was also affected by his treatment as
an alien enemy during the War of 1812, but his South Asian heritage and Muslim faith placed him on the other side of the color line from the other British
subjects discussed in this chapter. As he was sailing from Bengal to England to
attend a boarding school, Johnson’s ship was seized by American privateers, and
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he was abandoned on the island of Grenada to die of yellow fever. “A gentleman
of the island” found Johnson and aided his convalescence. After recovering,
Johnson sailed for Connecticut in hopes of obtaining passage to England. His
attempts were unsuccessful, and he lived temporarily with a New England minister. Because he was an observant Muslim and a dark-complexioned grandson
of a British man but otherwise of South Asian descent, his New England captors
felt that he could not attend a school for white students. Instead, he was sent to
the Foreign Mission School in Cornwall, Connecticut, where he, like other students, was subjected to Christian proselytizing and a strict disciplinary system.
The engagement of such migrants from outside Europe with the color line, and
their attempts to exercise citizenship and other political and social rights, are
detailed in the next chapter.62
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Citizens Not Denizens
Desiré an alien a native of Jacmel in the Island of San Domingo a
french citizen of the Christian Religion a free man of colour aged
thirty years Reports himself as above according to law.
— Landing Reports of Aliens, No. 74, Desiré, December 17, 1798
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enjamin Maingault was called in as a witness to explain why
he had voted in an 1806 Philadelphia election. He was part of a group
of allegedly unqualified voters—those who had come over from New
Jersey and did not live in Pennsylvania, those who had not paid taxes, and
those who were underage. Maingault, who himself may have been underage, was challenged for different reasons: a white witness, Samuel Ferguson,
described him as “a mulatto boy a native of Cape Francois” and a recently freed
indentured servant. Ferguson’s actions indicate that he saw Maingault not as a
potential or naturalized citizen, but as a denizen whose legal abilities could be
rescinded by authorities, or even informally by men such as himself. Indeed,
after Maingault finished voting, Ferguson “disputed with him his right to
vote.” Deposed by the governor’s commission on the election, Maingault
countered Ferguson’s challenge with evidence presenting his fitness for citizenship: Maingault’s white father had been a citizen, and Maingault himself
owned several houses, though they were in the hands of a legal guardian. As a
former indentured servant, he exerted his free rights as a citizen regardless of
his place of birth. Many, if not most, white Pennsylvanians may have not seen
him as one, but Maingault was exerting the rights of a citizen in defiance of
their wishes. 1
Maingault’s actions are significant because when confronting a top-down
hostility to his ability to be a citizen, Maingault exerted his agency and obtained
citizenship rights for himself. Rather than being a passive victim of white racism,
Maingault and others like him pushed back and secured rights of citizenship
that others sought to deny them. The hold was tenuous, but it was Maingault’s
111
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own actions that caused him to have them. To what extent citizenship was dependent upon racial status and class position in the early American republic
has been a matter of some debate. Looking at the experiences and choices of
migrants from outside of Europe enriches our understanding of these factors
by showing both their entrenchment and, ironically, their mutability. The ability of non-European migrants to obtain citizenship depended not only on class
position but also on social ties and religion, because these factors influenced
perceptions of racial status.
When non-European migrants tried to act as citizens, either entering into
the naturalization process or exercising the rights of citizenship regardless of
their legal status, they confronted the ways white Americans culturally conflated
citizenship and racial status. Many white Americans assumed that those who
labored in a servile capacity were incapable of becoming citizens, and associated servility increasingly with nonwhite status. Although the state imposed
restrictions upon their eligibility for citizenship, non-European migrants in the
United States sometimes managed to carve out citizenship rights for themselves,
although they often faced considerable hostility and sharply limited options.2
As they navigated the legal system in the United States, non-European migrants encountered issues of status and citizenship in ways that differed markedly from those faced by European migrants. French European migrants who
were reluctant to culturally integrate into white American culture embraced
the legal aspects of citizenship as the best safeguard of their rights in a foreign
country. Migrants from the British Isles, by way of contrast, often ignored the
legal requirements of citizenship before the War of 1812 precisely because they
were comfortable culturally integrating into their communities. Non-European
migrants present yet another variation on this pattern. Some desired the integration that the French avoided, but they knew they could not count on the informal acceptance that the British and Irish took for granted. Thus their attempts
to gain formal citizenship were a means to obtain legal rights and security in
the face of community hostility. Assertions of legal citizenship could provide
them with forms of status and legal abilities French and British migrants took
for granted.

Early National Policies Regarding Race and Citizenship
and White American Conceptions of Citizenship
One of the most important ways that issues of citizenship were tied to social
status for non-European migrants was through a key part of the Naturalization
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Act of 1790. It stipulated that naturalization should be extended only to “free
white persons.” It did not explain, however, what it meant to be white. Was it
simply a matter of skin color, or were other factors involved? Being nonwhite
conjured up a host of civic deficiencies for many white Americans. When
encountering these attitudes, migrants would have to work against them or
around them.
Most white Americans in the early nineteenth century associated Blackness
(and sometimes Indianness) with servile status and assumed that such people
were unfit for citizenship. In addition to outright racism, this exclusion was due
to the attachment of citizenship to the head of household and the concept of
economic independence as a test for the fitness of citizenship. As white Americans increasingly attempted to equate blackness with servility, they pushed
non-frontier American Indians into similar forms of indenture and servile
labor; during the same time white indentured servitude declined. Consequently,
white Americans increasingly associated other white people with independence
and head of household status, and nonwhite people with dependence and servile labor.3
Additionally, as discussed in Chapter 3, the connection of citizenship to the
head of household also rested on a concept of economic independence. Servants
were not only household dependents, but economic dependents. Unfree servants
required food, clothing, and shelter from the master; free servants required
wages. Republicans and Federalists differed in assessing who met this qualification, but they agreed on the concept. The economically dependent were in
danger of being influenced or compelled by those who held economic power over
them: servants, dependent on their employers for wages and/or shelter, certainly
fell into this category. Federalists also included artisans within this category,
because they depended on the propertied people within their communities as
a customer base.4
Migrants seeking citizenship would have to confront these views and evaluate
which strategies might be effective in securing them legal rights as citizens as
well as informal protections and community acceptance. The color line between
white and not-white needed to be negotiated during this process, because white
Americans sought to restrict naturalization to whites only. Leveraging social
capital, avoiding religious practices deemed too foreign or uncivilized, and displaying personal wealth could all result in different racial and citizenship statuses for migrants from the same region. Migrants recognized that they could
influence their racial reception through these means, and acted in ways that
secured them further rights and community acceptance or support.
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Agency Despite Exclusion from Citizenship:
Polynesian and South Asian Sailors
As the US whaling industry grew, teenagers and young men from Pacific Islands
and New Zealand began to arrive on American shores in small numbers; missionary accounts indicate a small number of Polynesian youths living in port
towns such as Boston and New Haven during the 1810s. US trade with East
and South Asia also brought sailors from those regions to American shores.
These migrants had neither the wealth nor the social capital necessary to pursue
naturalization, so they chose instead to either cultivate a permanently foreign
identity when interacting with the government, or present themselves as persons
of color when interacting with neighbors. Polynesians found that African Americans and Indians could provide them with social and economic support in their
daily struggles. Polynesians are almost nonexistent in naturalization records,
indicating that they saw legal citizenship as either unnecessary or unattainable.
Indeed, they probably made citizenship even more unlikely by creating social
networks through African Americans and Indians, thus identifying themselves
as nonwhite people. Despite white discrimination against them, many of them
may have felt that the advantages of a nonwhite support network outweighed the
disadvantages of alien status and white hostility.
Polynesians arrived via ships that were part of expanding American global
commerce. Once those voyages ended and put into port in the United States,
Polynesian sailors found that they had to seek employment in order to support
themselves. Most ended up as servants or in trades increasingly dominated by
African Americans. Thomas Hopoo “hired himself out in several families as
a servant . . . and removed with one family into the interior of the country.”
William Kanui (Tennoe) and his brother traveled from Boston to Providence
“in quest of employment,” and William continued this search in Hartford and
New Haven after his brother’s death in Providence. This work may have further
reinforced their place in the racial hierarchy and excluded them from the possibility of citizenship, as white lawmakers saw servants as lacking independence
from their masters. Similarly, missionaries recorded Polynesians associating
themselves with African Americans. In New Haven, William Kanui “went into
a barber’s shop [a traditionally African American trade] to learn the trade, and
soon became very expert at his new occupation.” At this point, he was contacted
by students of Yale College, who offered to assume some of his debts in return
for being “put to school under the direction of his Christian friends.” Another
Hawai’ian, Benjamin Carhooa, “joined a Baptist Church in Boston composed
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of people of colour.” Hawaiians and other Polynesians’ activities employment as
servants appeared to white Americans as economic dependence.5
Polynesian migrants sought to integrate culturally, but that integration was
not with white Americans. With a lack of extant naturalizations, and only a
few dozen extant Polynesian migrants in total, if even that many, the available
evidence indicates that Polynesian migrants found citizenship either unattainable or sufficiently lacking in benefits, and preferred permanent status as aliens
ineligible for citizenship if it afforded them support from African Americans
and American Indians. Since they overwhelmingly did not pursue legal citizenship and/or did not persuade white people to accept them as potential citizens,
they sought an alternative source of support, strongly economic and religious,
among people of color in the United States, even as accounts by white missionaries claimed to provide similar support.
Although missionaries sought to transform Polynesians through Christianization and adoption of Western customs, there was a limit to white acceptance
of Polynesian migrants as their social equals. Polynesians lacked the resources
that other migrants were able to employ to successfully push for equal treatment. White missionary accounts demonstrate the common dilemma that came
from bringing what they saw as civilization and Christianity to savage heathens:
once civilized and converted, white reluctance to see them as such and admit
them into the white community as equals created a set of people whose existence contradicted the civilizing and Christianizing process. White missionary
accounts avoided this dilemma by playing down those migrants who remained
in the United States for a length of time. In contrast, migrants who returned to
Polynesia to further missionize under white supervision were given much coverage, those who died young and tragically even more so. Henry Opukahai’a
(or Obookiah in missionary accounts) adopted Christianity, dressed in Western clothing, learned not just English but Hebrew and some Latin as well, and
traveled in New England to promote missionizing activities, where missionaries
presented him as a successful example to the townsfolk. His early death in Connecticut in 1818, not yet twenty-five years old, avoided the issue of his remaining
in the United States as a fully civilized Polynesian.6
South Asian sailors who sailed to the United States also experienced discriminatory treatment and categorization as nonwhite people. They sought to
redress discriminatory treatment through the US government, but did so by
presenting themselves as foreigners wishing to return home. There does not seem
to be any evidence of these sailors attempting to obtain citizenship, although
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later parts of this chapter show that genteel South Asian migrants were capable
of obtaining full citizenship while still acknowledging their ancestry.
Sailors’ encounters with racial categorization could begin before they set foot
in the United States. When describing his voyages on early nineteenth-century
whaling ships, the sailor Ned Myers spent considerable time with South Asian
sailors, and “learned [to speak] a little Bengalee.” But Myers also reinforced a racial divide that existed between himself as a white man, and the Bengali sailors,
whom he referred to as “darkies.”7
South Asian migrants, in addition to being racially associated with African
Americans, had occasionally been enslaved by white Americans. In part, this perception of enslavability was fostered by the presence of slavery in South Asia, and
British colonial participation in slaveowning. It was further normatized by the
existence of an Indian Ocean slave trade. For instance, during the colonial period
in 1737, “a Black Fellow born in Bengal called Pompey” who was “Detain[ed] as
a slave” in Virginia wrote to the East India Company, and successfully brought
the Company’s intervention on his behalf to allow him to return to India. As we
shall see, such attempts at enslavement also occurred after US independence.8
Despite such prejudice, migrants still sought legal redress in cases where they
had been wronged. South Asian sailors participated in voyages into the Atlantic
world that often ended in labor disputes. At times they successfully relied on
semigovernmental institutions such as the British East India Company to obtain
redress from Atlantic world governments. When encountering difficulties in the
newly independent United States, South Asian sailors hoped to continue using
what had been at times a successful strategy. In the best documented example,
the stranded sailors remained in the United States for close to a year prior to
obtaining passage back to Asia.9
The crew of the ship Pallas had sailed from Canton (Guangzhou) and through
Batavia (Jakarta) before arriving in Baltimore in 1785, where the Maryland Journal and Baltimore Advertiser noted that “It is no unpleasing sight to see the crew
of this ship, Chinese, Malays, Japanese and Moors, with a few Europeans, all
habited according to the different countries to which they belong.” The sailors
themselves, however, had a more difficult journey. Like many Asian sailors in
the Atlantic world, they found themselves in a dispute with the ship’s captain,
Irish-born John O’Donnell, over pay: “their wages on the Pallas were a paltry
sum compared with what the American seamen received.” Moreover, the sailors
were stranded: the Pallas was not slated to make any new voyage, and so they
traveled to Pennsylvania, where they petitioned the government of Pennsylvania
for assistance in returning to Asia.10
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But the petition also contained a second request: the return of Adam Keesar,
“a Lad about twelve years old,” the son of ship’s lieutenant, Sick Keesar, “who was
Stole from him by a certain Marylander John Hamilton.” Furthermore, Captain O’Donnell had “lately threatened to kill” the sailors if they returned to
Baltimore and had “kept the above mentioned lad in his possession.” Although
Captain O’Donnell wrote a letter offering a differing account of the dispute over
wages and the sailors’ decision to seek return passage from Philadelphia, there
is no extant defense of his role in the abduction of Adam Keesar. O’Donnell’s
behavior is consistent with the actions of whites who saw free children of color
as enslavable but refrained from enslaving white children. That indicates that
whites saw South Asians, especially of lower social status, as in the same category
as people of African descent, and as such, ineligible to become naturalized citizens. Low social status and lack of ties made enslavement thinkable and possible
to men such as O’Donnell. This lack of political, social, and legal leverage mean
that sailors appeared in the historical record not as aliens eligible for citizenship
but as people dependent on elite benevolence, and as foreigners seeking to leave.
Unlike the migrants appearing the following section, the South Asian sailors did
not act as potential citizens, at least in this instance.11

Dominguans of Color: Countering Denizenship
by Asserting the Rights of Citizens
People of color from revolutionary Saint-Domingue, soon to be Haiti, comprised the largest group of nonwhite migrants in the United States, arriving
in the thousands, including a well-documented wave of over 3,000 people of
color and over 3,000 enslaved people arriving in New Orleans in 1809, following their expulsion from Cuba. In eastern regions, a large number also came
with the predominantly white refugees who fled the battle and conflagration
of Cap-Français in 1793. Several accounts document Dominguans’ active path
to obtain citizenship rights and counter white attempts to discriminate against
them. While their African ancestry disqualified them from naturalization according to the Naturalization Act of 1790, they leveraged their wealth, social
connections, and association with the French Republic to carve out citizenship
rights for themselves. Their frequent exposure to both French and Haitian revolutionary rhetoric gave them a fuller transatlantic understanding of citizenship,
and they deployed that understanding in their struggle to obtain legal rights
and protections in the United States. Their experiences contrast with those of
Polynesian and South Asian migrants, whose limited social connections and
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lack of direct experience with revolutionary republicanism resulted in strategies such as asserting foreign status or seeking support among other people of
color. Migrants from Saint-Domingue did not necessarily avoid such actions,
but expressed them in terms of citizenship that forced whites to acknowledge
citizenship status.12
Dominguans of color confronted white prejudice and discrimination against
them by exerting rights of citizenship, or even citizen status itself. They did so
by engaging in activities increasingly associated with citizenship, such as voting,
but they also did so in less conventional ways: Dominguans sometimes presented
themselves as citizens, not of the United States, but of France, or even as citizens
who were fellow participants in the transatlantic revolutions of the eighteenth
century. These assertions of citizen status forced whites to acknowledge that
people of African descent could exercise the rights of citizenship. Dominguans’
engagement with citizenship was part of their struggle against the legal disabilities placed upon people with African ancestry in the United States. Migrants
of color also countered instances of discrimination against them through acts
of political civil disobedience: registering as aliens when that “privilege” was
reserved for white aliens only, or attempting to vote after obtaining freedom,
despite birth outside the United States. The tenuous hold on rights and legal
abilities of Dominguan migrants of color is part of the shift to denizenship for
people of African descent in the United States. Dominguans also pushed to be
potential citizens and sought fuller citizenship and legal rights.
Denizenship has historically been a status wherein the rights of citizens or
subject were conditionally granted to noncitizens. Some scholars have argued
that the rights extended to free people of African descent in the United States
were, in effect, denizenship: rights extended by the grace of the state, but subject
to unilateral revocation at any time. I agree that this is an accurate description
of African American legal rights during this period. White attempts to impose
denizenship were countered, however, by migrants of color seeking to obtain
citizenship or its rights, or to be seen as potential citizens, even if it meant being
defined as legal aliens. If denizenship was an attempt by whites to exert legal
power over people of African descent, attempting to function as a citizen or
potential citizen was the form that resistance took by definition.13
One case of a Dominguan asserting his status as a citizen in the face of discriminatory treatment is an alien registration made after the federal government
instituted compulsory alien registration in 1798, as described in Chapter 2. Despite the 1798 provisions stipulating that only white aliens should register with
the federal government, one head of household of African descent did register
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as an alien in federal court in 1798. This was an attempt to acknowledge that although free migrants of color could not become citizens of the United States, the
federal government had to acknowledge their status as citizens, albeit of other
republics, nonetheless. Desiré, a “free man of colour” and “an alien a native of
Jacmel” in southern Saint-Domingue, registered as an alien in a federal court in
Philadelphia. Desiré was denied the privilege of a last name, and unlike all the
other registrants except for the one immediately preceding him, identified himself not only as a “a french citizen” but also “of the Christian Religion.” Desiré
also needed to have a presumably white man, George Bond, sign as a witness.
His statement clearly indicates that if federal officials would not allow him to
become a citizen of the United States, they nonetheless had to acknowledge him
as a citizen of France. Assertion of citizen status was also a challenge against the
attempt push people of color into denizenship.14
Desiré may also have been accumulating evidence should his free status be
challenged. He experienced some difficulties with his former mistress, Mme.
Beverneau, who had Desiré prosecuted for vagrancy, claiming that he had “having at divers times embezzled money and spent the same in lewd houses.” Since
freedom without the good will of a former master or mistress could often be
precarious, Desiré may have been interested in documenting his free status
and securing his right to remain in Philadelphia. He had a number of different
motives, but in using the means of an alien report to his ends, Desiré also was
forcing the federal government to acknowledge the presence of another class of
citizens who suffered from unequal legal penalties and disabilities owing to their
race. Desiré’s strategy differed from other (usually white) men emerging from
bondage, who claimed that their matriculation into the public sphere was akin
to naturalization. In Desiré’s case, his mistress’s foreign birth, in addition to his
racial reception, may have prevented such an argument.15
Desire’s assertion of foreign citizenship is echoed in the actions of Pierre
Toussaint, another Dominguan of color who emphasized his foreign status.
Brought in slavery to the United States from Saint-Domingue, Toussaint was
able to leverage his personal connection with his widowed mistress, whom he
had economically supported in New York, to obtain his manumission. He chose
to do so, however, not through American courts, but through the French consulate; doing so granted him status as a subject of the emperor of France, the same
citizenship status as his former mistress. Thereafter, he worked as a hairstylist,
cultivating a wealthy clientele and building a highly successful business. Consequently, Toussaint was able to become one of the few wealthy New Yorkers of
African descent. He drew on his social prestige and cosmopolitan connections
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in France to construct an identity as a Frenchman, and for many years planned
to move with his family to France.16
Still others deployed citizenship in a manner intended to be vague about
their allegiance to a particular state or regime, finding that that ambiguity could
be used to avoid discriminatory treatment while maximizing connections to local
communities, differing nations, and the idea of revolutionary republicanism. For
people of color from revolutionary Saint-Domingue, an ambiguous citizenship
could be used to demonstrate loyalty and simultaneously push for radical social
change. Dominguans of color, especially as recent migrants, often viewed their
political identities as tied to both metropolitan France and the colony of SaintDomingue/emerging nation of Haiti, rather than as migrants intending to settle
permanently in the United States. For migrants of color, the American racial
system that failed to accord them an intermediate racial identity between black
and white proved galling, and many saw their treatment in the United States as
another reason to reject an American identity. Many also saw the United States
as a temporary residence until conditions in either Saint-Domingue/Haiti or
metropolitan France would allow their return to their place of true political
allegiance. When the political situation was uncertain and could shift rapidly,
refugees could find it expedient to deploy citizenship in a multisided way that
exploited the ambiguity of their political status and allegiance.
One particular document demonstrates how Dominguans simultaneously
presented themselves as local citizens, French citizens, and believers in transatlantic revolutionary republicanism. In 1793, the “citizens of color of Philadelphia” drafted a memorial to the French National Assembly supporting
the revolutionary order abolishing slavery in northern Saint-Domingue, in
anticipation of the formal abolition of slavery throughout the French empire
in 1794. For the Dominguans who drafted the petition, they lobbied as citizens
residing in Philadelphia but politically associated with the French Republic, an
identification that blurred national boundaries and the distinction between
local and national citizenship. Dominguans of all colors were not shy about
lobbying for their political and economic interests in differing sovereign states,
and presented themselves in a manner they felt would most benefit their interests. At this early juncture in the Haitian revolution (and the French Revolution), political identities were in flux. Was civil equality to be spread by the
French Republic, or would Dominguans of color find an independent or autonomous Saint-Domingue a better place to secure their political rights while
maintaining the plantation economy that was often the source of their wealth
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and economic and political power? Would republicanism and civil equality for
people of color spread throughout the world? It seemed likely as French armies
scored victories throughout Europe and the French commissioner Léger-Felicité Sonthonax negotiated an uneasy alliance with the leaders of the 1791 slave
revolt, leading to the conquest of all of Hispaniola. The citizens of color of Philadelphia may have found that emphasizing a local citizenship when addressing
the French Assembly carried a vagueness about loyalty that encompassed revolutionary dreams of the universal spread of republicanism yet avoided directly
taking sides in the increasingly complicated Haitian revolution. Furthermore,
the spread of republican governments across the Atlantic world meant that
they may not necessarily have viewed themselves as citizens fixed to particular sovereign state, but rather as public citizens loyal to the idea of republican government wherever it might rise against monarchy. Citizenship did not
necessarily have to be connected to a nation-state or a sovereign state—in the
giddy days of 1793 when republican possibilities seemed limitless, the citizens
of color of Philadelphia could present themselves as universal citizens loyal to
republicanism everywhere. Universal citizenship was thinkable because of the
virtual citizenship described in Chapter 2—wherever they might be, as long as
newspapers circulated, citizens could participate in public debate and practice
republicanism.17
The citizens of color of Philadelphia were attempting to link official citizenship with citizenship as it circulated in the public sphere. Unlike Desiré’s appearance in the archive, here the main route of persuasion was through the printed
public sphere of the Atlantic world rather than through face-to-face interaction:
the original handwritten document was intended to circulate publicly and was
ultimately printed in at least one newspaper. The actions of these citizens are
also similar to those of John Daly Burk, whose virtual citizenship is discussed
in Chapter 2. They differ in that they felt considerably less secure in their ability
to participate in their polities as citizens, and in their choice of the government
with which they should align themselves, or whether their citizenship was necessarily state-based or community-based.18
Other Dominguans attempted to exert the rights of citizenship as a
form of resistance to white power manifested by the imposition of denizenship
upon people of African descent. While those migrants asserting alienship often
associated their status with the French national state or empire, other migrants
of color, Dominguan or otherwise, attempted to exert a more local citizenship.
This assertion of local citizenship is exemplified by the actions of Benjamin
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Maingault, discussed earlier. His participation in the election was described in
a deposition given by white witness Samuel Ferguson:
“a mulatto boy a native of Cape Francois, who served his time with Andrew
Seguin, went up in the evening to the election with one James Mahan. . . .
His name is Benjamin Mingole [Maingault.] He has been in this country
ten or eleven years—lived with Mr. Seguin—was free the 19th of July last.”
“. . . did not see him deliver the tickets to Mr. Bender, when the boy came
down from the window he disputed with him his right to vote—Does not
know whom the boy voted for.”19
Ferguson’s deposition was followed by Maingault’s own deposition. Maingault admitted that he had “never been made a citizen of the United States,”
but noted that his presumably white father, who died in the mid-1790s, “was
a citizen of Pennsylvania,” and that his father had left him some property, “a
brick house and some frames.” Maingault also admitted that he did not “rightly
know his age,” but believed himself to be over twenty-one, even if his guardian
“Mr. Chaudron” still held Maingault’s property. In his testimony, Maingault’s
defense of his eligibility was geared toward addressing specific qualifications for
voting and citizenship. His ownership of property indicated that his economic
status was sufficient to pay taxes, although he did not say so directly. In keeping
with white attitudes toward the eligibility of people of color to vote, his propertied status indicated that he was a better candidate for suffrage than people
of color of lesser means. Furthermore, as a dependent of a deceased citizen of
Pennsylvania, he might be eligible to obtain his father’s citizenship status: he
could be a state citizen even if federal law prevented him from becoming a US
citizen. Pennsylvania allowed the adult sons of citizens the right of citizenship
in Pennsylvania.20
Maingault may have felt indifferent or hostile to the political system that consistently limited his access to political participation and not felt any compunction about what hostile whites would call voter fraud, or he may have viewed
suffrage as his right in the face of the laws that denied him that, or some combination of the two. The emergence of political machine-style politics, along with
a still functioning two-party system, allowed Maingault a political foothold
and space to emphasize his rights and change perceptions of “French negroes”
among the white American public. In Maingault’s case, he could successfully
argue that he was simply a citizen of Pennsylvania, or that the franchise was not
restricted to citizens only, or even that, owing to his time served under indenture, his freedom was akin to a naturalization as an opportunity to choose his
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own political destiny. Other former apprentices, albeit white, would claim that
their time served in an American household had naturalized them during the
War of 1812.21
Maingault’s actions differed from the actions of British and Irish migrants,
as well as those of white French Dominguans like his presumably white father.
Unlike typical white Dominguans, Maingault sought a local, rather than national citizenship. Also, despite Maingault’s intimate connections with white
Dominguans, he seems to have found the emerging party-based electioneering
a more effective means of acting politically than the bipartisan lobbying that
white Dominguans pursued in the 1790s. Maingault’s citizenship was virtual
in that he never formally sought naturalization; he attempted to exercise the
rights of a citizen by voting. Unlike most British and Irish migrants, he found
his virtual citizenship directly challenged by hostile whites. Maingault’s African
ancestry was a possible disqualification that whites needed to carefully monitor
continually, rather than a sudden, temporary response as occurred in the War
of 1812 when the US government imposed harsh controls on British subjects.22
Maingault’s presentation of personal respectability and participation in local
citizenship are indicative of the issues that free migrants from outside Europe
often faced when negotiating a place within American politics and the American racial system during the early American republic. Maingault understood
the tenuousness of his citizenship status. To combat the prejudice that he experienced, he drew on other factors likely to make him more appear more fit
for citizenship, factors that indicated elevated class status and connection to
respectable white persons. Therefore he emphasized his propertied status and
the transfer of wealth from his presumably white father, as well as his guardian,
Mr. Chaudron, who may be Jean Simon Chaudron, the prominent silversmith
and acquaintance of Thomas Jefferson discussed in Chapter 2.
Migrants also worked with the broader international system of identity documentation, but this, too, was not fully a top-down process. Maingault’s actions
and those of other migrants show how they reworked the system of identity
documentation to their advantage. Maingault’s bureaucratic citizenship demonstrates the imperfect, contradictory, and fictive nature of official documentation:
his status was vague and not fully decided. Instead of a realm in which everyone
is accounted for and categorized, and lawbreakers are duly found out and punished or corrected, instead there is ambiguity, and “fraud” from the perspective
of whites hostile to citizenship for people of African descent. 23
Similarly, Desiré was aware of the eighteenth-century system of identity tracking and worked through it to support his claims to freedom and citizenship.
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Desiré successfully persuaded federal court clerks to record his citizenship status, producing an official record. That documentation became part of the global
system of documentation that officials in the modern states of the Atlantic world
relied on to verify identity. Other officials seeking to verify Desiré’s status as a
free person and a citizen would assume he had an extant document trail, and
Desiré, assuming that asserting foreign citizenship status would be advantageous
in some future instance, could direct them to the federal court records in which
he appeared. The “fictional realm” described as a “second world that existed only
on paper and in files” and was “imperceptible to ordinary mortals” was not only
a top-down creation solely at the disposal of the state or solely resisted through
personal fraud; individuals represented in the second world used those documents to their advantage, even as those documents reinforced hegemonic norms
such as white supremacy.24
Maingault’s and other migrants’ actions are important because they demonstrate that non-European migrants attempted to counter white attempts to deny
them the rights of citizenship, thereby influencing the development of citizenship rights. The abrogation of rights may have been a top-down imposition from
American lawmakers, but migrants like Maingault resisted its enforcement and
carved out rights for themselves, participating in the debate about what rights
and qualifications should be associated with citizenship. In contrast, Desiré asserted a citizenship, not of the United States, but of France, and successfully
persuaded federal clerks to record him as such. Such successes were limited at
best. Other migrants were able to leverage their wealth and social connections to
be accepted functionally as white people, and consequently as citizens.

The Law Family: South Asian Leverage of
Social Capital to Obtain Citizenship
Some migrants persuaded their communities to see them as fit for citizenship.
They were further able to mobilize this status to successfully appear in bureaucratic and official records as citizens, virtual citizens, or potential citizens, and
as legally white persons. Persuasion of the community and successful representation in the official document system did not have to be total: not everyone
had to be thoroughly convinced of a migrant’s status as potential citizen or as
a white person. What mattered was the ability to circulate in respectable white
society as an equal.25
Success at becoming a citizen was affected by numerous factors: social capital
or social ties, economic capital, adherence to Western religious norms and other
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norms such as dressing in Western clothing. The importance of these factors
is demonstrated in the contrasting experiences of several biracial migrants of
British and South Asian ancestry who resided in the United States during the
years after independence. John and Edmund Law leveraged their ties, wealth, slaveowner status, and religious conformity as Anglican-Episcopalians to become
citizens: one obtained citizenship legally, the other virtually. Their experiences
contrast with that of John Johnson, the South Asian student described at the
end of the previous chapter, who had been abducted by a privateer when traveling from India to Britain and eventually arrived in the United States.26
The Laws’ transition was eased by significant social and economic capital, particularly in the form of strong family ties to wealthy whites. Edmund and John
Law were the illegitimate sons of Thomas Law, an Englishman living in India,
and a South Asian woman; they were able to naturalize and incorporate themselves into white society in Washington, DC. This transition was eased by their
father’s acknowledgement of paternity, active guardianship, substantial personal
wealth, slaveowner status, Anglican faith, ties to men in top government positions, and further building and solidification of ties to their local community.
These ties also meant that the Laws were able to acknowledge their South Asian
ancestry and not engage in a secretive attempt at racial passing.
The Laws were aware of differing systems of racial prejudice, and saw in
the United States an opportunity to circulate as equals in white society. In an
1829 letter, Thomas Law wrote that he saw the United States as a place where
his sons would encounter less prejudice than in Britain: “By coming to America
one object was to settle my natural children where a variety of climate reconciles
differences of complexion & where there are not such strong prejudices.” Law’s
letter shows an adherence to the popular early modern view of “complexion” as
being environmentally determined rather than as an inherited trait. His second
comment, “strong prejudices,” requires some further interpretation for someone
who settled in a society where racially based enslavement provided a cornerstone
of social order and hierarchy, as it did in the area around Washington, DC, at the
time. Although Law might have been expected to display some early naiveté concerning the racial order in the United States, this letter was written over thirty
years after Thomas Law’s arrival in the United States. Furthermore, he wrote
after his sons’ successful integration into Washington’s white elite, including
marriage with white women and successful business careers. Law’s letter shows
how family wealth, prominence, religious practices, and social connections allowed his sons a liminal space of either being within the range of acceptable
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white “complexions” or appearing as sufficiently nonblack or non-American
Indian to interact with elite whites as social equals. American elites found the
Law sons’ openly acknowledged Asian ancestry as a tiny exception that did not
upset the racial and social order of the United States. Some leading families of
Virginia claimed American Indian ancestry while identifying as racially white,
a claim that cemented their authority as a ruling elite. Perhaps the possibility of
other elite whites claiming to be part “East India Indian” was consequently less
disturbing to them. In contrast, Law felt that elite Britons more carefully policed
the South Asian/white racial boundary and saw biracial Anglo-Indian people as
a threat to the metropolitan monopoly over wealth and trade, and a disturbing
byproduct of the process of civilizing and colonizing India.27
Not only did the Law brothers successfully integrate themselves into Washington society, but Edmund Law also successfully began the naturalization process. There are no extant naturalization records for John Law. Their baptismal
records indicate a 1784 birth for John, and a 1786 birth for Edmund, both in
India. The family moved to England in 1791, and Thomas Law took John to
the United States in 1794, while Edmund arrived in 1802. The timing of Edmund’s naturalization in June 1812, shortly prior to the US declaration of war
against Great Britain, along with Thomas Law’s own naturalization in January
1815, shows that the Laws behaved in a manner consistent with other British migrants: they did not bother with naturalization until they faced strong wartime
alien penalties. While other British migrants found out about those penalties
too late, Edmund Law’s Washington connections may have made him aware
of the problems British subjects might face, and so he successfully obtained his
naturalization before the war began. Thomas Law missed that opportunity, but
availed himself of legislation allowing wartime naturalization for British subjects who were long-standing US residents. His naturalization actually dates
from after the signing of the Treaty of Ghent but several weeks prior to the
arrival of news of peace in the United States. Despite his alien status, John Law
served alongside Edmund in the DC militia, and took part in the defense of
Washington during the British raid in 1814. Like most British subjects, they
found that they were often able to obtain most of the benefits of citizenship and
incur few of the penalties of alien status, and so did not pursue naturalization
until they were threatened with restrictions on movement and compulsory registration of aliens.28
In contrast, Johnson found that his circumstances made the issue of citizenship less important than his ability to reestablish contact with his family
or exert control over his life in general. Missionary accounts focused on his tale
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of dramatic rescue and hinted at the possibility of a successful conversion from
Islam. They do not indicate that the missionaries had much interest in reuniting
Johnson with his family or fulfilling his father’s wish for his son to receive an
education in England. It is possible that Johnson might have later succeeded in
persuading Americans to think of him as a potential citizen, but his placement
in the Foreign Mission School indicates that this was not likely: the school intended for its students to receive an education with the purpose of evangelizing
in their native, insufficiently Christian lands. In contrast, the Laws experienced
an easier flow into community acceptance as potential citizens, ultimately leading to the official naturalization process.

Citizenship and American Religious Identity:
Despotic Oriental Islam, Savage Heathenism, Tolerable Judaism
Migrants from the Near East were often successful at obtaining citizenship so
long as they were not seen as Muslim, though there is a dearth of evidence articulating why Americans made this distinction. One explanation is an American
association of Islam with the concept of Oriental despotism, and consequently
an incompatibility with republican institutions. Alternatively, many Americans
may have had a more general sense of Islam as un-Western or too “foreign.” Still
other Americans may not have understood Islam as a distinct religion, despite
encounters with Islamic religious practices among enslaved Africans, but may
have viewed such religious practices as “foreign” rather than a religious identity
per se. In contrast, Middle Eastern or North African birth was not necessarily
a barrier to naturalization.
Of the students at the Foreign Mission School, one in particular was especially successful at integration into white society. Photius Fisk, an ethnic
Greek originally from Izmir in present-day Turkey, who had spent most of his
childhood in Malta, attended the Foreign Mission School and shared experiences with the Polynesian students that pushed him away from whiteness, even
though he was able to exercise white status later in life. Shortly after his arrival in
New England in 1822, Fisk traveled with missionary promoters to New England
churches, where he and another Greek-Maltese student were put on display “‘like
a couple of young baboons,’ to gratify the curiosity of the faithful” and replenish the cost of their transatlantic passage. Fisk graduated and served as a Navy
chaplain during the antebellum period and the Civil War, while also associating
with the leaders of the abolitionist movement. Fisk was able to make this transition in part because of a willingness among whites to evaluate his complexion
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as “white,” but he also had the advantage of having been born into (Eastern
Orthodox) Christianity and subsequently adopting, if not orthodox Calvinism,
an acceptable New England Protestantism.29
For still other migrants, emergency political conditions excluded them from
citizenship, and also resulted in the imposition of new state-level alien penalties,
such as deportation. Several North African Jews arrived in Virginia in 1785. Although they were probably from Morocco, the Virginia governor Patrick Henry
suspected that they were spies from Algiers, then at war with the United States,
and the Virginia legislature granted the governor the authority (for the first
time) to expel dangerous foreigners. Henry believed that their possession of documents written in non-Roman script, which was probably Hebrew, was evidence
of their spy status, although he does not appear to have made any attempts to
contact Virginia’s Jewish community for assistance in translation. Their expulsion was not explicitly on racial grounds, but rather as potentially alien enemies.
The expulsion did not occur through the judicial process but instead through the
executive branch, denying these aliens the right to due process. The Virginia legislature’s actions presaged the construction of executive-run deportation that the
US Congress passed as part of the Naturalization Act of 1798 and the 1798 Alien
Act. Once again, under those laws, a legislature granted the executive powers at
the expense of the judiciary, while imposing deportation as a new legal penalty
on aliens. In both cases, emergency conditions were the cause, but in the Virginia
case, the law was not designed to expire, unlike the Alien Act.30
Moses Elias Levy, a later arrival from Morocco, had a more successful path
to residency and citizenship: he settled permanently in the United States and
naturalized. Levy’s transition was possible because of an investment in social
capital as well as family and personal experience in lobbying political leaders.
Although family members faced anti-Semitism in the United States, it was not
a barrier to their naturalization. Moses Levy was a successful candidate for citizenship because he presented himself as an ally to white supremacy rather than
an enemy, even as he made no secret of his interest in establishing a Jewish colony
in northern Florida. Levy did publish an anonymous Plan for the Abolition of
Slavery in London in 1829. The plan was published not to further the cause of
abolitionism, but rather to counter it as it gained strength in the British Empire.
Levy’s plan was extremely gradualist and sought to stem calls for immediate
emancipation. He differed from supporters of colonization in advocating widespread interracial marriage after the abolition of slavery, which was an unconventional argument in the early American republic and one likely to encounter
strong white hostility in the antebellum era.31
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Levy’s transition was smoothed by a residence in the Caribbean and integration into slave society as a wealthy business owner and the husband of a daughter of a prominent family in Saint Thomas in the Danish Virgin Islands. Levy
declared his intent to naturalize in a Philadelphia court in 1821, having planned
to establish a Jewish settlement in northeast Florida in the waning years of its
Spanish rule—he would not settle there until after Florida was ceded to the
United States. His son, David Levy Yulee, born in Saint Thomas, became a US
senator from Florida. Levy and Yulee successfully negotiated, through their acceptance into Caribbean white society, acceptance into American white society—but the acceptance was not entirely smooth. Full citizenship for former
residents of Spanish Florida was increasingly policed along the color line in the
years leading up to the mid-nineteenth century; Florida shifted from a sparsely
populated frontier region to a more settled plantation economy, the borderland
receded, and political divisions heated up in the 1840s. During this time, David
Levy Yulee’s citizenship and racial status were called into question. Levy ran
successfully for office as Florida’s territorial Congressional delegate (despite the
challenges to his eligibility) and a final attempt occurred as he was sworn in, as
recorded by John Quincy Adams:32
. . . [Congressman Francis Wilkson] Pickens [D-SC] introduced David
Levy as delegate from the Territory of Florida. [Christopher?] Morgan
[W-NY] objected to his being sworn, and presented papers contesting his
election and denying that he is a citizen of the United States. The Speaker
called for credential, and, upon inspection of it, swore him in. The papers
presented by Morgan were referred to the Committee of Elections. Levy is
said to be a Jew, and, what will be, if true, a far more formidable disqualification, that he has a dash of African blood in him, which, sub rosa, is the
case with more than one member of the House.33
As Adams recorded, the challenge foundered, and although Adams would
continue to refer to him as “the alien Jew delegate from Florida” in his diary,
his remarks also show how it was necessary to treat the questionably white as
white, even as gossip about their racial ancestry might continue in private. To
do otherwise would upset the racial system that placed white people in positions
of gentility (as well as power).
The rumors of David Levy Yulee’s African ancestry reflected antebellum
concerns about racial mixing and white respectability that assumed that African ancestry was always passed matrilineally. These borders were policed in
part because such unions combined African descent with the potential transfer
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of wealth, and therefore upset the racial order in ways that white Americans
assumed patrilineal African descent did not. Thus the rumors about Yulee centered on his Caribbean-born mother rather than on his father, who was literally
born on the continent of Africa, but whom Yulee’s detractors did not see as
the source of “African blood.” Moses Levy had successfully become a citizen,
whether it was through the handover of Spanish Florida or through a petition
to naturalize in an American court. He had successfully presented himself, and
been accepted, as a free white man.
Yulee’s claims during the 1841 election to make him palatable to voters also
were related to his satisfactory claims of US citizenship. Levy stressed his conversion from Judaism to Christianity, and the family estrangement that resulted
from it; he had not converted merely for the sake of convenience. In Yulee’s case,
his father’s 1829 Plan for the Abolition of Slavery that advocated interracial marriage as a solution to the post-abolition problem of racial tensions did not come up
for public debate. If it had, Yulee’s racial evaluation might have placed him beyond
the possibility of whiteness. In fact, challenges to Yulee’s citizenship do not appear
to have openly alleged nonwhite status. Rather, challenges related to Moses Levy’s
Florida residency status at the time of the handover from Spanish to US control.34

Migrants from Latin America: Historians,
Essentialism, and the Unknowable
This discussion has not challenged the essentialist assumption that white Americans assigned a racial status to all the migrants that they encountered, even if
that status was one of racial ambiguity. To complicate matters, the racial status
that present-day readers might wish to assign to certain migrants may differ from
the status of that migrant’s time of appearance in the historical record. As scholars of queer theory have demonstrated, at times individuals defy the certainty
with which historians, scholars, and readers view their subjects. In other words,
it would be erroneous to assume that there necessarily exists some firm, clear
truth about the race and naturalizability of each free migrant from outside of
Europe in the early American republic. Migrants from Latin America are an
excellent example that should disabuse readers of such notions: people in the
United States assigned Latin American migrants a racial status in legal documents, but to evaluate that status in light of a “true” present-day status is to
engage in ahistorical thinking.35
Latin American migrants’ naturalization documents illustrate that they are
among those who defy easy and anachronistic categorization. In East Coast
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cities, migrants from Cuba predominated during the early republic, but a number of migrants also came from elsewhere in Latin America. Some of them obtained naturalization documents stating that they were “free white men.” Their
legal claims to whiteness, which may have rested on the racial hierarchy in Latin
America that considered them white in their places of origin, were successful.
White Americans were probably also willing to receive some of these migrants
as white, and perhaps others would be able, like the Law family, to present themselves as white despite their complexions. Many of these migrants were also aided
by wealth and gentility. They included a number of merchants and a prominent
composer, Antonio Raffelin, who migrated between Havana, Philadelphia, and
Paris. When Antonio Antelo, born in “St. Iago” in 1779, arrived in Philadelphia
in 1816 after a journey from “Havanna” and declared his intent to naturalize six
weeks later in a federal court, the court agreed that he was “a free white person.”36
Also missing is evidence of rejected claims. Examinations of the large body
of extant naturalization records indicate that clerks at times began to fill out
naturalization petitions only to stop and reject them, but the only extant cases
are for minors whose petitions clerks marked as rejected because of age. If there
were any migrants who appeared before the US District Court of the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania in an attempt to naturalize but were rejected because of
racial disqualifications, the existing archive leaves no record. Many migrants in
the early republic naturalized not on their own but with the assistance of lawyers
or politicians courting their votes. A migrant who sought naturalization not as
an act of civil disobedience but with the intention of succeeding would have
prepared accordingly. Similarly, Desiré, the migrant of color discussed earlier
in this chapter, took care to be accompanied by a witness, who was probably a
white man.37
The production of citizenship was a complex process in which the migrants
themselves participated. Although they often faced strong barriers and struggled against racial and class prejudices, they worked toward their own interests.
When faced with a denial of rights through the imposition of denizen status,
their resistance took the form of exercising citizenship and/or the rights associated with it. The rights and abilities that they managed to carve out for themselves complicate a fully top-down model for the development of citizenship in
the early American republic.
By engaging with citizenship in the ways that they did, these migrants laid a
groundwork for succeeding migrants who would negotiate American naturalization policy and its racial system. By leveraging social connections and personal

132

chapter 4

wealth, and disassociating themselves from Islam and low-status occupations,
some were able to obtain citizenship and legal white status. In contrast, those
migrants who found employment in service often found themselves in different
racial categories than their countrymen with more genteel occupations. Some
migrants were still able to force hostile whites to view them as foreign citizens,
acknowledging their citizenship status. Although white Americans attempted
to impose a racial qualification for citizenship, migrants, especially Dominguan
migrants, resisted and at times successfully exercised some rights of citizenship.
In so doing, they forced white people to extend some citizenship rights, or acknowledge the foreign citizenship status of other migrants.

Ch a pter 5

From Servants to Equals
He knew the law in America, he said, and I had better realize that
he was my equal.
— Ludwig Gall, in Trautmann,
“Pennsylvania through a German’s Eyes”

O

n November 29, 1818, twenty-two German indentured servants
decided they would no longer accompany their master to Alabama.
James Brown had purchased their time in Philadelphia, and was
transporting them down the Ohio River when they disembarked at Marietta,
Ohio, and refused to reboard. Brown organized a group of men to retake them
by force, but the servants were able to win the support of local law enforcement
and remain in Ohio. In response, Brown took out a notice in Marietta’s newspaper, the American Friend, warning Ohioans against aiding the servants in
their attempts at freedom. He closed his advertisement with an additional claim
over their legal status: “I forbid them or their children from becoming citizens
of the United States, as they are not free. . . .” Brown claimed control over their
citizenship status during the term of their indenture.1
Several overlapping understandings of citizenship coexisted in the early nineteenth century. Citizenship began to be associated with white social independence, an association that included European immigrant servants. At the same
time, an older Federalist conception of citizenship that adhered to leaders of
economic, social, and political standing within a community remained. In addition to this elite understanding, a local, face-to-face version based on crowd
actions—embodied collective actions by communities, often with the involvement of prominent local leaders—also persisted into the nineteenth century.
German indentured servants understood these concepts and deployed them
in their extant autobiographical writings. The early nineteenth century was a
period when citizenship, national identity, and white racial status began to be
more closely, but not yet completely, entwined. White indentured servants from
133
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Germany might emphasize one of these identities but only imply the relevance of
the others. Their migrant status also meant that they did not always fully emphasize American-ness, but sometimes asserted a legal status independent from their
masters that gave them rights within the United States: they were not necessarily
Americans, but they were socially and legally independent people in America.
German migrants encountered complex sociopolitical changes in the decades
after US independence into the antebellum period: the denization of African
Americans and the elevation of white citizenship, the role of white racism in
legitimating labor regimes and dignifying white labor, and the role of racism in
preventing the development of cross-class solidarity, as well as the possibility of
political participation for those outside of formal venues of power. 2 In response,
indentured servants theorized citizenship and functioned as citizens in their
communities in a way that that asserted greater independence and equality with
native white Americans despite their indented status. This chapter explores why
indenture persisted in a society that increasingly emphasized egalitarian citizenship between white men and dominance over others. The persistence of earlier
models and understandings of citizenship did not preclude the conflation of
citizenship with white male adult status.
The evidence in this chapter is drawn from a number of sources. In contrast to
French migrants, and even to some extent Irish migrants, German migrants are
difficult to track because of frequent Anglicization of names, successive waves
of German immigration and consequent duplicate names, and a tendency of
indentured servants to rename themselves. Consequently, this chapter relies on
newspaper accounts, political writings, records of political debates, state and
legal documents, and court cases. It also draws from several autobiographical
works, among the few cases where we hear indentured servants speak in their
own voices, and directly express their views regarding their political identities.

The American Revolution and the Destabilization of Indenture
The American Revolution, while not a radical reordering of society like the
French and Haitian revolutions, nonetheless destabilized hierarchical social
institutions, and indentured servitude was no exception. Indentured servants
had resisted the power that masters attempted to assert over them in a variety of
ways, and servants who served their contracted time received their freedom. The
American Revolution provided opportunities for servants to leave and join the
armed forces of either side. The rhetoric of the Revolution also created a space
for servants to assert their status as citizens or potential citizens. In extant public
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debate, however, assertions that white indentured servitude was incompatible
with the Revolution seem to have appeared only post-independence. 3
Virginia’s royal governor, Lord Dunmore, granted freedom to indentured
servants in his 1775 proclamation, stating: “I do hereby declare that all indentured servants, Negroes, or others, (appertaining to Rebels), free that are able
and willing to bear arms.” Dunmore’s proclamation was limited: it applied only
to servants indented to people in rebellion. The Patriot side also recruited indentured servants, but there were limits to these offers: the Continental Congress
forbade enlistments without permission from masters. Virginia exempted “imported servants” from its 1777 recruitment law while establishing a draft and
permitting free African Americans to enlist. New York required masters’ permission for indentured servants to enlist, and instructed Gen. David Wooster
to return runaways “provided their masters pay to him the disbursements, deducting therefrom the pay, if any be due.” Considering Washington’s decision
to enlist African Americans into service, and the offers of freedom to enslaved
African Americans in states such as Rhode Island in return for service (also
with the permission of masters), it is likely that official provisions against recruiting runaways were sometimes ignored as the recruitment of soldiers became
increasingly desperate, and fewer white Americans wished to enlist as the war
dragged on.4
The recruitment of people fleeing from bondage also coincided, and was related to, a changing conception of political membership during the American
Revolution: that of volitional allegiance. American colonists had been British
subjects. Subjecthood was a condition of loyalty to the monarch, and a permanently fixed identity. From enslaved women on Carolina rice plantations to the
wealthiest and most powerful men in the colonies, all were still subjects to His
Majesty. As tensions increased throughout British North America and spilled
into open conflict, everyone in the colonies was forced to make a choice: to side
with the Patriots or to side with the Loyalists. Rather than being born into citizenship, Americans chose to become citizens.5
This choice of status was made more complex by heads of household intending
to compel their subordinates both in the public Patriot-Loyalist divide and in
private household matters. Moreover, while popular memory views the personal
choice to embrace the Patriot side as earnest, brave, and permanent, other people
in the Revolution chose and re-chose, going back and forth for practical reasons.
For wives, children, servants, and enslaved people, personal freedom competed
with political ideology when the time came to pick one side or another. German
indentured servants were no exception.
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The factors affecting those choices are clearly recalled by Johann Karl Büttner.
Büttner had been an indentured servant, arriving in 1773 and bound to a master
in New Jersey. In May 1775, he ran away, was captured, returned, and began to
work several months later for a new master, Abraham Eldridge, an innkeeper,
member of the local militia and supporter of the Patriot cause. Büttner received
permission to attend Lutheran services in Philadelphia, and in 1777 Maj. Nikolaus Dietrich, Baron von Ottendorf, came to the services to recruit soldiers for
the Patriot side. Büttner joined, writing that German servants willing to enlist
were promised “thirteen acres of government land free of charge, to be taken
possession of as soon as peace was declared.” Büttner claimed to be motivated
by personal rather than political reasons, mainly hoping to be able to return to
Germany, stating: “I was less concerned about the freedom of North America,
than about my own.” But he was persuaded by local public opinion: “When I
saw the great enthusiasm for the cause of freedom manifested in Philadelphia,
I straightaway forgot Germany and plans for my own freedom, [and] took service in Major Ortendorff’s [sic] corps.” Freedom, however, was not complete: his
master was supportive of his enlistment, but demanded from Büttner a monthly
payment that would allow him to recoup the cost of the indenture.6
Volitional allegiance was indeed flexible, as Büttner’s experiences as a soldier in the Revolutionary War attest. He initially served in Ottendorf ’s Patriot
forces, but soon found that “the service of this corps was very hard” and decided
to desert. When Ottendorf ’s forces clashed with Hessians at the battle of Short
Hills in the summer of 1777, Büttner hid in the woods and waited until the
battle ended to see who won. As it was a Hessian victory, he approached the Hessians, expressed a desire to return to Germany, and was enlisted after providing
them with intelligence about the Patriot forces he had deserted. This change of
allegiance was not permanent; he would, according to his narrative, change sides
twice more: once more in the aftermath of the battle of Red Bank in October
1777; after an injury on the battlefield he worked in a Continental Army hospital for the future Surgeon General Theodore Tilton. His final shifting of sides
described in his narrative occurred after joining an American privateer: Büttner
conspired with British prisoners to help them take over the ship, after which he
returned to the Hessian forces and left with them to return to Germany at the
war’s end.7
While for some indentured servants the war was a path to freedom, the war
led others into bondage. A number of Hessian mercenaries were captured by
Patriot forces and were given the option of indenting themselves instead of remaining interned as prisoners of war. For these indentured Hessians, formal
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naturalization could also matter. During the American Revolution, George
Shaffel had served as an infantry private in the forces sent by the state of
Hesse-Hanau. His regiment was among those that surrendered at the Battle of
Saratoga, and while being held prisoner of war at Reading, Pennsylvania, he
was indentured on October 12, 1782. The American government, which had
previously been fairly lenient in its treatment of prisoners of war, changed to a
policy designed to encourage naturalization and enlistment but also to reduce
its financial burden. American captors cut rations and moved prisoners out of a
barracks and into more prison-like conditions. The way out was to enlist in the
Continental Army or sign an indenture. Shaffel chose the latter.8
Shaffel’s actions indicate a preference for settling permanently in the United
States. Other Hessians signed indentures but quickly absconded to New York
with the intention of returning with Hessian forces to Germany. While many
wished to return home, others found that the United States offered greater
economic opportunities than Hesse, also sweetened by American government
incentives. Relationships with and marriages to local women added further inducement to remain in the US.9
For these Hessians, there may have been a connection between indenture and
a desire to obtain formal, legal citizenship. Shaffel is the only former soldier
painted by the local Pennsylvania artist Lewis Miller with an extant record of
naturalization, and also the only clearly extant record of an indenture. Shaffel’s
portrait also demonstrates citizenship in other ways: he is depicted with a flail
to indicate his status as a farmer, and through that, a productive member of
the community. Miller painted several other tradesmen, all former Hessians,
with their tools, including plastering tools for the plasterer Heinrich Hattendorf, a brush and bucket for the house painter David Craumer, and knives for
the butcher Johann Hubly. The more prosperous blue-dyer Friedrich Stein was
shown with a blue coat, symbolizing the product that he made rather than his
tools: none of the artisans were so depicted. Thus less prosperous artisans defined
their membership and value to the community as productive citizens, emphasizing their labor, while the more well-off dyer asserted the value of the finished
product, eliding his labor and those in his employ: a consumerist citizenship of
the emerging market revolution of the post-independence period. There is some
ambiguity in whose conceptions of citizenship are being painted: it is not clear
whether these inclusions are at the direction of the painter or subject. However,
the frequency of artisans emphasizing their productive work as part of their citizen identities in public parades and other forms of self-representation indicate
that those painted wished to have those tools included.10
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Reconciling Indenture with a Newly Emerging White Republic
The Confederation period saw a resumption in the migration of European indentured servants but also some republican rumblings against the institution,
including a few tentative plans for the compensated liberation of indentees arriving in the United States. Those plans also envisioned a republic of free, independent, white citizens.
There had been important changes in the demography of indenture during
the Revolution. The disruptions of the Revolution cut off traditional sources of
European migrants, causing a temporary demographic depression in the number of indentured servants. The other major change was the growth of African
American indentures in Northern states as they began to end slavery and pass
gradual emancipation laws, most notably in Pennsylvania in 1780. With the arrival of peace and the end to disruptions of transatlantic trade and travel, indentured servants from Europe began to arrive again in larger numbers. 11
In November 1783, the ship Irish Volunteer arrived in Charleston, South Carolina, with “Sixty-nine passengers, Tradesmen and Labourers, indented for 4
years” and “subject to a clause of Redemption for twenty days.” After its first
advertisement ran, a subsequent issue of the South Carolina Gazette carried a call
to purchase the manumission of the passengers. “THE GENTLEMEN AND
LADIES OF SOUTH-CAROLINA” were urged to begin a “subscription for
the emancipation of the indigent natives of Ireland, now in our port.” The Irish
passengers were deserving of “the genuine lustre of Virtue and Charity” owing
to their being “mostly forced from their native country, by the cruelty and oppression of rich, and unfeeling Landlords.” They were further deserving because
of the support the Irish public had given to the American cause: they had “been
so remarkably instrumental in promoting our present freedom, happiness, and
independence,” and furthermore had “such a glorious thirst for rational liberty.”
Unsurprisingly, this call for emancipation did not extend to people of African
descent, and in late 1783, the South Carolina Gazette was filled with advertisements for the sale of enslaved people and attempts to recover runaways seeking
their freedom.12
In January 1784, the New York Independent Gazette issued a similar call:
WHEREAS the traffick of WHITE PEOPLE heretofore countenanced
by this state, while under the arbitrary controul of the British government,
is contrary to the feelings of a number of respectable Citizens, and to the
idea of liberty this country has so happily established: And whereas it is
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necessary to encourage emigration to this country, upon the most liberal
plan, and for that purpose a number of the Citizens of this state, have proposed to liberate a cargo of SERVANTS, just arrived by paying their passage, and repaying themselves a small rateable deduction out of the wages
of such Servants.—Such of the Citizens of this state, as wish to encourage
so laudable an undertaking, and (if necessary) petition the Legislature for
a completion of their humane intentions, are requested to meet at Mr.
DAY’S, the sign of the HYDER ALLY, the lower end of King-street, this
evening, at six o’clock.13
The announcements had several major similarities: both called for an organized attempt to raise funds for the purchase of the indentees’ time. In both
cases, the calls followed the arrival of a shipload of indentured servants, rather
being addressed generally to the community for the purchase of servants’ time
or a case-by-case fund. In the New York example, the meeting place was close to
the slave market, perhaps a mere block away. There does not seem to have been
any action taken beyond the call for the meeting: despite the nascent ideological
attack on indenture, there is no extant evidence that either of these attempts to
free indentured servants from their contracts transpired, either through purchase or other means.14
These advertisements also imagined a particular racialized vision of the nascent republic: one composed of free white citizens, liberal in its openness to
immigrant membership, benevolent in purchasing their freedom, and stripped
of all old monarchical institutions. In South Carolina, the vision was a transfer
of servants’ debts to virtuous citizens, leaving them as free wage laborers, albeit
with their wages garnished (as had been the case for indentured soldiers such as
Büttner). In New York, the new citizens were to be free of debts and economically independent. There were also other ways that the status of indentured servants could be understood in this period.
One closely related alternative was a conception of indenture as an institution through which European migrants could become citizens: the end of indenture meant a matriculation into the public sphere, and then citizenship. J.
Hector St. John de Crèvecoeur’s Letters from an American Farmer discussed
this idea. Indenture would provide “both technical training and moral cultivation” to become a virtuous republican citizen. In particular, Crèvecoeur’s Letter
3 was both liberal in its understanding of citizenship as mutable and possible
through naturalization, reflecting a Scottish Enlightenment understanding of
citizenship as a status that came with duties, and incorporated a republican
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understanding of citizenship as the public face of the household, dependent
upon public representation to be effective.15 Crèvecoeur’s citizen was implicitly
white, male, economically and socially independent, and demonstrated the racial limits of this citizenship: Crèvecoeur did not envision it for native people,
and while his letters condemned slavery, they did not envision black citizenship
as a possibility either.
The question of the status of indentured servants also appeared in debates
over representation at the Constitutional Convention, leading to the infamous
clause by which enslaved people would be counted in the census as three-fifths
of a person (indentured servants would count as whole persons in that instance.)
These debates also showed how the members of the convention viewed the relationship between race, bondage, freedom, and citizenship: they associated
whiteness, citizenship, and free status, and where indenture might diverge from
such an association, they placed it closer to citizenship.
When debating the clause, Gouverneur Morris equated citizenship to free
status for men: “Upon what principle is it that the slaves shall be computed in
the representation? Are they men? Then make them Citizens and let them vote.”
As the scholar Hoang Gia Phan has noted, the delegate William Paterson, describing a hypothetical scenario of direct democracy, stated that enslaved people
would not vote, and therefore were not part of the general will, as their enslavement compelled them to obey the will of their masters.16
Citizenship was also equated with a labor theory of value during debates
over taxation and representation in the Confederation Congress. The members
of Congress viewed enslaved labor as less productive of wealth, and therefore
counted free labor as more valuable to the nation. Although the congress was
made up of the nation’s elite, this view reflected the emerging artisanal radicalism that equated political membership, and therefore citizenship, with products produced by labor. Citizens contributed to the commonweal through their
labor, and those who did not contribute were, conversely, not worthy of political
membership.17
The Constitution’s final form provided another way that indentured servants were placed into the category of free people and, implicitly, citizens.
“Indians not taxed” were excluded entirely from counting toward representation, enslaved people (“all other persons”) counted as three fifths, but “the
whole Number of free persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of
Years” would otherwise count for representation. Indentured servants would
be counted as citizens, and their status was clearly understood as separate from
“Servitude,” which the convention altered from the original draft. No explicit
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mention was made of immigrants for purposes of representation, even though
the convention had previously debated the number of years that a member of
the House of Representatives would have to have been naturalized in order to
hold office.18
Overall, the debates at the Constitutional Convention showed the legal and
political atmosphere that indentured servants would confront when contemplating their social and political identities, one that held out citizenship as a possibility after their terms of service were complete. This understanding would affect
them as they used court cases to push for greater freedom. But many servants had
to confront the reality that even after their terms ended, they would continue to
rely on their former masters in ways that made asserting an independent political
identity challenging, especially as the conflicts of the first party system began to
intensify in the 1790s.
The story of one particular indentured servant illustrates servants’ own
views on politics and participation as citizens after the completion of their indentures, if not necessarily a universal one. In an account written in 1795, John
Frederick Whitehead (Johann Friedrich Wittkopf) placed himself outside of
citizenship, which he reserved for local elites or politically motivated factions—
although his writings and observations show that he was not without opinions
on political and social power. Whitehead’s memoir, as other scholars have noted,
emphasizes the “victimization of the innocent or vulnerable by those in power
or authority” and contains little discussion of “relationships with people who
would not have demanded deference or subordination—his siblings, friends,
fellow servants, his wife and children, and even the friend to whom he dedicates
his work, Thomas Pearson.” His writing also contains a “radical insistence on the
essential equality of masters and subordinates.”19
Whitehead’s public and civic identity was infused by relationships with the
more powerful. Written in 1795, his account demonstrates a view of citizenship
put forth by Federalists: to be a citizen was to be a prominent person within
the community, whose status was further asserted through public presentation
of elite status. This view existed alongside a view of citizenship as being politically active within the public sphere. During a brief period of trying work as a
shoemaker, Whitehead hoped that he would acquire the skills to make elegant
footwear such as “Cordevan boots, Morocco slippers,” and “the cork heel of a
Citizen.” In his narrative, discussing his writing style and the topics he covered,
Whitehead characterized himself as an “inhabitant of the Country,” in a rural
sense, and warned readers that they “must not expect to find in me the politeness
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and high complimential Strains of a first rate Courteor [courtier] or a high bred
Citizen.” His post-emancipation experience included continued reliance upon
his former master, and he stated that the he was not so quickly “metamorphosed
or . . . refined from a Country Pumpkin into a Citizen.” As this transition occurred at the same time as Cornwallis’s surrender at Yorktown, his return to
his master allowed him to “escape the Hands of the Citizens,” further stating
that there was “a great deal of mischief which was performed by a foolish inconsiderate mob whereby many that were worthy and peaceable Citizens greatly
suffered.” Whitehead was almost certainly referring to the large Quaker community in his region of Pennsylvania. Whitehead was able to slowly transition
to greater economic independence, but his narrative does not display a clear assertion of civic identity throughout. Instead (as other scholars have noted) its
emphasis is on the exploitation of the weak by the powerful, especially between
men, while advocating for female chastity.
Citizens, as they appear in the narrative, are local elites, whose refinement and
business relationships with persons of lower status accord them the title. This
bourgeois citizenship, defined by conspicuous consumption and public display,
was accurately represented in Whitehead’s writings by the overlapping meanings
of bourgeois and citizen in German: it was bürgerlich. Existing in parallel to this
understanding in Whitehead’s narrative is a description of citizens functioning
as an organized political group (e.g. Patriots) whose coercion of loyalty within
the community accorded them the status of citizen. To Whitehead, citizenship
functioned as a status of exerting power over others in the community—political, economic, and social. 20
During the post-independence period, courts also confronted the status of
indentured servants in cases brought by servants asserting independence and
demanding release from their contracts. Northern judges increasingly applied
scrutiny to the contracts of white indentured servants, while allowing masters to
retain power over servants of African descent. By the 1830s, this scrutiny would
combine with employers’ needs in the emerging industrial revolution to result in
the collapse of indenture as a common labor system through the effective unenforceability of indenture contracts, with a few odd cases persisting until the eve
of the Civil War. These cases were not primarily driven by German indentured
servants, but they acted to secure greater independence and equality as the legal
system became more amenable to their interests. 21
A 1793 state court case illustrates this shift, and servants’ choices and actions. Benjamin Hannis, a fourteen-year-old indentured servant, ran away
from his mistress, Katherine Keppele, was caught, and was held in jail. Hannis

From Servants to Equals

143

appealed his case and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled in his favor. In
fact, the court ruled that no native-born whites could be bound as servants because the indenture of native-born whites was incompatible with republican
government.22
But that did not mean that other forms of bound household labor were incompatible. Apprenticeship of native-born whites remained legal, with the understanding that apprenticeship produced artisan citizens, whereas white minors
bound as servants would become “degraded” white adults. The court did not see
such as status as unfit for nonwhite people in Pennsylvania: although in subsequent court cases, white people bound into labor were increasingly able to obtain
favorable rulings on legal technicalities, for people of color the technicalities resulted in rulings in favor of people claiming mastership over them. This included
a rejection of freedom claims by two people enslaved by a white Dominguan
refugee, Mrs. Chambre, who had returned to Philadelphia after she forced them
to accompany her to New Jersey in order to avoid Pennsylvania’s manumission
law. In 1795, the court issued a ruling in Respublica v. Richards regarding another
white slaveowner’s attempt to evade the manumission law by forcibly taking a
man to Virginia through deception and kidnapping. In that case, the court allowed the slaveowners to retain ownership, concluding that because the seizure
occurred in New Jersey it was outside Pennsylvania’s jurisdiction, and that the
anti-kidnapping provisions in the manumission law applied only to free people.
The court was dismissive of evidence that Toby, the formerly enslaved person,
had his documentation of free status taken by the master, while viewing claims
of his enslavement as valid. 23
There was also another difference between native servants and white immigrant servants: non-native Europeans, particularly German redemptioners,
could still be subjected to an indenture contract (redemptioners differed from
other indentured servants in that their contracts could be “redeemed,” or bought
out by a family member or other benefactor—they also could negotiate contracts directly with potential employers.)24 The courts viewed such contracts as
legitimate means of paying the cost of passage, and implicitly providing time for
an acculturation into possible citizenship. Redemptioners and other European
immigrant indentured servants benefited from the legal scrutiny given to those
contracts and could obtain favorable rulings owing to clerical and other errors.
A subsequent case, however, shows the scrutiny that courts began to apply to
transatlantic contracts.
In 1797, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court again encountered a case relating
to indentured servitude. The indentured servant John Connor refused to work
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for his master, Hugh Black, who “claimed him by an indenture, executed in
Europe, on 13th June 1797.” Consequently, Black lodged Connor in the Philadelphia prison, and Connor petitioned for a right of habeas corpus. In this
case, the court ordered Connor to be freed because in his indenture contract
“the word ‘servant’ had been inadvertently omitted.” When indentured people
of color brought suits to courts in Northern states, such legal technicalities were
of no matter to court, and those indentures were permitted to continue until the
post-Jacksonian rise of a free-labor understanding that servants should only be
wage laborers. The one exception was in cases where Northern states eliminated
indenture under abolitionist pressure. 25
The result of the changed legal environment was a strengthening of legal
advantages for native whites at the expense of people of color. But another
difference was the increased value of native status, and with it citizenship.
Citizens should not be bound into a “degraded” life of serving others but
should become productive, independent citizens of the republic. White foreign migrants were different: they had, in theory, contractually consented to
their arrangements, and were not citizens, although they could become citizens in time.
This shift in court attitudes was part of a move away from a strict, narrow,
patriarchal model in which citizenship attached to the head of household. Instead citizenship began to be associated with adult white men, in part through
a redefining of what it meant to be free and independent. Indenture fit uneasily
into this understanding, but German redemptioners, seeing the advantages of
American concepts of independence and social equality, seized their opportunity. The bonds of mutual obligation between master and servant dissolved as
free wage labor became increasingly dominant, but what remained was a significant amount of economic power for former masters (now employers). Redemptioners such as John Frederick Whitehead, mentioned earlier, remained
economically dependent after the end of their indentures: they often found that
they needed to rely on former masters for their connections. In the 1830s, courts
would be less welcoming to indentured servitude, applying sufficient scrutiny to
conditions of housing and food as to render contracts unenforceable, and a brisk
labor market made most newly arrived immigrants uninterested in continuing
to abide by their contracts. Migrants continued to arrive and would have to negotiate this shifting legal environment. During this transition, European concern about the treatment of migrants grew and would lead the commissioning
of a report on their status.26
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Fürstenwärther’s Report: An Aristocrat Finds Vulgar,
Democratic Citizens and Fears Possible “White Slaves”
German indentured servants were among those who arrived in significant numbers during this period of changing legal attitudes toward their contracts and
status. The Post-Napoleonic years were a period of severe hardship for many
people in Europe: environmental disaster and postwar chaos led to a wave of
indentured migrants arriving in the US from the German states in the later
1810s. The volcanic eruption of Tambora in 1815 was large enough to affect the
global climate and cause a year without a summer in Europe. Cold temperatures
resulted in crop failures and forced many people off their land. They began to
migrate down the Rhine and congregated in Amsterdam, where, desperate, they
signed indentures in exchange for food and passage to the United States.27
In 1817, the German Diet, concerned about migration from the Rhine Valley
area, commissioned an investigation into the issue. Moritz von Fürstenwärther
was tasked with visiting the United States and informing the German Diet
about emigrant conditions there. He was given a list of questions and areas for
investigation. Some of these questions implied a goal of replicating traditional
German social hierarchies and installing a gentry over German tenant farmers
with inheritable loan contracts (Erbleihcontracte/Erbvertrage), while others reflected concerns facing German migrants and the threat of exploitative indentures. The initial questions also reflected concerns about relations with native
whites and European immigrant groups, and asked, “How does the German
farmer get along with the savages?” The initial questions did not inquire about
relations between African Americans and Germans. 28
Fürstenwärther’s report differed in some key ways from his original instructions. Comparing the original instructions and what he chose to emphasize, the
report painted a broadly positive picture of German redemptioners’ experiences
in the United States, while expressing some concern about the loss of German
cultural identity. Fürstenwärther did, per his instructions, include descriptions
of the process by which redemptioners disembarked and sold their time to local
masters in the United States. His aristocratic status seems to have led him to
view American republicanism critically, if not negatively, and his report devoted
relatively little space to the idea of citizenship: Fürstenwärther was no Alexis
de Tocqueville. His report followed his instructions to comment on the functioning of the redemptioner system, and he expanded his instructions to focus,
not on citizenship, but on German immigrant relations and status relative to
enslaved African Americans. When he did discuss citizenship, Fürstenwärther
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emphasized cultural assimilation into American vulgarity and coarseness, and
the loss of German culture.29
Fürstenwärther’s report betrayed an inconsistency when discussing perceptions of Germans and their experiences as indentured servants: when comparing
Germans to free whites only, the report painted a rosy picture, but in passages
comparing Germans to African Americans and slavery, the report showed considerable anxiety about white perceptions of Germans and the similarities between indentured servitude and slavery.30
Fürstenwärther addressed a major point of concern: the binding of passengers
on arrival. He emphasized the regulations in place, the oversight by German
aid societies, and the practical benefits of indenture for passengers, while dismissing concerns about exploitation by cruel masters after the process of arrival
and sale of time. The report contained extensive description of the process of
binding servants and the conditions upon arrival in the United States, as well
as demographic and socioeconomic information about the servants themselves.
This information was probably taken from the register of indentures in Philadelphia, the main port of entry for German migrants. The report concentrated
on migrants leaving from Amsterdam, the chief port of embarkation at the time,
and arriving in Philadelphia.
Fürstenwärther reported that migrants concluded contracts, written in German, with ship captains in Amsterdam. Ships arriving in Philadelphia were
first subjected to quarantine and “visited by a doctor representing the board of
health, and at the same time by the interpreter from the German Association.”
The interpreter would also inquire “concerning treatment on the voyage and
[investigate] grounds of possible complaints in this regard.” After this process,
the arrivals would be advertised in local newspapers, and the ship would land.
Those passengers who paid full fare would depart, and the rest remain on ship
with the captain or “local consigners [would] take them on the basis that the
Americans will take these people into service.” Negotiations for contracts would
ensue, and would be “concluded in the dwelling of an authorized person,” fluent
in German and English, and who would act as a mediator between parties in addition to recording the contracts. Contracts were generally for two to four years,
“according to differences in fare, age, sex, health, and capabilities,” and would
contain stipulations for living arrangements and clothing, as well as schooling
for children. Laws also restricted bindings outside Pennsylvania or family separation, except with the consent of the servant. Those whose time was not sold
would remain in debt to the captain or consigner, although the report noted that
such situations were “highly unusual.” Fürstenwärther also noted that 1817 was
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a year of unusually heavy migration, and that the migrants, usually poorer and
without means of support, overwhelmed the emigrant aid societies’ resources for
assistance and had to compete for limited employment opportunities. 31
The report argued that a short term of indenture was often the best option for
migrants, as they could invest what money they might have brought with them
with their masters, and “draw interest until the end of their service.” Doing so
would give them time to familiarize themselves with “the language, the customs,”
options in employment, and “obtain for themselves necessary local knowledge.”
Their savings would allow them to “be able to [begin] a self-supporting trade,”
or “buy a few acres of land on which to settle,” while improving the land in
increasing its value. The report emphasized that “Almost all who come here . . .
after ten or twelve years . . . become skilled in this manner,” and that “instances
are known” where after “20 or 30 years, they are now capitalists.”32
Furthermore, Fürstenwärther claimed that “in Pennsylvania and the western
bordering states where the population is mainly German” treatment of indentured servants was “as a rule humane and good.” Those maltreated or deceived
could lodge a complaint with “the solicitor of the German Association,” and that
“more frequently, there are complaints on the part of the employer against the
employee.” According to the report, those who opted not to do a year of service
were “often misused by their own fellow countrymen for their own purposes”
and likely to “squander [their money] until they find an opportunity to work.”33
Fürstenwärther did temper his positive remarks to describe specific abuses. In
part, he attributed these abuses to “lack of following the law which produced the
great suffering and disorder in former years.” At the time of his writing he identified other issues that migrants faced: commission agents who “transmit money
to respective heirs in both parts of the world” were often dishonest. Ship captains
in Amsterdam would “make arbitrary alterations,” often illegal, to passengers’
contracts, “which the people in their inexperience let go by.” The German aid
society in Philadelphia suffered from “little money to relieve the great needs.” 34
When comparing Germans and enslaved African Americans, Fürstenwärther
painted a grimmer picture. In areas with significant enslaved populations Germans lost status. In areas with fewer enslaved people the report was largely
sanguine and fears of sinking in a shameful comparison with native whites appeared, supported by anecdotes acquired secondhand.
The report illustrated these concerns by including several English-language
newspaper extracts, all from 1817, one containing the headline “German slaves in
Ohio,” (although it clearly stated that the so-called slaves were in fact indentured
servants). Another article was summarized: “Deceived young German artisans
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become white slaves in this manner.” Fürstenwärther also included an article
that mentioned an important difference between slavery and indenture, freedom
from sexual exploitation by masters. That article noted that “The Germans in
Ohio forced a scoundrel to give a fifteen year old Swiss girl freedom and 500
Reichsdollar for disgracing her.”35
Government or German immigrant action was swift when white indentured
servants were purchased by people of color, cases where there is extant evidence
suggest. In Baltimore in November 1817, according to Fürstenwärther, “Two
families [traveling from Amsterdam] were bought by free Negroes” without the
initial knowledge of the German community. Fürstenwärther himself cited a
letter from “H. Graff, one of the rich local businessmen” in recounting this incident. According to this secondhand account, the German community “brought
the families back and pledged to prevent further such disgraceful abuses.”
Fürstenwärther contradicted the details of the story in a later section of his report, referring to the same letter, stating instead that it was a single family purchased by a single free African American buyer. In Louisiana, another incident
(not appearing in the report) occurred in the spring of 1818, where free people of
color purchased German redemptioners from a recently arrived ship. In this case,
the response came from the Louisiana legislature, which banned such sales.36
Last, Fürstenwärther did describe redemptioners’ and other Germans’
views on citizenship and political identity. Here his aristocratic background
and distaste for republican government caused him to paint their attitudes in a
negative light: “I cannot remain silent about some of the dark sides,” he wrote.
The United States lacked Germany’s elegance and high culture, “one misses everything that can make life on earth more beautiful and refined.” Refinement
in life was so absent that there was “no notion” of its earthly existence in the
United States. Instead, “Lack of sociability, disdainful pride, reserve and coarseness distinguish the masses and repel the European of culture and sensitivity.”
Americans had “civic freedom” but not “that higher spiritual freedom which is
found only in Europe—and I say it boldly—mostly found in Germany.” Despite
republican government, Americans were “with all their freedom more or less
slaves to their national prejudices, to their narrow-mindedness, their ignorance
of everything that is not practical or parochial.”37
German immigrants were not immune to this transformation into vulgar
American citizenship. According to Fürstenwärther, the German in the United
States was “an ardent Democrat, and at the same time a quiet citizen.” He singled
out former Hessians especially as “a good example. . . . Beside[s] being especially
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democratic in outlook, they are given to bluntness, crudeness, and obstinacy.”
Speaking of more newly arrived immigrants more generally, he wrote that “After
a time, [they] become accustomed to [the US] once they find suitable surroundings, or by degrees an awakening feeling of pride as free citizens, [that] the memories of the advantages of their Fatherland vanish.”38
As his writing revealed, Fürstenwärther’s aristocratic views were not shared
by his fellow Germans in the United States. The report demonstrated a politically active population, if not one so famously forceful as the Irish immigrants
described in a previous chapter. His notes on race relations provided a window
into the anxieties and choices made by indentured German servants when asserting status and independence in a society that increasingly equated citizenship
with a white, adult male identity in contrast to blackness.

Redemptioners, Renewed Anxieties, and Runaways
During the period of Fürstenwärther’s travels, the controversy over indentures
erupted again in American newspapers when a ship with redemptioners aboard
docked at Annapolis, and “their time was purchased . . . by some western members of Congress” who then attempted to transport about fifty redemptioners to
Tennessee. They passed through Washington, DC, and then Kentucky, where
the editor of the National Pulse expressed “remarks on that kind of soul-selling
business in all its various branches,” addressing both the conditions of passage
and the system of redemptioning and indenture, with a particular focus on the
customs of hospitality to journeymen artisans in Germany and its use in luring
the unwary to the US. The editor noted that “an express law of Kentucky not
only sanctions such bargains, but even enforces the servitude, by the same cruel
means by which African slaves are mellowed down to absolute obedience to a
master.” The editor stated that he wished to “lay before the public an unhallowed speculation in white free men’s liberty, which is in the highest degree
derogatory to the exalted character of the American republic.” The editor further claimed that the trade in indentured servants was “a flagrant breach of the
law of nations, and abhorred by every civilized government,” was “absolutely
unconstitutional” in the United States, and that such laws should be “speedily
and eternally repealed.”39
The recent sudden rise in poor German migrants and continuing migration
along the Ohio River valley into the interior of the United States meant that
officials and members of the public in Ohio would have to confront the status
of redemptioners in their state. This came about because of the actions of the

150

chapter 5

migrants themselves: their choices and actions precipitated the discussion over
their status and political engagement in Ohio communities. It was in this context that another group of German redemptioners would work to secure their
freedom in Ohio in the fall of 1818.
These redemptioners arrived in Philadelphia in October 1818, and negotiated indenture contracts with the American James Brown. According to
Brown’s later memorial to Congress, he “purchased . . . a number of German
redemptioners” including “vine-dressers and mechanics.” Brown intended to
transport them to Tennessee, where they would serve for a term of three years
and five months. His memorial also stated that he “described to them the climate . . . and the kind of business they would be required to follow.” Brown and
the redemptioners left Philadelphia on November 2—there does not seem to
have been a significant issue or dispute as the party traveled overland through
Pennsylvania, but things changed after Brown purchased a boat at Wheeling and
they all began to sail down the Ohio River on November 26, and approached
the growing town of Marietta “on the evening of the 29th.” When they were
about seven or eight miles away, they had to land the boat “in consequence of
high wind.” They stayed there for the night, and in the morning James Brown
and a free employee, George Ross, “left the boat in a skiff about three miles
above Marietta and proceeded in advance to said town.” Brown purchased provisions and got them ready to put aboard the skiff, “when he discovered his boat
landing some distance above.” Brown went up with the skiff, put the provisions
on the boat, and came back into town, where he encountered his servants—he
told them everything was ready “and that they must go on board immediately.”
Brown claimed that the redemptioners at this point “made several frivolous excuses,” and when he followed his earlier request to board with a direct order to
get back on the boat, “they refused to obey.” Brown believed this was “in consequence of advice given” to the redemptioners “by the people of Marietta.” 40
Having encountered the refusal of the servants, and the lack of sympathy for
his views from the people of Marietta, Brown turned to local law enforcement
“for the purpose of putting down insubordination of citizens and servants.” On
the advice of his lawyer, he went to the house of Enoch Hoff, constable at Marietta—but Hoff “was not at home, and would not be until late in the evening.”
Brown returned to the courthouse and met again with his lawyer, John P. Mayberry, who recommended that Brown “get men enough in the town of Marietta
to put his servants on board his boat,” and Mayberry was willing to accompany
him in this endeavor. The people of Marietta, however, were not so willing: “after
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repeated trials, not more than one man could be got who would lend any aid or
assistance.” They would have to wait for Constable Hoff to return home that
night. While waiting, Brown spoke with another local lawyer and county solicitor, Caleb Emerson. During their discussion, Emerson learned that Brown was
“preparing aid to take them away by force that night.” Emerson warned him that
“such a procedure would be a violation of our laws, and would not be submitted
to by our citizens.” Brown’s plans would be delayed until the following day: he
had crossed over into Virginia to meet one Levi Wells, recommended by Mayberry, as someone who “no doubt, would afford the necessary aid” in seizing the
redemptioners.41
In the meantime, the redemptioners had “taken lodging” in a house in Marietta and stayed the night. Emerson visited them the next morning and “through
an interpreter, had partly heard their story,” when they were interrupted by the
arrival of a posse comitatus organized with the help of Levi Wells: “Certain men
came with Mr. Brown, from the Virginia side, armed with bludgeons, &c.” A
crowd had organized in Marietta to challenge the posse, including the house’s
“landlord and a young man by the name of Willard, as well as many others.” In the
meantime, Emerson and the redemptioners closed the doors of the house to prevent entry and they waited “until [the posse] dispersed.” After this experience, the
redemptioners decided to flee “into the country as a body” the following morning,
with help from two local men, David Ward and John Taylor. They made fast
progress, covering “fourteen miles up Duck Creek,” but “they were requested to
return,” or in Brown’s account, “arrested” for a hearing before “Mr. Justice Booth,
in order to obtain a certificate to remove them under United States law, respecting
fugitives from labor.” This hearing would “occupy a great part of two days.”42
Brown soon found events turning in an unexpected direction. Once the redemptioners had come back into town on the evening of December 3, Enoch
Hoff “came down to [Brown’s] boat, and informed” him that Hoff “wanted
[Brown] to go up immediately.” Hoff took him not to the courthouse, the implied destination, but they “had to pass near Captain John Mills’s storehouse”
where Brown “discover[ed] a number of persons collected together at the door,
[and] he was induced to approach,” at which point Brown further “discover[ed]
that they were armed.” Brown was puzzled. What was going on?43
The answer came after a short wait: Sheriff Timothy Buell “came out of the
store accompanied by Captain John Mills, and informed [Brown] and Enoch
Hoff constable, that they were prisoners.” Hoff and Brown were marched to
“Justice Booth’s office . . . with Captain Mills’s company of militia armed at
their heels.”44
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James Brown’s arrest was the result of claims made by the redemptioner John
Gold, who alleged “assault and battery and false imprisonment, damages five
thousand dollars; that [Brown] was ruled to bail.” Brown expressed skepticism that this came from Gold himself, suspecting that the charges came from
Emerson or his ally David Putnam, or so he “was informed by the clerk.” The
charges, Brown further claimed, were put forth to elicit public sympathy for
the redemptioners and help in collecting funds to pay off their indentures. He
quoted David Putnam as saying “that the money and the cost and expenses of
[Brown’s] servants could be made up,” and if Brown “did not take that, he could
whistle for them.”45
It seems there was both a trial and a simultaneous negotiation for the paid
release of the redemptioners from their contracts. Caleb Emerson stated that
Brown paid “$1,275 for 22 [redemptioners] in Philadelphia. It was proposed to
him in Marietta to redeem these Germans, paying all reasonable charges; but he
refused to take less than $3,500.” Brown had implied in his statement that the
purchase price would pay his fine, while Emerson’s account omitted this aspect,
firmly focusing on the payment and presenting Brown as unreasonable in his negotiations by demanding nearly the triple the original amount he paid. Brown’s
deposition indicated that the trial included a “lapse of nearly thirty-six hours”—
it may have been during this period that the negotiations took place, and when
they failed to come to arrangement pleasing to Brown, the court would make its
ruling without any provisions for a paid remuneration.46
The trial deliberated the status of the redemptioners (what Brown called “a
trial of property”) and not Gold’s allegations against Brown. It began with two
justices: James Booth and probably Buell as well; justices of the peace seem to
have served as judges uncontroversially. In the trial, discussions hinged on the
Fugitive Slave Law of 1793 and whether it applied not only to enslaved people but
to indentured servants as well. Brown claimed that one of the justices left, and
implicitly it was Justice Booth who delivered the final verdict: “the court set the
servants at liberty.” This was a popular decision in the courtroom: “the servants
were congratulated by the court, most of the bar, and nearly all the spectators.”
James Brown himself felt that he was “unable to obtain justice” but he did not
know nor “was able to learn where the United States district judge for that district resided” and so decided to leave Marietta.47
There was still the matter of his own arrest to contend with. Brown “made
application to judge Sharpe for a writ of habeas corpus” in order to determine
on what charge he was held and who was behind it. Emerson “had directed the
writ to be discontinued on the 4th day of December,” but Brown was held until
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the seventh. During that time, “stones were frequently thrown” at his boat, still
moored in town. Shortly afterward, Brown slunk out of town with his damaged boat.48
James Brown was not done. He planned to return, but in the meanwhile he
took out an advertisement in the local newspaper, the American Friend. There
he wrote to “hereby caution and forewarn all persons in the state of Ohio, and
elsewhere, from harboring or employing, aiding or assisting, or contracting with
or trusting” the redemptioners, whom he listed by name. It was in this advertisement that he announced that he “forb[ade] them or their children from becoming citizens of the United States . . . until they go to the Alabama Territory and
serve me there” for the term of their indentures.49
Let us pause in this narrative to address what it meant for the idea of citizenship. The controversy over the redemptioners showed several conceptions in
conflict, with Brown’s understandings and claims on one side at odds with the
redemptioners’ and Mariettans’ on the other. Brown’s understanding of the law
indicated a conception of citizenship linked to the head of household and rooted
in patriarchal control over dependents. In his view, indentured servants lacked
the legal power to choose allegiance, and could not have a political allegiance
separate from the head of household. The naturalization process would have to
wait until their matriculation as free people. 50
In contrast, the Mariettans’ view rejected patriarchal control over other
white adults. Their focus was not on naturalization but rather on the ability of
the redemptioners to reject their indentures and act independently as separate
households and legal persons. In particular, their view was expressed in legal arguments rejecting the obligation to assist in the seizure and remanding of white
bondspeople. They also showed a local understanding of citizenship and political
culture, in which community leaders could organize and direct crowd actions.
It may have been elite-directed, but it relied not just on passive consent but on
active public affirmation and political participation by the community.
Let us return to the redemptioners’ two-day court case and their legal status
and rights. At its heart, the case centered on the right of access to the courts:
under what circumstances were alleged runaways to have access to the courts?
And how should this law be interpreted? Caleb Emerson and Justice Booth
thought that the 1793 Fugitive Slave Law applied only to people born in slavery:
“It may well be doubted whether this provision can in any case apply, excepting
as to persons born slaves.” Emerson recalled the status of indenture as it appeared in the debating and drafting of the US Constitution: the pains taken to
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distinguish indenture from slavery; the view of indentured servants as potential
citizens resulted in a divide in racial treatment. Enslaved African Americans
leaving masters to seek freedom could be denied that opportunity, but white
indentured servants received protection under the law. Emerson also followed
his statement on legal interpretation with a tale of misery: the Germans stated
that they had been forced to abandon their ship in the Azores after “losing many
of their children and companions” at sea, and then further obliged to “re-ship,
as redemptioners, for America.” Once again, these travails can reflect a divide in
racial sympathy: surviving the transatlantic slave trade would not be grounds for
exemption from the 1793 Fugitive Slave Law.51
Caleb Emerson also presented a vision of the law in his statement, and with it,
a notion of citizenship that emphasized rights and protections for white people
within the bounds of the state of Ohio. Emerson pushed against Brown’s claims
that Mariettans had talked the redemptioners into defiance of his will. Rather,
Emerson stated:
The citizens of this place would have been better satisfied, had the Germans
been content to go with their purchaser. But the Germans having claimed
the benefit of our laws, for the protection of their persons, the citizens
could not, in justice to themselves, tamely suffer one of the most essential
maxims of our constitution to be violated.52
The Germans were foreign, and not citizens like their rescuers. But they were
(white) people in Ohio, and therefore had rights of access to the law and its
protections—this was Emerson’s argument as written in his reply in the American Friend.
Emerson’s reply also offered a Federalist interpretation of citizenship. He,
along with leading citizens such as David Putnam, James Booth, and Timothy
Buell, made decisions as community leaders. They were citizens in the fullest,
Federalist sense. The crowd that they assembled to prevent the seizure of the
redemptioners, and to arrest James Brown, was composed of citizens, but the
crowd was acting in an orderly manner in accordance with the wishes of the
leading citizens of Marietta. This view also countered the accounts of Brown
and his fellow deponents of disorderly mobs preventing the proper enforcement
of the law. Both Brown and Emerson emphasized “law and order” and presented
their opponents’ crowds as illegitimate.
The incident also showed that naturalization followed an earlier pattern
of attaching to the head of household but increasingly was being tied to a status of free economic agent. Since the court in Marietta ruled in favor of the
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German migrants, it did not address the issue of whether Brown had control
over his servants’ ability to naturalize. Brown continued his campaign to persuade government officials to take action, but dropped the naturalization issue.
His initial forbidding of naturalization was in part based on a fear that if they
did naturalize, or even begin the process, his case for control over their labor
would be greatly weakened. The more the German migrants acted like citizens,
the less likely Brown would be to assert control over their time, labor, and free
movement. After his initial push to use brute force via a posse comitatus failed,
Brown increasingly relied on other legal channels. His actions revealed the shifting landscape of freedom, citizenship, and bondage that was developing in the
early American republic.
Brown was attempting to treat the white redemptioners like African Americans, and found that Ohioans were unwilling to let him. Black Americans
could be subject to interpersonal, private violence and force without the intervention of the legal system, but white migrants could use the system to their
advantage, removing themselves from bondage, and asserting a citizen-like status based on their economic agency and white racial status. This was the case
in the North: so-called “Dutch slaves” were increasingly an impossibility in
Ohio and Pennsylvania, while masters retained more power over indentured
servants in the South, though indenture remained a temporary form of bondage
distinct from slavery. This initial incident also highlighted sectional and partisan division in what was supposed to be an era of good feelings, at a time when
harder feelings were developing over the Missouri Compromise. Brown would
encounter this system again in his second attempt to seize the redemptioners
several months later.53
James Brown had made a tactical retreat in leaving Marietta, but he made
plans to return, and began to lobby powerful people in the Ohio Valley. Brown
traveled to Tennessee, where he persuaded Governor Joseph McMinn to write
“a letter of remonstrance” to Governor Ethan Allen Brown of Ohio, delivered by
a William Craighton Jr., of Chillicothe, Ohio. Brown then came back to Ohio
and successfully obtained “a warrant to arrest . . . his servants” from Federal
District Court Judge Charles W. Bird. With this warrant, Brown returned to
Marietta, arriving on February 27, 1819, having stopped first at Parkersburg “to
procure physical aid to assist in arresting his servants.”54
The redemptioners were still in the area, and Brown was able to seize six of
them on the 28th. Brown also found “two of his servants in the employ of Caleb
Emmerson [sic] . . . who had been the zealous advocate for their emancipation.”
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Emerson persuaded Brown to hold off, making “a matter of conscience about delivering them on Sunday.” When Brown came back, however, he “found the door
closed, the family at home, and no admittance to be had.” That night a “number
of persons crossed over the river to Levi Wells’s, on the Virginia side, for the
purpose of rescuing the six servants,” but they apparently were unsuccessful. Still
determined, Brown came back to Emerson’s house “the next morning . . . and
was informed by” Emerson’s wife, Mary Dana Emerson, “that neither he nor the
servants were there; that they had left town.”55
Temporarily foiled again, James Brown nonetheless heard of more redemptioners: “he was informed where ten or twelve of them had been seen the day
before.” Once again, Brown turned to Parkersburg and “procured . . . four men
to go with him” and crossed the river again at Marietta and “proceeded immediately to the place where his servants had been seen.” He did not receive a warm
welcome or much sympathy or aid: “none of the neighbors appeared disposed to
give . . . any information” and they “pretended not to know of any such people
having been seen in the neighborhood.” Brown thought “they were making off
to get into the interior of the country” and he kept looking for them “until two
o’clock next morning, when he stopped at a house.” There he learned that the
redemptioners “were not far off, and being much fatigued, called a halt:” Brown
would start again “by sunrise.”56
Brown “was roused from bed by a visit from one of the neighbors” with more
information about the whereabouts of the redemptioners, but he soon found
himself in a trap. Sheriff Buell and Caleb Emerson “had collected between one
and two hundred men, and had stopped in the woods until the preconcerted
signal could be given.” They marched out of the woods, “variously armed,” and
constable Silas Cook arrested Brown “for an alleged assault and battery . . .
on [his] servants while acting under the [federal] warrant” Brown had been
issued. Brown was tried and Emerson “was the prosecuting attorney”—but as
the trial began Emerson quickly “abandoned the prosecution” and Brown “was
dismissed” from the court—but only for an hour or so. Brown “was again arrested . . . upon the affidavit of Charles Sylvester.” This second time, Brown appeared for trial “before Justice Whitney,” and “he was again dismissed, no one
appearing to prosecute.”57
It had taken him a while, but James Brown was finally realizing that the community of Marietta had organized against him and would not let him seize any
more of the redemptioners. Still, he had managed to capture six of them, and
so he began his voyage down the Ohio in a flatboat, with the six forced to accompany him.
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This second round of conflict over the status of the redemptioners displayed several new aspects: a federal government more amenable to Brown’s
claims, coupled with the ineffectiveness of the federal order facing a broader
public mobilization. Additionally, the local courts were willing to entertain
claims of violence exerted by a master against his servants: claims that enslaved
people could never bring before a court across the river in Virginia and that an
Ohio court would be highly unlikely to entertain. And although Brown had
temporarily succeeded in seizing the unlucky six, he would encounter yet another crowd of citizens in Cincinnati.58
Brown and the remaining redemptioners “embarked the on the fourteenth
day of March,” arriving one week later at Cincinnati. According to the boat’s
owner, William Eastham, Brown left the boat for several hours while the servants
remained on board. When he came back, however, a “considerable assemblage of
persons” had crowded around the boat, coercing the disembarkation of the German servants. Roderick Osborn, a boat hand, described the crowd as a “mob . . .
preceded by five men, who called themselves citizens.” Eastham claimed that
Brown arrived as the last one was disembarking to freedom, at which point the
crowd “[threw] away the stones they had with them” and “dispersed.” A larger
crowd soon reappeared and forced the boat to land, and the crowd “took such
things as they chose, stating them to be the property of the aforesaid German servants.” Osborn told a slightly different version of events: the “citizens” requested
to board the boat, while Brown, still on board, refused. Brown himself stated that
the men who approached the boat had heard one of the redemptioners speaking
to another “in the German language.” The citizens “disclaim[ed] any evil design towards the master or servants,” convincing Brown to let them board, but
it soon became clear that they intended to “seize” or “seduce off his servants.” By
all accounts, the servants were able to leave with assistance from the crowd. But
they were not done: according to William Eastham, “an increased number of
persons reappeared” on the banks of the Ohio, “with every appearance of hostility.” Brown’s witnesses corroborated the account from this point: the crowd
demanded that the boat be landed, and, meeting with refusal, “forcibly seized the
cable and the oar” of the boat and towed it shore. The crowd boarded and “took
from the boat what they were pleased to call the property of the . . . servants.”
Evidently satisfied, they then “retired to shore with their booty.” Thus the two different accounts of the same series of events in Cincinnati differed in some details,
but agreed on the main picture: a crowd assembled and liberated the servants. 59
Once again, we see a local citizenship in action in support of the redemptioners, and James Brown at a loss: he would have to rest his hopes on a memorial
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submitted to the United States Congress, since “owing to the temper and feeling of the people generally . . . he would be unable in the state of Ohio to have
[Brown’s version of] justice done.” Cincinnati’s practice of citizenship resembled Marietta’s in this account: local leaders were supportive of and perhaps
organized crowds to engage in action. In Cincinnati, local citizens included
German-speakers, as evident from the initial negotiations. The entirety of action
was informal in Cincinnati: no appeal to courts is mentioned in the accounts,
but by this time Brown was probably skeptical of using local Ohio courts to
maintain command over the redemptioners.
Other accounts of master-servant tension reflect assertions of legal and
social egalitarianism, with accompanying implications for citizenship. Ludwig
Gall, a German intending to travel and perhaps emigrate to the United States,
experienced similar difficulties as part of a generally disastrous journey to the
United States. During his voyage to the United States one of the other passengers “attempt[ed] to throw him overboard.” Gall had paid the passage of several
other travelers, with the expectation that they would serve as redemptioners in
the United States, but they “r[a]n away from him by the time he was cleverly
landed.” Others continued to “drop off, one by one, on the way from Philadelphia to Harrisburg.”60
Gall also had to contend with renegotiation of household relations in the
context of household service. As his servants came to understand the cultural
meaning of white servility, they advocated for a greater equality of social relations, with a focus on communal meals, not doffing one’s hat, speaking with “unwonted familiarity,” and being provided with “a Sunday suit as good as” Gall’s
own. This renegotiation bears similarity to the reimagining of companionate
marriages as marriages between equals in a Scottish Enlightenment sense, as
discussed in Chapter 3. Gall’s servant Peter Wissel demanded social equality
between master and servant, grounded in legal rights: “He knew the law in
America, he said, and I had better realize that he was my equal.” When Gall had
him imprisoned, Wissel countered that the conditions there were preferable to
working under Gall’s terms. Gall also noted that this assertion of equal status
was more common among his male servants. German redemptioners reevaluated
their relationships in the transition to republicanism as well as their economic
negotiating power and access to a legal system that was increasingly uninterested
in tolerating white indentured servitude, even among foreign migrants.61
These incidents extended beyond indentured servants to white waged laborers, and into the Jacksonian Era. The English novelist Frances Trollope, seeking
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to hire and retain white women servants while living in Jacksonian Cincinnati,
linked their expectations to citizenship: “The greatest difficulty in organizing a
family establishment in Ohio, is getting servants, or, as it is there called, ‘getting
help,’ for it is more than petty treason to the Republic to call a free citizen a
servant.” When she instructed a servant to eat separately in the kitchen, she was
told: “I guess that’s cause you don’t think I’m good enough to eat with you. You’ll
find that won’t do here.” The idea of equality also extended to clothing: according to one of her servants, white women employers regularly lent their dresses
to their servants, but when Trollope balked at such a suggestion, her employee
replied: “I guess you Inglish thinks we should poison your things, just as bad
as if we was Negurs.” Trollope also noted that one of her servants employed an
enslaved woman who traveled from Kentucky to work in “free” Ohio. After further difficulties, Trollope eventually settled on “a very worth French woman, and
soon after a tidy English girl to assist her.” Both continued in Trollope’s employ
for most of the rest of her stay in the United States, and to her satisfaction in the
employment of servants, she had “no more misfortunes . . . to relate.” Trollope
also contrasted such behavior with a greater public deference when she crossed
the Niagara River into Canada, and encountered “British Oaks, British roofs,
and British boys and girls. These latter, as if to impress upon us that they were
not citizens, made bows and curtseys as we passed, and this little touch of long
unknown civility produced great effect.”62
Overall, these incidents allow us to think about the place of citizenship for
people as the United States moved toward Jacksonian democracy, elevating the
status of free white men and emphasizing adult white economic and legal independence. Citizenship mattered for these migrants, but only as one of many
markers of personal independence from masters. Their own choices and seizing
of freedom were important in this process, but they were greatly aided by shifts
in public opinion and the friendliness of the courts, prosecutors, and the legal
community, which frequently made white indenture contracts unenforceable.
Economic arguments about the collapse of indenture need to take into account
the shift in legal thought, the practical choices open to migrants, and the reframing of household economic relations and hierarchy as part of the shift toward a
commercial, free-labor market that created a growing space for “independent”
wage labor.
Formal citizen status in Jacksonian society still coexisted with an alternative
meaning of citizenship, grounded in the political conflicts and tensions of the
final decades of the eighteenth century. “Citizen” continued to mean persons of
high standing the community who could function as community leaders. There
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was some flexibility in this term, as it could by 1819 extend to German-Americans
even as they acted in ways that seemed to destabilize social, economic, and political order from the perspective of people such as James Brown and William
Eastham. Indeed, the “citizens” of Cincinnati shared the ability to mobilize
inhabitants to violence with the Patriot citizens of Whitehead’s Pennsylvania.
The incident at Cincinnati demonstrates a Federalist conception of citizenship
without xenophobia, or at least one that did not view German immigrant political organizing as a threat.63
Akin to this tiered conception is an understanding of community membership, leadership, and narrative. Full citizens were those who intervened with
heroism, while a crowd of lesser citizens lent them support. But those rescued
were framed as outsiders: potential citizens, perhaps, but definitely not members
of the community at the time of their rescue. Americans increasingly consumed
Romantic novels and watched melodramatic plays. White women learned that
republican citizenship could be threatened by aristocratic seducers. Gothic horrors of revolutionary violence spilled out from the speeches of counterrevolutionary politicians excoriating France and proslavery writings denouncing the
Haitian revolution. In this instance, the drama came back into real life.64
Germans continued to be politically active after 1798, and fully active
participants in law and society when it came to perceptions of German indentured servants. Germans were similarly active in shaping race and racial categories during the early American republic, driven by their need (and that of Americans of all races) to rethink the relationship between race, labor, freedom, and
citizenship as unfree German servants labored in parallel with a growing number of indentured and free African Americans. Germans attempted this reshaping by vigorously policing the possible exploitation of German servants while
emphasizing the temporary nature of indenture. Even as a Jacksonian model
became more dominant over time, different conceptions of citizenship, including those associated with the Federalists of the 1790s, persisted into the 1820s.

Coda
Haunting this tale of white freedom is another one: of Black death and slavery.
Thirty-five years after the German redemptioners escaped from their master,
Margaret Garner, an enslaved woman, joined a group of seventeen people who
crossed the frozen Ohio River in January 1856. They hoped to escape slavery and
secure their freedom by traversing the state of Ohio and reaching Canada. Some
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of the group were able to evade the gauntlet of white surveillance and secured
safe hiding places in Cincinnati, but Garner and the majority of her companions
were not so fortunate. Alerted, their masters came, “with officers and a posse of
men.” Unlike the German redemptioners, Garner and her companions had no
assistance from a large white crowd, only the backing of a handful of abolitionists working discreetly to help them. With the passage of the Fugitive Slave Law
of 1851, they had no support in securing freedom from the legal system. Garner
and her companions decided to fight nonetheless, but were overpowered. The
abolitionist Levi Coffin described Garner’s next choice of action:65
At this moment, Margaret Garner, seeing that [her] hopes of freedom were
[in] vain seized a butcher knife that lay on the table, and with one stroke
cut the throat of her little daughter, whom she probably loved the best. She
then attempted to take the life of the other children and to kill herself, but
she was overpowered and hampered before she could complete her desperate work. The whole party was then arrested and lodged in jail.66
There followed a trial at which Garner petitioned for freedom, citing earlier
residence on Ohio’s “free” soil. Her claims were unsuccessful, and she was ordered to be returned to Kentucky and to slavery. According to Coffin, “A crowd
followed them to the river,” but Garner and “the masters were surrounded by
large numbers of their Kentucky friends . . . and there was great rejoicing among
them, on account of their victory.” What the Germans gained, Garner lost—or
never had in the eyes of the American legal system. The psychological scars and
legacy of such events, both personal and social, are more deeply explored in Toni
Morrison’s Beloved.67

Conclusion

T

he growth of national citizenship and its importance as a legal
status occurred alongside the growth of the power of the national government in the early American republic. This expansion was not necessarily a top-down imposition, however: the growth of national citizenship did
not always proceed smoothly, as migrants themselves challenged laws they found
to be restrictive, and frustrated the enforcement of others, while offering alternative ways of constructing citizenship.
National crises were important points in the formation of national citizenship during this early period. The Alien and Sedition Acts laid a groundwork
for further national legislation pertaining to citizenship and naturalization. The
acts also pushed the United States in the direction of a nation-state and away
from a state that functioned as a decentralized republic or confederation. The
War of 1812 was the first test of the Alien Enemies Act, and it resulted in an
enormous growth of state power over foreign residents: compulsory registration,
the imposition of an internal passport system heretofore restricted to borderland
areas, and forced internal removal.
The War of 1812, like other periods of emergency, led to the growth of executive power. But this change was contingent on historical circumstances: Republicans did not trust the court system where too many Federalist judges could
impede Republican policies, so they relied on the executive instead. Pragmatism
also mattered; the orders were impossible to carry out without the cooperation
of local sheriffs and other government officials. The surveillance of aliens was
centralized through the collection of information, but achieved through the cooperation of local community surveillance of British subjects.
In addition, while periodic crises of nationality surfaced at discrete, brief
times, migrants of color faced a durable political climate that saw the idea of
citizenship for people of African descent as a continual threat. That hostility
would continue, if not grow, during the Jacksonian era.
Migrant agency and resistance gave shape to citizenship law in the early American republic. Policies, even when harsh and strictly enforced, were nonetheless
affected by migrants’ resistance and attempts to influence the policymaking process. Non-citizen rights were not merely the result of what policymakers might
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condescend to give them. Instead, these rights often were wrested from the grasp
of hostile officials and Americans generally, especially in the case of race-based
restrictions. For white migrants, even indentured servants, citizenship became
easier to obtain, but it was part of a broader web of status and coincided with
varying definitions of citizenship that persisted into the Jacksonian period.
During the War of 1812, migrants indirectly subverted the law of coverture
when they challenged existing policies that considered American women who
married British subjects to no longer be American citizens. They were successful in winning exemptions because of several factors relating to how elite
marriages were viewed at the time: American-born women were transmitters
of culture, able to persuade their husbands of their proper civic duties and able
to act as the temporary public representative of their husbands in this instance
of their legal disability. They further cemented their claims through their everyday face-to-face interactions with the community. When challenging official
attempts to exclude and control them, they did not offer destabilizing radical
claims, but rather presented themselves as pillars of community order and as
members of the community. Their actions resulted in a victory for migrants in
the face of harsh government measures such as forced internal removal. The relationship between head-of-household status and citizenship mattered not only
for the wives of citizens but for those who labored for them, be they enslaved,
indentured, or contractually obligated. Migrants in these situations found that
the path to citizenship was difficult and challenging and its benefits sometimes
elusive. Some foreign migrants chose to reject citizenship, preferring to cultivate
personal support networks among people of color, while others chose to exert
citizen rights or foreign citizen status.
National citizenship would continue to gain strength in the nineteenth century, despite the continuation of state and local citizenship into the antebellum
period. Notable among the actions of the national government were the Passenger Act of 1819, which sought to limit pauper immigration while encouraging
white migrants of somewhat better means, indirectly affecting the pool of potential citizens. This regulation of European immigration emerged simultaneously with the colonization movement, which aimed to remove free people of
African descent from the borders of the United States. Similarly, the Supreme
Court case of Chirac v. Chirac (1817) gave greater strength to national citizenship, even if Spratt v. Spratt (1830) kept state jurisdiction over naturalization. As
other scholars have described, it was the period leading up to, during, and after
the Civil War when citizenship gained truly national reach. The case of Scott v.
Sanford (1857) attempted to reserve citizenship for whites and exclude people
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of African descent from citizenship at the national level. During Reconstruction, frustrated with white Southern intransigence, the Republican-led passage
of the Fourteenth Amendment created a national citizenship: it defined who
was a citizen, and prevented states from curtailing national citizens’ rights. The
Fifteenth Amendment specifically connected voting rights to citizens. Even so,
full federal bureaucratic control over naturalization would not arrive until 1906,
when Congress created a Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization and stated
that only federal courts had control over naturalizations.1
The relationship between citizenship, public identity, and the household
would continue to cause tension along the citizen/alien divide. The Fourteenth
Amendment was not only a gain in rights for African Americans but a rejection
of the paternalist view of slavery that recast its fundamentally exploitative nature as an ordered, hierarchical household. Similarly, the changes in the Alien
Enemies Act during the First World War, which extended its provisions to
women, reflected a change in the relationship between citizenship and the head
of household. In acknowledging that women could act politically in a manner
separate from their husbands, it weakened the association between citizenship
and head-of-household status. 2
Much has happened since I began writing this book. It began in graduate
school as I became a graduate teaching assistant for a twentieth-century immigration course. My then-partner was in the United States on a student visa, and
the American public and government seemed determined to never recognize
our same-sex relationship. I began to look into the deep roots of immigration
policy as I researched its origins in the early American republic and its definitions of family, citizenship, and membership in the nation, even as those definitions shifted in the first two decades of the present millennium. I completed
my dissertation as Barack Obama was campaigning for re-election against the
Republican challenger Mitt Romney. On the left, the original enthusiasm for
Obama had dimmed somewhat: deportations continued, and the government
was targeting people abroad in warfare, including US citizens.3
In the course of researching this book, it became clear that debates in the
early 2010s over citizenship, and the understanding of citizenship and belonging, had roots in the events from the period after US independence, particularly
the relationship between the household and citizenship. Both historically and
into the present, the federal government has used naturalization as a tool to
shape households, citizens, and the nation, while excluding those whose household arrangements did not conform to prevailing norms. Historically, migrants
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have challenged these strictures in a variety of ways, most notably the deployment of the concept of Republican Wifehood in the case of binational couples
challenging their forced removal during the War of 1812. These couples used
popular understandings of women’s status along with the effect of their everyday integration into their communities to make successful claims to remain in
their residences. Migrants in the twenty-first century still challenge normative
views of households and have faced discrimination in naturalization when doing
so. Some campaigns have been able to influence policies more effectively than
others. Campaigns by same-sex couples to stop deportation and challenge the
1996 Defense of Marriage Act had some limited short-term success, and were
able to mobilize a base of public support, even as many Americans viewed such
couples as a danger to American society and heteronormativity. Following the
Obergefell v. Hodges decision (2015), which compelled the federal government to
recognize same-sex marriages, LGBTQ couples achieved formal equal footing
with heterosexual couples, although LGBTQ couples and migrants still face
challenges when dealing with the US immigration system. Other migrants have
faced greater challenges in gaining public support, and some may not choose to
operate in a manner intended to sway the broader American public.4
Migrants must still make claims in a normative fashion to experience success.
For example, the DREAM Act, a cause that undocumented college-age migrants
championed during the Obama presidency, grounded its claims of citizenship
through normative ideas of who deserved to be a citizen: college graduates and
those who have served in the armed forces. Like the migrants discussed in this
book, Dreamers faced a dilemma; in order to engage with policymakers under
pressure, they could either argue that they fit the normative criteria for citizens, or
they could seek to change how citizenship and naturalization functioned. In this
case, undocumented DREAM Act supporters did both. They sought to change
the law by presenting themselves as good citizens, but at the same time engaged in
acts of civil disobedience by pursuing goals and careers many US citizens take for
granted. To be undocumented and publicly announce that status is itself an act of
civil disobedience that calls attention to the freedom from deportation that US
citizens gained in 1798 at the expense of noncitizens, as described in Chapter 1.5
Although this book has emphasized the concurrent growth of national citizenship and the centralized state, such changes should not necessarily be taken
for granted. One case in point: in 2012, US Attorney General Eric Holder justified the targeted killing of US citizens abroad. This policy was a growth of state
power, but one that removed a privilege of citizenship and places citizens and
aliens on an equal footing. In this case, neither has a right to trial, and either
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may be designated for targeted killing by the United States government. Additionally, that policy is a new power that has accrued to the federal government
not at the expense of internal state or local governments, but at the expense of
international institutions and foreign sovereign governments. 6
The period and issues covered by this book also have troubling implications
for this policy change. How much due process would there be? What precedents
would be drawn upon? In explaining and justifying this policy, Holder differentiated between the issue of due process and the right to trial, a policy choice
remarkably similar to the enforcement of the Alien Act described in Chapter 1,
when Secretary of State Timothy Pickering oversaw the enforcement of alien deportations, which included a due process but no right to trial. He and President
John Adams clashed over differing visions of how extensive the process should
be. Adams was unwilling to provide blank warrants to Pickering, who wished to
fill in the names himself. This incident highlights the issues of centralized power,
authority, and decision-making that make such policies troubling to many US
citizens and the wider public. 7
As I write this conclusion, Donald Trump has been US president for nearly
four years, having ridden a wave of xenophobia as part of his campaign for the
presidency in 2016. I have since struggled to make sense of, interpret, and fully
understand the historical roots of Trump-era xenophobia, its mindset and consequences. The rapid shifts in policy and contestations from a large and active
protest movement mean that making effective predictions about even the short
term are quite difficult, especially in light of the 2020 election. What policies
will the administration attempt to roll out? How will Trump’s Supreme Court
appointments affect the interpretation of citizenship status and immigration
law? And will they survive a challenge from supporters of immigrants in the
public sphere? If Trump does not hold onto the presidency after 2020, what
policies would a new administration keep in place? 8
The Trump presidency has pursued policies that have targeted undocumented
immigrants in the United States while also seeking to halt or diminish migration from certain countries or regions, notably through attempts to eliminate
the global visa lottery and attacks on family reunification. Other historians have
connected the current administration’s policies to tactics intended to suppress
Asian immigration in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This
push attempted to limit families to a nuclear definition, and while nonwhite
migrants were often subject to harsh enforcement, white migrants received tolerance and exemption.9
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The Trump administration’s policies and attitudes look back to one of the
incidents at the beginning of this book: Benjamin Maingault’s attempt to vote
in 1807. Americans at the time saw his action as a threat that could corrupt
the republic. In the eyes of white Americans, his family status was irregular; he
appeared to be the son of a deceased white Dominguan refugee and an enslaved
woman of African descent. The current administration and supporters of its immigration policy share a similar view: to grant immigrants and their descendants
voting power so that they can sway elections is a threat to American national
identity. Built into this view is a narrative that defines white racial status as pure
and the presence of people of color as inherently corrupt, especially when they
exercise political power or have a voice in civic matters. This is also described as
immigrants “cutting in line” in front of “true Americans” who deserve more of
a voice, power, and political access. Maingault confronted the same issues and
problems that immigrants and their supporters face today.10
The current political climate has made clear the importance of activism in
forming immigration and citizenship policy. For historians, broadly defined,
this is a call to engage more broadly in writing, with the public, in the classroom,
and as private individuals. Many of us are already doing this: of particular note
is the creation of the #ImmigrationSyllabus, a resource put together by a number
of historians of immigration, but I encourage you all to build civic engagement
in your classes, to connect students with people in positions of power, and to
engage with the public and the press. These are things that can help you professionally despite the initial time investment. They can raise your profile, get
more students to think about taking your classes, and lead to invitations to submit publications or contribute to scholarship. At the same time, it is important
to recognize that some face greater consequences for speaking out than others,
and those consequences can be terrifying and severe for women, trans people,
and people of color. Historians have other skills that are important for social
movements: the ability find and research information, access and look through
government records, compile information and create databases, apply for grants,
and find local, national, and international contacts and to build ties with them.
These activities require time and often money; once again, many of us face a variety of demands upon our time, and this can be the case particularly for women
and people of color.11
For the broader public, let me emphasize the importance of sustaining the
movement and building lasting connections. This book emphasizes the work
that immigrants did in securing their status in the face of widespread hostility. This is also not always easy: many of the issues facing historians engaged in
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activism and public engagement also apply to activists. This work to change and
historicize the understandings of immigration in the present is work that will
likely require a long and sustained push by broad swaths of the public. I am sure
we are up to the task.
But perhaps, dear readers, you want a plan. Here it is, put together by someone
with much more direct experience than I have. First, do some reflective thinking:
what are some things you want to change? What are some ways you might assist
a broad social movement? Can you provide help, such as housing and meals?
Are you in a place to advocate within institutions? Or maybe you are better
positioned to organize outside the system? Perhaps your frustrations make you
determined to speak out and act, even at risk to yourself. Reach out to others and
draw up a plan: what are the pillars of support that uphold oppression, the actors
and deciders who need to be engaged with? Work on an action, and feel free to
join an existing campaign (reaching out to strangers is hard, I know!). Finally,
victories are hard-won and hard-fought, but they have historically been the result
of post-action deliberation and recalibration, the testing of tactics and strategies,
and gearing up for new action. You will find Daniel Hunter’s guide (noted at the
end of this paragraph) to be an excellent resource as a guide to action.12
At a time when an increasing number of people residing in the US are not
citizens, and when US power continues to be projected beyond its borders, the
issue of legal rights of citizens versus that of non-citizens is of great contemporary importance. Policymakers who seek to make and enforce laws and policies
without considering how their actions affect those whom they act upon should
take note. Readers, I urge you to engage and act, and have given you some tools
and suggestions on how to do so. You have finished this book; put it down (or
turn away from your screen), take up a notepad, and get started sketching out
what you have decided to do.13
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